This volume intends to address a question so far rarely asked: relationship between foreign policy and nationalism in postwar Japan. The question has been avoided in the academic world in spite of the omnipotence of nationalism associated with Japanese foreign policy either implicitly or explicitly. Though nationalism is admittedly multifaceted phenomenon, the characteristic of nationalism is contradictory combination of liberal society and cultural community, past legacy and future prospect combined into the notion of “nation.” This peculiar nature of nationalism enabled it to proliferate into all over the world in the last two centuries. Despite this situation, International Relations study has not given enough attention to the issue of nationalism.
In addition, there is peculiar character in Japanese postwar nationalism. The postwar Japanese nationalism underwent four stages. The first postwar stage until 1955 was strongly connected with the prewar culmination of nationalism, though the major advocate of nationalism shifted from right-wing to left-wing. The second was the period of high economic growth from late 1950s to the end of 1960s, when the so-called Yoshida doctrine was planted into political framework. The third period was from 1970 to 1989, when Japanese society and politics underwent enormous change into a highly consumer-oriented society. This period saw rise of cultural nationalism hailing Japanese culture. The last period is the post-Cold War period since 1990. The dual shock of the bursting of the bubble economy and the Gulf War drove Japanese politics into overall restructuring, where nationalism gradually gained political influence. Rise of Asian countries and friction over history and territory, deepening of democracy by citizens’ involvement, heightened sense of military insecurity increasing social and economic gap within Japan in the globalization and post-bubble recession, all contributed to the enhancement of nationalism.
There are gaps between nationalism study and IR study, study on nationalism in general and Japanese nationalism, and diplomatic history and nationalism. The articles in this volume attempt to fill these gaps in one way or another. The topics include Japanese realists view on nationalism, new nationalism and security contribution in 1980s and 90s, economic nationalism and foreign policy in 1960s, Okinawa and Northern territorial island issues,and relationship with China and South Korea on history. The author hopes this pioneering collection will lure further entries in the field.
Throughout the postwar period, realism has been the dominant school of thought in academic international relations (IR) communities in the United States and Europe. During the same period, in the IR community in Japan,there has been a group of scholars called genjitsushugi-sha, which literally translated means “realist(s)”. (Genjitsushugi literally means “realism,” and “sha” means “a person” or “people.”) Unlike realism in the Western IR communities, genjitushugi was not a dominant school of thought in Japan during the Cold War years. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Japanese IR community witnessed a harsh debate between genjitushugi-sha and risoushugi-sha (idealist[s]) over the role of military power in postwar international politics and the desirability of the “Japan-U.S. Security Treaty system” (i.e., the U.S.-Japan alliance) for Japan. In the Japanese society at that time, where strong pacifist orientation was widely shared, it was idealists, who denied the utility of military power in the contemporary international relations and insisted on the policy of unarmed neutrality for the security of Japan, who represented the mainstream view.
Although Japanese genjitsushugi-sha have significant resemblances to Western realists, such as the recognition of the struggle for power as a continuing nature of international politics and the acceptance of the utility of military power in the postwar world, substantial differences also exist between the two. The previous research done by the author shows that genjitsushugi-sha recognized the decreasing utility of military power in international politics as early as the early 1960s. They also noticed variations in the utility of power resources depending on issue areas by the early 1970s. In these senses, the genjitsushugi-sha’s view on power shows considerably liberal tendencies.
This article argues that their view on nationalism also has liberal, rather than realist, inclinations. While realism is a particularistic theory, liberalism is universalistic. Realist and liberal views on nationalism should reflect such natures of respective theories. The analysis in this article shows that Japanese genjitsushugi-sha’s view on nationalism shows strongly universalistic tendencies. In the face of the revival of nationalism among the Japanese citizens since the mid-sixties, genjitsushugi-sha argued: 1) that Japanese diplomacy should reduce the dependence on the U.S.; 2) but that Japan, as a trading country with a limited military power, could maintain its security and prosperity only with close cooperation with other countries,particularly the U.S., and increasingly so under the deepening interdependence in the postwar world; 3) that Japan, therefore, should not define its national interests in a narrow, egoistic sense, 4) and that the Japanese people should pursue nationalism that is internationalist in nature. Despite the conventional view that regards Japanese genjitsushugi-sha as (a subspecies of) realists in Western IR terms, this article argues that they were rather “realistic liberal” scholars.
The paper examines the change of perception among Japanese policy makers regarding the status and function of the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) throughout the 1980s, and how this change was instrumental in the dispatch of the minesweeper flotilla to the Persian Gulf in 1991. After Japan regained independence in 1952, constitutional revision imposed severe limitations on the functions of the post-war military apparatus, the JSDF. Indeed, the Socialist Party of Japan (SPJ) and Communist Party of Japan (CPJ) regarded the JSDF as unconstitutional, and as a source for the revival of militarism.
The paper argues that in the mid-1980s, established perceptions reached a turning point and started evolving. It investigates one key factor that prompted such a perception shift, the problem of the dispatch of the Japan Maritime Self Defense force (JMSDF) minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. In 1987, the United States put pressure on the Japanese government to consider dispatching a naval force to Persian Gulf. This issue divided policy makers in three groups. The first group, including Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, agreed with the JMSDF dispatch to Persian Gulf. The second group disagreed with SDF dispatch, preferring the deployment of the Japan Coast Guard (JCC) instead. This group included Tadakazu Kuriyama, foreign ministry official, and senior staff from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The third group, including Masaharu Gotouda, chief cabinet secretary, SPJ, CPJ, supported no contribution. They thought that the dispatch overseas of JSDF and JCC were not permissible under the article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.
The paper investigates the political debates that occurred within the three groups, focusing on how fears of strong criticism from the Japanese people and the psychological pressure of contributing to the alliance shaped the Japanese dilemma. The paper explores how these elements constituted core features of Japanese ‘post-war nationalism’. In 1991, after the Gulf War, the political debate reached the culminating point with the Japanese government decision to send JMSDF minesweepers to the Persian Gulf. At the time, the SPJ, CPJ, and liberals from Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) raised a strenuous objection to send ships for the Gulf. Yet, the Japanese government decided in favour of the operation. In its aftermath, Japanese people did not support the views of SPJ and CPJ, nor they came to think that the JSDF were a symbol of revival of militarism. They recognized that the JSDF were a tool of international contributions.
During the Ikeda administration (1960–1964), Japan’s index of import liberalization accelerated from 40% in 1960 to 93% in 1964, approximately same as in the European Economic Community countries. Such rapid liberalization, however, prompted severe anxiety among the Japanese, who feared their economy might be swallowed up by “black ships.” Focusing on actions of the Economic Affairs Bureau (EAB) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the leadership of Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, this article explores the rising of Japan’s economic nationalism, its underlying logic, and how Japan government restrained it.
Under insistence from the U.S. government, Japan decided to liberalize its trade restrictions in 1960. Such overt foreign pressure, however, fueled economic nationalism among Japan’s governmental agencies. Believing trade liberalization was needed to not only meet U.S. demands to expand free trade and defend the dollar but also strengthen Japan’s economy, EAB urged Ikeda to take assertive action. Consequently, Ikeda expressed his determination to hasten the removal of trade restrictions when he visited the U.S. in 1961.
Nonetheless, intense nationalism was inherent in the Japanese government, especially among its economic agencies. Although they considered trade liberalization necessary, they rejected its basic theory—the principle of comparative advantage—fearing that Japan’s infant heavy industries might be forced out, obliging Japan to specialize only in light industries. Hoping to avoid that outcome, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) introduced legislation titled “Temporary Measures for Promotion of Specific Industries” intended to create a new industrial structure and strengthen competitiveness of the Japanese heavy industry through public-private cooperation. However, this bill could not muster enough support for enactment because it emphasized regulation rather than free trade.
Instead of trade regulations, Japan’s economic agencies regarded higher tariffs as the means to prevent acceleration of imports. In opposition, the U.S. and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) called for linear tariff cuts at the start of the Kennedy Round negotiations. MITI and the Ministry of Agriculture resisted drastic tariff cuts, but their insistence on protecting domestic industries was so self-serving that Japan was reproached during the GATT negotiations. It was Ikeda’s initiative that persuaded the intractable economic agencies and enabled Japan to participate affirmatively in the Kennedy Round negotiations.
This article concludes that Ikeda’s leadership was essential to Japan’s overcoming of the forces of economic nationalism and liberalizing its trade policies. Ikeda believed that the Japanese economy would become more vigorous and competitive through trade liberalization.
After World War II, Japan was the largest importer of Cuban sugar outside of the Soviet bloc. This continued well after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, making Japan one of Cuba’s largest trade partners in the 1960s. As is often suggested, Japanese foreign policy is based upon two main principles: Japan’s collaboration with the United States, its closest ally outside of Asia, and the high priority given to trade promotion and economic growth.
Trade between Japan and Cuba began to trouble the U.S. government to such a degree that the U.S. undertook direct intervention against it. Efforts were even made to have other Latin American countries boycott trade with Japan. As a result, the Japanese government was faced with the dilemma of which of the two foreign policy principles should take priority. Meanwhile,the U.S. government was particularly concerned with the export of Critical Commodities (CC) from Japan to Cuba and the Japanese use of the Export and Import Bank of Japan (their official financial loan firm) when trading with Cuba.
President J.F.Kennedy himself asked the Philippine Government to divert its sugar export from the U.S. to Japan, Secretary of State D.D.Rusk urged Latin American countries to scale down their trade with Japan, and the U.S.government pursued a policy of not purchasing goods and services from those private foreign commercial firms engaged in trade with Cuba.
On the other hand, Ambassador E.O. Reischauer and Minister J.K. Emmerson, both diplomats in Tokyo highly respected for their Japan expertise,worked hard to keep the Cuban Sugar trade issue low profile for fear that Japanese nationalist sentiment would react strongly against this direct U.S. intervention.
Two primary reasons help to explain why Japan continued to trade with Cuba. One is based on an agreement within the Commercial Treaty of 1961,in which Japan promised to import 450,000 tons of Cuban sugar per year. In this de fact barter trade agreement, Japan imported sugar with its competitive or low price and good quality, while Cuba obtained Japanese manufactured goods such as ships, machinery, tools, and buses. The other reason why Japan refused to scale down its trade with Cuba was that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) was inept and powerless compared to the Ministries of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and of Finance (MF), both of which maintained strong influence over the domestic private sector.
The U.S. government was highly concerned with these commercial activities, fearing that important materials from Japan would be obtained, and that further trade activities would contradict its hostile policy toward Cuba.
While MOFA was highly susceptible to U.S. pressure, Japanese politicians and those in MITI, MF, and the private sector were reluctant to obey any such request. This article reveals (as a case study) that Japan’s trade agreement with Cuba actually helped to harmonize future collaboration with the U.S. on foreign trade with other socialist countries. The primary sources used to support this argument are from the National Archives (NARA) in Washington D.C., the Archivo Nacional de Cuba, and the MOFA Archives in Tokyo.
Based on R.Brubaker’s sociological framework for “eventful” nationalisms,this paper presented the formation processes of the dominant “we” vision (so called “national identity”) of the post-war Okinawa in the early 1950s. It focused on the transaction between the vision formation and the institutions/policies of the two relating governments, the U.S. and Japan.
The term “Complex Nation” refers to the “we” vision represented by simultaneous employment of the two different categories of “nation”, in this case “Japanese” and “Okinawan”. This concept was introduced to avoid the dominant, but theoretically invalid presumption that see “national identities” are mutually exclusive.
In pre-WWII Okinawa, the modern “we” vision was formulated as a distinctive ethnic group that constitutes a segment of the Japanese nation. The term “Okinawan” was not expressively linked to the thought of Self-Determination.
This “we” vision, however, was destabilized when the Japanese rule was replaced by that of the American’s after the war. I argued that the reconfiguration processes of the “we” vision in the early post-war period may be revealed by paying attention to the formation and relating processes of the three Self-Determination derived ideals arose at that time. These are Jichi (self-governance), KeizaiJiritsu (economic self-support) of the Okinawan Nation and Fukki (reversion to the Japanese Nation).
After verifying the fact that Jichi and keizaiJiritsu became idiomatic phases by 1950,
I argued that the “national identity” formation processes of the two different vectors occurred simultaneously in 1951.
One was the process of the strengthening Jichi and keizaiJiritsu ideals, caused by the American institutions/policies conflictive to these ideals.
The frequent American interventions in the civil affairs that were supposed to be reserved for the self-governance of Okinawan left the Okinawa Gunto Government with little self-deciding power to practice.
The keizaiJiritsu ideal, put forward by the Okinawa Gunto Government in its economic plan, was also denied by the U.S., because the “native” industrial growth was considered as of secondly importance.
The resulted grievances strengthened the Okinawan’s normative attachment to Jichi and keizaiJiritsu ideals, and the vision of “we” as a self-determining subject.
The process of the other vector, the formation and mainstreaming of Fukki proceeded simultaneously.
The trade with Japan, reopened in 1950, constituted the structural factor. The Japanese government institutions/policies that established the tariff and non-tariff barriers against Okinawan commodities stimulated the Okinawan perception that the Okinawan export industries could only survive if it had a free access to the Japanese market, and placed under the Japanese Government protection.
The actual reversionist movement arose when the negotiation on the political status of Okinawa after the peace treaty started between Japan and the U.S. in the early 1951.
The “we” vision put forward by the reversionists, however, was qualitatively different from the “we” vision of the pre-war type since the category “Okinawan” now connoted “the self-determining subject”. What came into being was a frame of vision in which the two categories of self-determining subject are rhetorically connected to represent “we”.
The Soviet Union invaded the Kuril Islands after the end of the Pacific War and Russian border guards had often apprehended Japanese fishing boats on the sea around these islands for the invasion of “Soviet territorial waters”. These numerous incidents by Russian authorities in capturing Japanese fishing boats and their crews seriously damaged the livelihood of the Japanese fishermen involved. They continued to demand the Japanese government to secure the safety of fishing on the sea especially around the Habomai and the Shikotan islands. In June 1963, a part of their earnest wish was realized. The Japan Fisheries Association concluded a private agreement with the Soviet government. This agreement allows seaweed harvesting by the Japanese fishermen in a small area within “Soviet territorial waters”. This article will examine the negotiation process of this agreement.
It took a long time since the restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1956 to reach the agreement because it involved an intractable territorial dispute over a Russian-held chain of islands. The Soviet Union proposed to Japan to conclude a Peace Treaty in which Japan world accept to have only two of the islands (Habomai and Shikotan) returned as part of the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration. However, the government of Japan could not accept this condition and asked the Soviet Union to return not just the two islands but also Kunashiri and Etorofu. Therefore, in order to secure the safety of the Japanese fishermen on the sea, either the Soviets would drop the condition, or Japan would accept the proposal and conclude a Peace Treaty with such provisions. However, both countries exhibited an uncompromising attitude to each other. In addition, many Japanese were indifferent to this local problem.
The individual who resolved this difficult problem was the Chairman of Japan Fisheries Association Takasaki Tatsunosuke. He was a famous conservative political leader known for his contribution in signing a private trade agreement with the People’s Republic of China in 1962. When he participated in the Japan-Soviet Negotiations on Fishery, he personally tried to lead both countries to conclude a Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty by making Russia recognize “residual sovereignty” of Kunashiri and Etorofu and return Habomai and Shikotan. However, the Soviets took a stern approach toward the government of Japan because of the revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The government of Japan was not sympathetic to his initiative either. Hence, Takasaki decided to adopt a stopgap measure and sought to conclude a private agreement with the Soviet government in order to avoid the territorial issues. His proposal succeeded in gaining concessions from both countries and in securing the safety of the Japanese fishermen in the given small area. But as a result, ironically, the stability of the Japan-Soviet relations reduced the need for a Peace Treaty and Takasaki’s “residual sovereignty” plan.
This paper examines how Postwar Japan’s initiatives of material assistance and verbal apology promoted reconciliation with Asian neighbors; I address the topic in terms of the interplay of theories and history. After World War II, Japan sought to improve relationships with Asian neighbors,such as South Korea and China, on which it had inflicted suffering through war and colonization. Historical case studies reveal the details of the process of moving toward the normalization of diplomatic relations, and I can find theoretical studies that support these historical descriptions.
However, it is not easy to provide consistent, congruent explanations that account for all of the historical studies. Careful analysis supports a mixture of the view that an economic approach to diplomacy has contributed to reconciliation with neighbors, and the criticism that Japan’s atonement for the past was not enough. The limited inferences that can be drawn from international relations theories make the situation more confusing. I should transcend the fragmented accounts provided by both history and theories by fusing the two. To achieve this, I can re-examine history by introducing the scientific knowledge of cognitive psychology, as applied to the decision-makers of the parties concerned. This approach sheds light on the fact that perceptions of the historical past, which were products of nationalism, greatly affected the diplomatic positions of Japan and its neighbors, and were relevant to the progress or lack thereof in reconciliation.
Based on this perspective, I provide a theoretical framework of diplomacy that focuses on the cognitive psychology of decision-makers in order to reconstruct relationships between the history of Postwar Japan’s reconciliation diplomacy and nationalism. I pay attention to both the intentions of offenders who offer reconciliation and the perceptions held by victims.
By comparing different Postwar Japanese administrations’ efforts at reconciliation with South Korea and China, I can find interactions between an offender’s diplomatic options and the influence of nationalism on a victim’s diachronic perceptions. The offender’s choice between assistance and apology interacts with the victim’s relative interests in the past and future, and thereby has effects on the progress of reconciliation. Depending on the perceptions of victims, both assistance and apology can be effective signals, or counterproductive. While assistance is a useful tool for reconciliation with future-oriented victims, apology is an effective signal for nationalistic, pastoriented victims. This suggests that symbolic words and material goods are complementary to each other in international politics, and that their functioning is profoundly related to the characteristics of the perceptions of human beings.
It is often the case that when economic ties expand through trade, and the exchange of people expands, diplomacy will also take a favorable turn. However, in terms of the Japan-China relationship, which is symbolized by “cold political relations but hot economical relations,” such progress is not occurring. Because of incidents such as the collision of fishing boats off the coast of the Senkaku Islands, political tensions do not seem to be withering. Both Japan and China admit that the reason for this is the existence of the historical perception issue.
However, until the 1970s, the historical perception issue was a domestic Japanese issue rather than a pending problem between Japan and China; but in 1982, with the textbook incident, it became an international issue. During this process, both the Japanese and Chinese governments have made certain political “compromises,” but this has instead stimulated domestic radical claims and both nations strengthening their nationalism, and this has created the structure of a vicious cycle.
Furthermore, in the background, a composition was made involving the “politicization” of the historical perceptions of both countries and the “asymmetry” of respecting Chinese claims.
Moreover, in recent years, the downturn of Japan and the rise of China have been making the historical perception issue more complex. In other words, the historical situation that Japan and China have never experienced coexistence as great powers, has been promoting a sense of mutual rivalry,which has undeniably led to the historical perception issue becoming more complicated.
The historical perception issue has become a complex phenomenon as a result of its expansion in both countries after the textbook incident, such that the issue spans several dimensions of political diplomacy, academic research,and national sentiment; and it is becoming difficult to discuss it only within the framework of each government’s diplomacy. Therefore, it is necessary to work on the historical perception issue not only by considering diplomacy,but also by keeping watch on the achievements of academic research and on public opinion in both countries.
The purpose of this paper is to clear up the security relation between Japan and Korea, which was formed through dealing with the “security crisis” of 1968. This became the origin of the Japan-ROK (Republic of Korea) security cooperation later called “economic security cooperation”.
The “security crisis” of 1968 occurred when reunification by all-out war became impossible due to the establishment of the divided-system. North Korea’s purpose was to bring down South Korea from within by armed guerrilla warfare. Therefore, what the ROK and Japan emphasized in dealing with this crisis was not how to respond to all-out war, but rather how to respond to indirect aggression.
South Korea asked Japan for cooperation concerning the enhancement of equipment for ROK’s anti-guerrilla police. They have explained to Japan that the possibility of an all-out war was low, and that even if war happened to occur, they could respond under the mutual defense treaty with the United States. This is why they have requested special assistance from Japan.
The Ministry of foreign affairs of Japan and Prime Minister Sato decided to cooperate with South Korea. They pointed out that the patrol boats ROK asked for does not violate Japan’s regulations which prohibit the export of military arms. “Three principles on arms exports” would not be undermined in this situation. However, South Korea ultimately withdrew its request. This was because the pressing issue of drought damage inside the ROK required immediate attention. Therefore the ROK requested emergency assistance from Japan to deal with this situation.
It is very significant that both countries have discussed and found possible areas of cooperation for the security of the ROK. The characteristics of which are as follows. First, it has clarified the political position of both countries to counter North Korean indirect aggressions. Secondly, in order to ensure the internal security of South Korea, Japan and South Korea have sought to cooperate for the enhancement of equipment used by the police engaged in counter guerrilla operations. South Korea and Japan, while premising on the treaty of alliance with the United States, identified new threats from indirect aggressions and tried to find areas of possible cooperation. Thirdly, is the fact that South Korea has ultimately withdrawn the request for police equipment cooperation and eventually switched to a request for emergency economic assistance to focus on domestic stability. This is how a typical pattern of security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, later called “economic security cooperation” has developed.
The U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) included six different areas. Although negotiated simultaneously, the distributive results of each area were quite different. Previous studies have attempted to explain this outcome by comparing each area’s internal conditions (e.g., the degree of participation expansion in the Japanese political process, the similarity of the perceptions of two government officials regarding the problem involved). However, this research design is inappropriate for an omnibus negotiation like SII. For a comparison to be valid, the outcomes of each area have to be independent. If there is a cross-area barter, the outcome of area A cannot be explained only by the internal condition of area A. Using primary sources and analytical models, this paper demonstrates the effect of cross-area issue linkage in SII, and thereby overthrows conventional explanation on why U.S. pressure succeeded in some areas but not others.
The first part elaborates two spatial models of multi-issue bargaining between two governments, and suggests how the outcome of international negotiation is affected by whether or not participating governments can strike cross-area barters.
The second part empirically shows when the U.S. and Japanese governments were ready to make such barter deals. At first, the level of negotiation was sub-cabinet and both governments suffered from interagency conflicts, leaving no room for sacrificing one agency’s issues for the sake of another’s. This situation changed when top-level policy makers took direct command in both countries. The top policy makers in the U.S. allowed their Japanese counterparts to choose across areas, on the condition that the package as a whole is significant.
The third part quantitatively evaluates newly declassified records of the negotiation, and shows the timeline change in the Japanese responses to the U.S. requests. This clearly illustrates the reversal in the pattern of Japanese concession when the top policy makers intervened. At first, Japanese concession was concentrated in keiretsu and exclusionary business practice areas, where the potential targets of U.S. retaliation (export sector and large business) were most affected by U.S. demands. After the change in the level of decision making, significant concessions were made in the other areas, while the draft of keiretsu and business practices was left virtually untouched. This observed tendency fits in with the prediction of the models; however, no major preceding hypothesis on SII can explain it.
Theoretical research on bargaining has shown very clearly that issue linkages can completely change the bargaining outcome. However, empirical case studies of issue linkages in specific negotiations have seldom matched the clarity, owing to the difficulty in obtaining direct evidence of highly political barters, which involve intense conflict between interest groups, bureaucratic agencies, and politicians. By compensating the lack of direct evidence by theoretical models, this paper adds one clear example and demonstrates a method to do so.