Japan and Australia were never direct allies. But they have been linked in the Pacific in indirect alliances for more than fifty years since the beginning of the twentieth century as the allies of Great Britain (1902-1923) and of the United States (1952 until to-day). Fortuitous as their alliance linkages in the Pacific may appear to have been, they did have an impact on the development of the strategical element in Japanese-Australian relations, and are worth looking at for an assessment of strategical cohesion in Japanese-Australian relations. With this in mind, the paper examines and contrasts, from an historical point of view, the strategic developments in Japanese-Australian relations under so-called
Pax Britannica and
Pax Americana, and looks for any discernible trends in the two countries' involuntary strategic associations, when Japanese-Australian relations were evolving under the predominance of British and American leadership in the Pacific. It does so by first focusing on the genesis of the alliance structures in the early 1900s and 1950s, and surveys then, in two separate sections, the major developments in Japanese-Australian relations under
Pax Britannica and
Pax Americana.
Two noteworthy similarities in the alliance formation periods show that both in 1900 and 1950, it was the menace of Russian advances in the Asian/Pacific region which triggered the fate that caused Japan and Australia to become indirect allies in the Pacific, and that both in the early 1900s and early 1950s, Australia displayed an acute sense of suspicion of becoming locked in indirect alliance with Japan.
What emerges as the most obvious difference from one period to the other is the qualitative change in the development of Japanese-Australian relations, which evolved from often tense and erratic relations under
Pax Britannica (hinging as they did on Australia's regional insecurity vis-à-vis Imperial Japan) to more regular and durable relations centered on the promotion of Japan's and Australia's complementary economies under
Pax Americana.
On the other hand, most strikingly similar to observe in both periods has been the trend that despite Australia's deep mistrust of Japan at the beginning of both “
Paces” periods, strategical congruity in Japanese-Australian relations developed rather consistently, both at the end of
Pax Britannica, when Australia was loath to see the Anglo-Japanese alliance lapse, and again at the end of
Pax Americana, when there were calls in both Japan and Australia to upgrade their indirect alliance and pull closer together strategically. If this positive trend, from suspicion to trust, has had a certain beneficial effect upon the general progress of Japanese-Australian relations, it is also pointed out that the essence of rising Japanese-Australian strategical congruity in the early 1920s has been different in character from that of the late 1970s.
Differences in strategical perceptions past and present notwithstanding, it appears not inconceivable that Japan and Australia, who at this stage are firmly allied with the U. S. and share a vital interest in the safety of the region's sealanes, particularly with regard to the protection of their own phenomenal two-way trade, may in the future act more in league with one another on defence questions.
抄録全体を表示