Postwar Japanese diplomacy has both benefited and suffered from the Yoshida Line of foreign policy, consisting of the peace constitution and the U. S. -Japan security treaty. This set of Yoshida's choices during the occupation period became the foundation of Japan's postwar economic recovery and eventually the rapid economic growth rendering Japan a world-class economic power. Deeply embedded in the Yoshida Line, however, was the structure of “dependence” on the United States for economic growth as well as security protection. This in turn has often invited, rather inevitably, challenges from nationalism attacking the lack of “autonomy” or “independence” of postwar Japan. This structural problem was also a source of criticism by external countries, especially the United States, for Japanese inaction or “free-riding, ” and the lack of a strategy. As Japan grew into an economic power and the negative views became prevalent concomitantly, some analysts rebuffed the criticism by arguing that the Yoshida's commitment to “light armament, economic growth, and the U. S. -Japan security ties” indeed constituted a strategy of postwar Japan. Simply put, the Yoshida Line was elevated to the Yoshida Doctrine. There were three types of discourse on the Yoshida Doctrine, which began to emerge since the end of the 1970s. One was to argue that the Yoshida Doctrine had been a viable strategy of postwar Japan, but that it would now need to be modified in a more proactive fashion. The second argument claimed that nationalistic challenges against the Yoshida Doctrine should be inevitable as Japan had recovered a sense of national pride, but that domestic political balance was still favorable to the supporters of the Yoshida Doctrine. Thirdly, it was contended that the Yoshida Doctrine was a strategic representation of Japan's political realism and should be retained as such particularly against the logic of military realism. The common denominator among the three was that the deep structure of “dependence” on the United States was taken for granted, or even assumed as the source of postwar Japan's successful strategy. This meant that the structural problem, susceptible to challenges by nationalism, was kept intact, which has now re-emerged as an old and new problem for Japan as it gropes for a new diplomacy, including possible revision of the peace constitution, in the 21st century. The articles in this volume traces the development of the Yoshida Line since the occupation period to the 1960s, when the deep structural problem was dodged, rather than rectified, in the evolutionary process of Japan's foreign policy making. There are three sets of propositions relevant for this period. Firstly, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida had not successfully integrated his basic foreign policy with his Asian diplomacy, particularly toward China, demonstrating the lack of independent Asian policy on the part of postwar Japan. Secondly, close examinations of the origins of the peace constitution and the U. S. -Japan security treaty, as well as the origin of economycentered approach, reveals that the leaders, including Yoshida himself, did not expect that their choices should remain unchanged after the occupation period. Thirdly, this in turn calls for the scrutiny of Japanese diplomacy in the 1960s, when Japan grew into a global economic power precisely by putting a lid on the structural problem entrenched in the Yoshida Line.
Despite the quite number of writings on Yoshida Shigeru, his relationship with Asia has not been treated from a broad perspective. The omission is regrettable, for Yoshida had deep involvement and concern with Asia, China in particular both in his prewar diplomat years and in his postwar statesman years. In addition, Yoshida's record of struggle and lack of substantial fruit in his Asia diplomacy is suggestive of the weakness of Japanese modern diplomacy towards Asia from the Meiji period down to the current era. So long as the so-called Yoshida doctrine is said to be the orthodox policy line for postwar Japan, any of the three elements of the said doctrine, light armament for self-defense, Japan-US alliance, and economy-oriented diplomacy, does not give direct clue in terms of Japanese policy towards Asia. By examining Yoshida's involvement with Asia, Korean peninsular and China among others, this paper delineates the continuity of Yoshida's attitude and perspective on Asia from his early diplomat days to the final years of his life. Following his natural father's concern with Korean railway, Yoshida was groomed among the diplomats and soldiers who saw the “Continental Governance” (Tairiku Keiei) holding the vital significance for Japanese security and economic interest. This policy line was thought to be compatible with European and American great powers in the sense that the imperialism was conducted primarily by economic, cultural, and scientific means. At the same time, the policy was seen as spearheading the modernization process in Asia. In the postwar period, Yoshida adjusted his policy towards Asia to the reality of dissolution of Japanese Empire and chose to follow the path of “Maritime State” (Kaiyo Kokka). Despite this shift, Yoshida had to deal with Korean issues such as Korean inhabitants in Japan or normalization with South Korea, while assisting the US for the latter's commitment to the Peninsula. Yoshida also took pains to lull both the US and Great Britain to his cherished idea of detaching Communist China from the Soviet Russia by penetrating into Chinese society via non-military means such as commerce and propaganda. It was his belief that the Chinese culture and tradition would ultimately lead to the conflict with Russia. But Yoshida's main concern was to form the concerted policy among Japan, the US and Great Britain. His policy towards China lacked concreteness and was subject to his higher consideration over Japanese relations with the US and other Western powers. All in all, throughout the prewar and postwar periods, Yoshida's policy toward Asia was quite consistent. He saw the Korean peninsular from Japanese security perspective and almost ignored Korea as a nation. When it comes to China, Yoshida had ambivalent view on Chinese culture and his policy towards China oscillated. These characteristics of Yoshida's Asia involvement was typical for the modern Japanese diplomatic tradition, taking Fukuzawa Yukichi's civilizational perspective and seeing Japan as naturally most advanced in Asia. This conviction no doubt helped Japan to be proud of its rapid modernization, but posed difficulty in handling with neighboring Asia, especially when Asia showed its own way of modernization and demonstrated its own relationship with the West.
On December 27, 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru sent John F. Dulles a letter that explained “Counter infiltration” against China. Yoshida thought the best way to wean Chinese from the Communist regime was by sending people into China through trade activities and encouraging an anticommunist movement in China. He believed that Japan could have a major role in such an operation. The purpose of this paper is to examine Yoshida's “Counter infiltration” plan against China from the standpoint of intelligence. Yoshida, taking a special interest in intelligence, established intelligence organs such as the Public Security Intelligence Agency and the Cabinet Research Chamber (CRC) in quick succession soon after the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect in April 1952. Worried about indirect aggression from communist countries, Yoshida concentrated his efforts on developing an interior intelligence framework. At the same time, he tried to foster the growth of a Japanese intelligence organization that could gather information and perform covert operations it Mainland China. This study shows that Yoshida proactively tried to strengthen intelligence cooperation with governments of both Taiwan and the United States. Yoshida appointed Ogata Taketora Chief Cabinet Secretary and made him supervisor of Japanese intelligence organs. Ogata urged the Nationalist government on Taiwan to cooperate in establishing a Communist information exchange organ, and asked the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for assistance in creating a Japanese CIA. On the other hand, Yoshida let retired lieutenant General Tatsumi Eiichi recruit ex-military personnel for service in the CRC. With the assistance of Tatsumi, the CRC started actual intelligence activity against China after January 1953. The CRC interrogated repatriates from China, and proposed a joint operation with the CIA to use Japanese agents. Thus Yoshida tried to establish a Japanese intelligence system and backed U. S. strategy against China in the intelligence field. Yoshida's idea, however, was frustrated by rapid changes at home and abroad. After the Peace Treaty came into force, Yoshida couldn't maintain a firm hold on power. Not only the opposition parties but also the media criticized Ogata's plan to launch a Japanese CIA. In the end, Ogata had no choice but to downscale his ambitious plans, and eliminate overseas covert operations. Moreover, Yoshida's confrontational approach against the Chinese government was criticized for being behind the times after the Indochina armistice in 1954. In the last days of his ministry, Yoshida encouraged both Britain and U. S. to set up a “high command” on China in Singapore. His aim was to use overseas Chinese based in Southeast Asia to infiltrate Mainland China, but his idea wasn't put into practice because he was unable to gain the support of either Britain and the United States or even his own entourage.
This paper examines “Ashida Amendment” and “Ashida Memorandum” with particular focus on his views on the international affairs. Both are known as the origin of the Japanese postwar security problems: Article 9 of the Constitution and the Japan-U. S. Security system. It illustrates the basis of Ashida's view on the international affairs. He always saw contemporary issues from the perspective of global history. After the World War I, the establishment of the League of Nations and conclusion of Treaty of Locarno and Treaty for the Renunciation of War promoted the idea of renunciation of war. Ashida had a hope that “international partnership” would be advanced in the post-World War I era. At the same time, he understood its uneasy reality. Indeed, the progress toward “international partnership” by the League of Nations, Treaty of Locarno, and Treaty for the Renunciation of War was frustrated by World War II. Right after the war, the world pursued afresh the ideal of “international partnership.” Ashida served as chairperson in the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Revision of the Imperial Constitution from July 25 to August 20, 1946. Ashida had the idea that Japan's decision to renounce war should be guaranteed both domestically and internationally by making the Article 9 serve as de facto diplomatic documents. Thus he made a point of the autonomy of the article. This led to the making of the “Ashida Amendment”. At the same time, Ashida consistently knew that the right of self-defense was the natural right of the nation despite the trend toward the abandonment of war. The conflict between the United States and Soviet Union became inevitable and overt. With the MacArthur's statement for the early peace with Japan, Ashida, as Foreign Minister, was made to consider the security after the independence. The “Ashida Memorandum” was submitted as a response to the Eichelberger's question about a time of withdrawal of the occupation army. It was handed to Eichelberger on September 13, 1947. The conception in “Ashida Memorandum” was that the best measures of guaranteeing Japan's security was to conclude a specific agreement with the United States and to reinforce the domestic police forces. Ashida had an intention that the “Ashida Amendment” should target international community rather than domestic one. He sought to grasp Japanese opportunity to be actively involved in shaping the postwar international order by acting as a leading advocate for the renunciation of war. At the time of the issuance of “Ashida Memorandum”, the most pressing concern in Japan that was sovereignty might be limited with the stationing of the Allied forces even after the independence. With the deterioration of the conflict between the United States and Soviet Union, Ashida thought Japan could resolve security problem while defending its sovereign right by the conclusion of the treaty with the United States which is independent from the peace treaty. Accordingly, “Ashida Memorandum” limited the right of stationing of US forces only at the time of emergencies, and emphasized the necessity of the build-up of Japanese police forces. By examining the process of making “Ashida Amendment” and “Ashida Memorandum”, this paper argues that Ashida had the strong desire for the achievement of participation in the postwar international order and early peace with a full sovereignty, so contributed to realization of them with the view on international affairs.
After World War II, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida was faced with economic devastation in Japan. As he struggled with the situation, he placed higher priority on economic recovery than on increasing Japan's armaments. It is said that Yoshida's Policies affected Japan's economic success, security and international relations. In contrast to other studies which focus on Yoshida's policy on Japan's re-armament after World War II, this paper examines Yoshida's economic policy, especially on trade policy with regard to Japan-US “Economic” Relations. As security and economic issues are interrelated, it is necessary to analyze them from both points. US security policies and the escalating Cold War played a large role in promoting Japanese economic development and a strong relationship between Japan and the US was built. Although political and economic frictions existed in Japan, Yoshida coordinated his policy towards them by taking advantage of the US presence in Japan. Studying US diplomacy and economic policy reveals the many connections between the Cold War environment abroad and how it facilitated Japan's economic development. The US contributed to fostering an international environment where Japanese effort would produce meaningful results. Yoshida thought that the economic relations between Japan and US were a central focus of Japan's trade policy. Without US support, it was difficult to build Japan's trade relations with other countries in a harmonious way. In fact it was absolutely imperative in Japan's application for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) membership and building economic relations among South East Asian countries. Whereas Japan had a large population and heavy industry, Southeast Asia was rich in food stuffs and raw materials. US policy makers believed that if a trade link was established among these countries, they could save foreign currencies thereby reviving their own economies. It could contribute to enforce national power among the area. Thus the US government began to promote the establishment of trade links between Japan and Southeast Asia. Although the Chinese mainland was a major market and a source of supply for Japan before World War II, it lost it's impetus because of a US led embargo on trade after the Korean War in 1950. It shows how the US foreign economic policy towards Japan was inseparable from the Cold war Strategy and how it established Japan's trade relations. This article aims to suggest that as a prerequisite for the role of the US, the Japanese government decided to build economic relations among other countries. Tracing through the history of Japan's trade relations, it is revealed that parts of Yoshida's decisions affected postwar Japan.
This article explores the foreign policy of the Hayato Ikeda administration toward the “Free World” of the United States and its European allies. In July 1960 in the immediate aftermath of the controversy surrounding revision of the U. S. -Japan security treaty, the Ikeda cabinet found itself in the midst of domestic turmoil and felt the sense of losing credibility from the international liberal camp. Hence it was imperative for the cabinet to stabilize domestic politics and restore Western trust on balance. The Ikeda cabinet sought to unify the nation in the economic sphere by adopting the Doubling National Income Plan. The plan relied on Western markets as exclusively export-oriented destinations for economic growth leading to European powers, such as Britain and France, to invoke the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT) Article XXXV to discriminate against Japanese imports. Improvement of relations with Europe was thus imminent for the sake of economic growth. This meant the Ikeda administration's effort to integrate Japan in the liberal camp via the deepening of its relations with the West. Subsequent diplomatic investment resulted in Japan's forging an “equal partnership” with Washington, gaining access to the meetings of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and European states' discontinuation of discriminatory measures. Hence Japan established itself to be part of the Free World. One can consider the movement against the U. S. -Japan security treaty as an intensification of “domestic cold war” closely associated with the Japan's position in “international cold war.” Ikeda won the domestic cold war by way of economic growth, which required Japan to be part of the West during the international cold war. In other words, the success of the Ikeda administration in balancing its domestic economic agenda with international situations epitomizes the interaction between domestic politics and foreign policy.
This article reviews the Okinawa reversion negotiations from the standpoint of Japan's “shared responsibility” issue in the context of the Japan-U. S. security relations. It was during the 1960s that the Japanese government began to be aware of Japan's growing international economic role in the Asian Region. The issue of Japan's security role also became salient during the Okinawa reversion negotiations. Prime Minister Sato first raised the Okinawa reversion issue in a meeting with President Johnson in January 1965. However, the Johnson administration was not in favor of tackling the issue at that time. Okinawa was an essential staging area for U. S. forces engaged in the Vietnam War. On 14 November 1967, Johnson requested that Japan be ready to take over the responsibilities for its defense. Furthermore, the U. S. indicated that Japan must permit U. S. military operations in Okinawa which might require nuclear weapons to be placed there as well as U. S. combat operations conducted from there. Japan entered into negotiations with the U. S. in 1969. Sato insisted that Okinawa should be treated the same as the “homeland” when the reversion took place. The U. S. government claimed that Japan had to accept more responsibility for regional security if Okinawa was to be reverted back to full Japanese control and covered by the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty. The U. S. government had already accepted the reversion in NSDM 13 on May 28, and set down the conditions for the reversion: the first was that Japan accept maximally free conventional use of American military bases specifically with respect to Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, and the second was that Japan approve storage and transit of nuclear weapons in Okinawa by the U. S. during emergencies. The U. S. position was that Japan had to accept the above conditions as part of Japan's new responsibility in the “Free World” after the reversion of Okinawa. The Sato administration accepted these conditions. In the summit meeting held on 19 November 1969, PM Sato and President Nixon reached an agreement on the reversion. They also signed the secret minutes in which Japan accepted the storage and transit of nuclear weapons by the U. S. in Okinawa during emergencies. After the agreement on the reversion, Japan and the U. S. went on to plan for SDF deployment in Okinawa. Through the Okinawa reversion negotiations, Japan and the U. S. reached an understanding about Japan's shared responsibility in the “Free World.” Future Japanese actions were to be taken within the ambit of the Japanese Constitution and the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty. This understanding basically was sustained up to the end of the Cold war.
It is said that the controversy surrounding the question of the Japan's participation in the United Nations Peace-keeping operations in the 1960s was largely responsible for the establishment of the so called Yoshida Doctrine as Japanese ground strategy in the post war period. This paper will examine the question of the Japanese government's handling of this issue using document by evidence. It will investigate various problems related to Japan's PKO participation through the lenses of Japan's war renouncing constitution and the security alliance with the United States. They form the cornerstone of the Yoshida Doctrine. These problems became especially salient during the establishment of Sato Eisaku. The administration sought to use Japanese participation in PKO as a means to accomplishment two diplomatic objects. First, such participation was seen as means of actions with in the framework of the US-Japan security system to alleviate some of America's Asian security burdens and create an environment conducive to the return of Okinawa to Japanese administration. Second, it was seen as a means to growing diplomatic autonomy in the United Nations and South East Asia. Therefore Ministry of Foreign Affairs drew up a “United Nations Cooperation Bill” in 1966. Policymakers planned to send Self Defense Forces on PKO using this bill. Even though this plan ended in failure because the climate of public opinion was strongly influenced by postwar pacifism and there was widespread and vehement opposition to the dispatch of military personnel abroad, the Sato administration sought a way to interpret the constitution in a manner that would allow Self Defense Forces participation in PKO. Afterward, with the end of the Cold War system and the outbreak of regional conflicts, most conspicuously the Gulf War, the international community and especially the United States expressing their exasperation with Japan's continuing reluctance to participate international peacekeeping. However, by that time, due to its actions during the Sato administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had long since devised a method to reconcile PKO participation with the post war constitution and thus allow Japan's adaptation to the new international solution within the framework of the Yoshida Doctrine. As a result, Japan could dispatch not only civilians but also SDF personnel to PKO in Cambodia in time. Japan could reinforce the Japanese commitment to the Cambodian peace process, cooperation with the U. S., and U. N. diplomacy which were, after all the very purposes of Japanese PKO policy.
It is an interesting puzzle why the labor movement, generally influenced by Marxist ideology, is considered to be the principal democratizer of modern history. This article addresses this puzzle and finds an appropriate explanation for how the labor movement becomes a democratizing force. As this puzzle is concerned with the normative aspects of the labor movement, constructivism is the best thoretical frame. Constructivists assert that actors construct their norms by the experiences obtained from the interaction between the actors. This approach, different from the other approaches of political science —rational choice approach and institutional/structural approach— grasps directly the actors' norms and their changes. However, there are three problems with constructivism when applying it to the politcal sciences: how to identify the actor's norm, how to prove that experience is the decisive factor which creates the norm, and how to tell the timing of redressing the norm. The first problem can be solved by using primary source material from such as official documents or interviews as revealed norm. On the second problem two things should be done: finding the actor's retrospective saying about the influence of his/her experience upon the transformation and, in the case study, comparing constructivist explanation with rational theorist and structuralist ones to reject the latters. Finally, when considering the redressal of the norm, sociologists in the school of constructivism often explain that it comes when his/her experience contradicts what the norm anticipates. This criteria is also applicable to a political analysis. Taking into account these points, we apply the construtivist approach to the analysis of Bolivian labor movement. While it led both the Bolivian Revolution in 1952 which won universal suffrage and the anti-military-regime movement in the dictatorial era, it also supported the coming of the military regime in 1964 and in the event “Jornada de marzo” of 1985 they obstructed the election to install their own government. Why did the political attitude has changed like this? The rational theorist hypothesis which asserts economical profit expected from the political regimes decides the labor movement's support of democracy, and the structuralist explanation in which the national economic level measured by the GDP per capita determines the political tolerance of the labor movement, can't explain the Bolivian labor's actions. On the other hand, the constructivist approach focuses the norm as the motive of their political action and succeeds in explaining the case. Since the alliance between the labor movement and the governing political party failed in the democratic era of the 50s, the labor movement lost its confidence in democracy in which political parties play the principal role. This anti-democratic norm was abondoned when Jornada de marzo failed because they came to realize that their norm already didn't have its viability.