国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
2006 巻, 145 号
選択された号の論文の16件中1~16を表示しています
  • 天安門事件後の中国
    国分 良成
    2006 年 2006 巻 145 号 p. 1-16,L5
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    In the wake of the Tiananmen Incident and the end of the Cold War, China essentially changed the nature of its policy of reform and opening. This was an individual decision taken by a single leader, Deng Xiaoping, and it was taken to secure China's stability by means of active participation in the international community as opposed to shying away from it. China conspicuously embarked on a path to economic growth, aiming to achieve a shift to a market economy through the bold introduction of foreign capital, and its subsequent readiness to join the WTO in 2001, implying submission to the international system, indicates the compromises that the establishment was willing to make in order to survive. In this respect, the impact of the Tiananmen Incident and the end of the Cold War can be seen as having determined China's consequent course.
    However, the plan to promote economic growth, through marketizing the economy amidst expansive globalization, is bound to give rise to grave difficulties in the near future. Disparity between regions, between urban and rural areas and between income groups, social unrest, energy shortages, environmental damage, corruption in government and rampant materialism are only some of the countless contradictions that have been recently exposed, and which may undermine the government. China needs to change in more substantial ways than mere privatization and political reform if it intends to overcome these predicaments.
    In terms of foreign relations, the US-China relationship has been a stepping-stone for China's flourishing omnidirectional and multilateral diplomacy, coinciding with a fanfare of Chinese government pronouncements about “peaceful development” and the country's “peaceful rise.” Nevertheless, it remains a closed political system, and the lack of transparency in its political decision-making and military affairs is a constant source for concern. Furthermore, Chinese policies abroad are firmly linked with the balance of political power within the top leadership circle at home. Feuding over the transition of power from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao had palpable effects even in foreign affairs.
    The issues shaping China's domestic policies and foreign relations are increasingly ramified and complicated. What shook the regime during Tiananmen may have been caused by a fraction of the elite and an international “third wave”, but today the elite is beginning to erode at its very own core. When reading Chinese intentions, it is imperative to bear in mind the following facts: that the Chinese Communist Party's ultimate aim is to sustain its political authority; that economic growth is necessary for it to achieve this; and that it finds itself compelled to pursue cooperative relations in today's interdependent, globalized world. This political, economic and diplomatic reciprocity constitutes the terms by which the future of China should be assessed; that is, failure in any one of these areas will compromise China's hold on its structural stability.
  • 天安門事件後の中国
    川島 真
    2006 年 2006 巻 145 号 p. 17-35,L6
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    China has sought to enhance its international status on its diplomacy. Especially, from Hague Peace Conference, via League of Nations, to United Nations, China's diplomacy paid strong attention to its rank on these international institution, because Chinese diplomats thought it as the symbol of recognition for China in the international society. Although China had hard pressure from powers after the opium war and lost many tributal countries, but China basically kept or didn't change its self-identification under family of nations, therefore at the 2nd Hague Peace Conference in 1907, Chinese diplomats were surprised and threatened that China was recognized to be ranked the third level country according to the extent of its modernization/civilization especially about legal system. And they also found ‘enemy’ who wanted to reduce China's status intentionally-Japan. Chinese diplomats were disappointed somewhat that they couldn't have chance to solve so-called unequal treaty problem at these institutions, but sought to get the target to enhance its status, because they believed that these problems couldn't be solved until China came to be a normal civilized country and furthermore became one of the powers. In 1920's China wanted to be a un-permanent member of the Council of LN and dare to have the burden of its share as a big country in the expense. In 1930', China was successful to have the honeymoon period with LN, especially on its cooperating activities of social policy, and to leave Japan away. On the process of WWII, at last, China got a prospect to be the symbol of great power, in the new international institution. China could get the seat of a permanent member of Security Council of United Nations. But it just meant dual symbols for China, one as one of the primary ‘Allied’ nations, the other as a representative government of China with recognition by international society. On the more realistic field of international politics, China didn't achieve the target to be one of the great powers so far, though it kept the afterimage as one of the real great powers at Cairo Meeting, with care. Now that China gradually enhances its status on realistic field, but basically, its historical context also can be considered as important factor to understand its diplomacy at UN. at UN, China intends to behave as a moderate actor relatively, except for some topics to be relevant with national ideology—for example, Taiwan problem. And for China, it seems that China's aim at UN was focused just on being a permanent member as one of the powers continuously.
  • 天安門事件後の中国
    加茂 具樹
    2006 年 2006 巻 145 号 p. 36-56,L7
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    During the Eighth Session of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress (NPC) of China, which ended on 6th July 1989, the Committee adopted the Resolution of the Standing Committee of the NPC (NPCSC) on Checking the Turmoil and Quelling the Counter-revolutionary Rebellion. Under the terms of the Constitution of the PRC, the NPC is the supreme institution of state power in China and is the representative organization through which the people can exercise their sovereign will. The adoption of the Resolution by the NPCSC meant that the political decisions taken by the Party during this period were approved by the NPC and thereby acquired legitimacy. Of the numerous decisions made by the Party during the Tiananmen Square Incident period, the most important was that which was made by the Politburo Standing Committee of the CCP on 17th May 1989. The Party's declaration of martial law on the 17th May became the legal justification for the counterattack by the military against the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square before dawn on 4th June, on the grounds that the turmoil in Beijing had developed into a serious counter-revolutionary rebellion.
    It is a well-known fact that the CPC has realized its leadership (lingdao) across the State. Nevertheless, the Party had to wait for a long time before receiving the approval of the decision taken on 17th May by the NPCSC. Most of the governmental organizations, excluding the NPC, declared their approval immediately after martial law had been imposed. The author believes that this delay in granting approval implies that there might have been changes in the relationship between the CCP and the PC in Chinese politics since the 1990s. The reason for this belief is that, within the framework of Chinese politics as defined by the Constitution, the legitimacy of the Party's leadership over the country is secured only because the will of the Party is deemed as that of the Country at the PC.
    Since the 1980s, the Party has recognized that one of the factors lead to the Cultural Revolution is the ineffectiveness of the PC as an organ of State power, and has positioned the improvement of such functions of the PC as one of the most important subjects of political reform. Moreover, the Party has been struggling to improve the functioning of the PC, which has been ridiculed as a “rubber stamp” organization, and to increase its political authority. The Party has also tried to thoroughly lead the PC. Consequently, the aforementioned delay in securing the approval of the NPCSC would not have pleased the Party. Following the Tiananmen Square incident, the Party has continued to promote change in the functions of the PC as important measures of political reform and has endeavored more to bring about a more thorough enhancement of its leading of the PC than in the 1980s. However, as this paper indicates, it can hardly be said that the Party's efforts in this context have been successful.
    In view of this understanding, this paper would like to explain how the Party has been able to exercise control of the PC, by reviewing the reform of the PC's functions in the context of continuity and discontinuity of the reform before and after the Tiananmen Square incident. By so doing, this paper will enable us to find important clues, by surveying the limit of the Party's leadership over the country. It will also examine how the PC, which has functioned as an organ that has given legitimacy to the Party's readership, acts as a representative organ through which the people can exercise their sovereign rights. In conclusion, the paper considers the potential for change in the functions of the NPC in Chinese politics and attempts to find signs of the advent, in the near future, of parliamentary politics in China.
  • 天安門事件後の中国
    星野 昌裕
    2006 年 2006 巻 145 号 p. 57-71,L9
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    It is undisputed that the Tiananmen Incident became a turning point for Chinese politics in various respects. However, today, after 17 years have passed since the Tiananmen Incident, it should be reexamined what impacts the Tiananmen Incident has had in the context of contemporary Chinese politics. The purpose of this paper is to clarify those impacts from the viewpoint of Chinese minority policies relating to the issues of Tibet, Uygur, Inner Mongolia and Korea.
    China's minority policies had become hard line even before the Tiananmen Incident occurred. The Tiananmen Incident played a role in strengthening that hard line rather than acting as the turning point for minority policies. Chinese leaders already recognized the severe national integration problems around the minority regions located along the nation's borders. It is necessary to examine the possibility that the crises that preceded the Tiananmen Incident in the frontier region influenced the policy decisions taken because of and after the Tiananmen Incident.
    Through the 1980's, China made efforts to solve the many minority problems caused during the Mao Zedong era. However, the Tiananmen Incident effectively shelved those efforts. Chinese minority policies after the Tiananmen Incident urge minorities to adopt Chinese culture, including its history, national identity and language. In addition, following the Tiananmen Incident, other cultures and religions have been held in low esteem because China devotes no economic resources to efforts promoting them. Instead, China gives priority to economic development alone in minority regions.
    China has attempted to sever international cooperation between minority movements and outside organizations by strengthening diplomatic relations with surrounding countries and using its power in international relations. On the other hand, there are cases wherein the minority problems have been in fact caused by strengthening diplomatic relations with surrounding countries. The representative case is the Koguryo (in Korean)/Gaojuli (in Chinese) issue between South Korea and China. China claims this area, Gaojili, is historically part of China's regional government founded by an ethnic group. South Korea has lodged a diplomatic protest against China because it considers Koguryo part of Korean history. China claims the issue is academic. The issue is contentious because China is concerned that the Korean minority living in China may seek to have its identity recognized as Korean after the reunification of the North and South regions of the Korean Peninsula.
    As Chinese minority problems are thus internationalized, China will be unable to rely only upon its governing principle using domestic legitimacy alone to solve any problems that arise.
  • 天安門事件後の中国
    東郷 育子
    2006 年 2006 巻 145 号 p. 72-92,L10
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Since the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the Chinese government has strongly governed and controlled to constrain democratization. Despite severe limitations, China's citizens have lived better and freer than before 1989 as a byproduct of China's economic reform and opening to the outside world. The enhanced government control following the Tiananmen incident has understandably aroused the civil liberties awareness of the Chinese people vis-à-vis the government, particularly with respect to human rights.
    The Chinese government has basically rejected western human rights pressure, while at the same time, pursuing a positive strategy at the international level. China has signed and ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and is also a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, although this is not yet to be ratified.
    In line with the continued development of the market economy, China has promoted legal reform including the adoption of the Civil Procedure Law, the revised Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law, Administrative Litigation Act and others. In 2004, China adopted amendments to the Current Constitution including articles for improving the protection of citizens' lawful private property and provisions on respect for human rights. However, full compliance with these legal reforms and international human rights law is a different problem to be analyzed separately.
    Since 1991, China has published the so-called white paper on human rights practices to advocate its own view on human rights, and to make public a limited amount of information about human rights in China. A number of NGOs and human rights research institutions have been established and are engaging, albeit under significant government scrutiny and control, in academic research and international exchange about human rights. The China Society for Human Rights Studies is a typical government sponsored NGO. It hosts the country's biggest human rights website and published the first human rights magazine in China. In China, while the number of NGOs is increasing rapidly, only NGOs permitted by the government are allowed to engage in westernized human rights development or democratization. Furthermore, international NGOs that are critical of the Chinese government are barred from operating in China.
    It goes without saying that the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and subsequent human rights battles with Western nations have heightened awareness and concern amongst the international community of China's human rights record. As a result, the Chinese government has become more accommodating, holding over the years an increasing number of meetings and dialogue on human rights with various governments and private organizations. Tibet and Xinjiang, which had hitherto not been treated as human rights issues, are now the object of calls for improvement by the international community. At the UN Commission on Human Rights, Chinese government has fought year after year to resist Western cosponsored resolution for China's human rights abuses. However, it is significant that the Chinese government has accepted visits and activities of High Commissioner for Human Rights and Special Rapporteurs, and promoted human rights technical cooperation with the UN agencies.
    However, China's policies and strategies have not necessarily produced a standard of human rights sufficient to satisfy international community. The criticism from international community remains strong. With China now a member of the new UN Human Rights Council, it will come under increasing pressure to fulfill new obligations with respect to this role and the promotion and protection of human rights.
    Two vectors in China's human rights development can be identified. Firstly, there exists external pressure, such as calls from international community for the improvement of China's human rights situation in addition to diplomatic pressure.
  • 天安門事件後の中国
    兪 敏浩
    2006 年 2006 巻 145 号 p. 93-108,L12
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Since the end of the Cold War, a new world order based on “universal values” has taken hold among industrialized nations. Such values, however, fundamentally clash with prior international sovereignty norms of nonintervention in domestic matters, and especially in the case of authoritarian states still in the process of nation state building, universal values that transcend sovereignty pose a challenge to state unification, national integrity and legitimation within the international community, and are thus not something that can readily be assumed. In this respect, China can for a number of reasons be seen as the most determined advocate for “sovereignty norms.”
    The dispute of “sovereignty norms” (non-intervention in domestic matters) and “value norms” (universal values), which caused the severe diplomatic twists between China and the West in the post-war era, was also observed in Sino-Japanese relations to some extent. In the early 90s, however, the legacy of the “Sino-Japanese special relationship” still maintained its influence and the dispute did not surface. In fact, Japan rather harmonized its own norms with Chinese standards and applied double-standard policy in its diplomacy. As this special relationship declined since the mid-90s, the norm dispute was triggered by China's most sensitive issue: Taiwan. Chinas distrust towards Japan intensified, and Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated to their “worst” level since the normalization. Afterwards China and the major powers of the West, including Japan, gradually compromised the two norm standards, and the new situation along with China's subsequent domestic stability and economic growth consolidated Chinese state legitimacy. Consequently, China began to actively take diplomatic initiatives, and also China-Japan relations turned from good-neighbor friendship to a new stage of the partnership for friendship and co-operation.
    Nevertheless, during Chairman Jiang Zemin's (state) visit to Japan in 1998, historical issues were raised on a number of occasions for a variety of reasons, and subsequently resentment erupted in Japan as China was seen to raise historical issues for political ends. This in turn spurred nationalism in China even further.
  • 天安門事件後の中国
    諏訪 一幸
    2006 年 2006 巻 145 号 p. 109-125,L13
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The Hu Jintao administration was aimed to resolve social contradictions like the spreading corruption and economic disparity; toward a “harmonious society”. However, the days have long past when the people were satisfied by a novel slogan. Under this recognition of the present state, this paper verifies the intensity of the Chinese Communist Party to maintain the one-party system by focusing at its cadre management system. The cadre management system has been considered sacred even in the Zhao Ziyang era. If some sort of change has occurred, it should be seen as a reflection of the recognition on the side of the party. This is why the paper focuses on this area.
    The traditional model of cadre management policy, though the cadres were nominally managed directly by the party (dangguanganbu), it was practice of the party to categorize/manage cadres to three groups according to the nature of assigned agency; 1. “Party and Government Cadre” (dangzhengganbu), 2. “Managers and Specialized Engineers of Government Enterprises”, 3. “Managers and Specialized Engineers of Corporate Enterprises”. In principle, the first group is managed mainly by party agencies and the other two by governmental organizations (the party committee or leading party group being a core).
    However, due to the ambiguity of the definition of “cadre” and the oneparty-rule found in socialist systems, the management power was ultimately concentrated to the Party; resulting a uniform management. It is also the result of cadre wanting a management system by the Party due to the following reason. The staffs of the Communist Party and government agencies have better treatment than others.
    Since 1992, a market economy policy has been clearly engaged, and changes in cadre management policy have been initiated due to its implementation. First, there is a movement toward a public servant act. Second, the use of “talent” (rencai) concept can be pointed out. On May, 2003, the Political Bureau of the CCP decided to categorize the potential cadres to 3 groups under its “Party Management of Talent” policy (dangguanrencai); 1. “Party and Government Talent” (dangzhengrencai), 2. “Business Management Talent” (qiyejingyingguanlirencai), 3. “Technical Talent” (zhuanyejishurencai).
    Both, the New and Traditional model of management employs a threecategory system. However, the following points may be stressed as characteristics recognized in the transformation process of “cadre” management toward “talent” management.
    First, such change may be considered as measures to 1. talent drain from the Party and Government Organizations due to market economy reforms and internationalization and 2. the increasing number of people as potential talent.
    Second, due to the introduction of the Public Servant system, it was suggested that public servants will be managed/controlled by the party and nonpublic servants (many of which are business management talent and technical talent) will be managed/controlled by the government.
    Third, taking this improvement of dichotomous management, Party management of public servants (especially those high-ranking officials listed in the “Job Title List” of each rank) may be enforced further than before.
    Fourth, this paper points out the political influence of non-public servants such as private enterprise and managers of foreign business enterprise to future cadre management policy.
  • 天安門事件後の中国
    飛鳥田 麻生
    2006 年 2006 巻 145 号 p. 126-140,L14
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Public interest in media communications in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China has mainly focused on how Hong Kong can maintain its autonomy and freedom of speech under Chinese sovereignty. Despite such concerns, the media in Hong Kong has differed widely from the Mainland even following reunification in 1997. For example, with regard to newspapers in Hong Kong, there are commercially driven neutral papers that are largely managed with the objective to “write what is marketable” as well as leftist papers that are the propaganda organs of China's central government. Moreover, surveys have generally demonstrated that freedom of speech has been maintained in Hong Kong under the One Country and Two Systems structure.
    According to such considerations, this paper examines the meaning of the Hong Kong media for China's central government. First, this paper assesses the recognition and correspondence of the central government with the Hong Kong media. Second, this paper analyzes the differences of reporting style on Japanese affairs between newspapers in Hong Kong and the Mainland, and the implications of such differences on the central government.
    This paper also describes the possibility that Hong Kong has been used as an “experimental area” where the central government observes the response of public opinion in its decision-making process through examining reports on a series of anti-Japan demonstrations in April 2005. In short, it was April 9 when the leftist papers started to publish editorials regarding the anti-Japan demonstrations whereby insisting the importance of rational behavior against Japan; meanwhile, the Mainland media remained silent. Articles expressing the need for rational behavior had appeared repeatedly in the leftist papers and had been gradually introduced to the Mainland although the Chinese government still held a tough posture against Japan. For example, Xinhua News Agency, China's national news agency, reprinted articles with such tones of the leftist papers into the Mainland paper, Reference News, before the official announcement. It was ten days later, April 19, when the central government formally announced its position on the anti-Japan demonstrations, officially demanding the rational behavior against Japan.
    Such a course suggests that the central government defined its attitude against the anti-Japan demonstrations very early on behind the tough posture against Japan but deliberately planned the release of the official announcement of its stance through utilizing the articles of the leftist papers to observe responses from the readers in both Hong Kong and the Mainland.
  • 天安門事件後の中国
    伊藤 剛
    2006 年 2006 巻 145 号 p. 141-154,L15
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper addresses the changing nature of power (or influence) in the study of Chinese politics and diplomacy, and seeks to clarify the extent to which theoretical approaches in academia can be useful for a fuller understanding of China.
    The discussion has three parts. The first deals with the part of foreign policy, and argues that China's application of the “New Conception of Security” or “Peaceful Rise” has created more stable relationships not only with the United States but with neighboring countries. More specifically, in order to sustain economic development since the 1990's, the creation and the development of “soft power” has produced more benefits to China's interests.
    The second part addresses China's domestic politics. Since the 1949 revolution, the Chinese Communist Party has maintained the “party state, ” and even after the economic growth started in the early 1990's, the CCP, with its society so far pluralized, has sought to keep its power under control. The emergence of various societal groups, which leads to the application of “corporatism, ” will be addressed.
    The third part seeks to combine both arguments of foreign policy and domestic politics. It argues that, in the face of the rapidly changing politics and society within China that has also affected its foreign policy, various theoretical frameworks such as “second image” and “reversed second-image” could be useful. The Chinese government, trying to maintain its power not only over its society but also vis-à-vis other countries, has created more complicated means to maintain its authority and legitimacy.
    The paper concludes by slightly touching on the brief history of Japan's study on Chinese studies. There, more positive methods and approaches toward the “real” Chinese politics and diplomacy should be examined.
  • 井上 茂子
    2006 年 2006 巻 145 号 p. 155-158
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 倉田 秀也
    2006 年 2006 巻 145 号 p. 158-161
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 三浦 聡
    2006 年 2006 巻 145 号 p. 162-165
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 中北 浩爾
    2006 年 2006 巻 145 号 p. 165-168
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 東野 裕人
    2006 年 2006 巻 145 号 p. 168-171
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 佐藤 晋
    2006 年 2006 巻 145 号 p. 172-175
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 国分 良成
    2006 年 2006 巻 145 号 p. 176
    発行日: 2006/08/29
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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