国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
2016 巻, 184 号
選択された号の論文の15件中1~15を表示しています
国際政治研究の先端13
  • ―日中「三・一一災害外交」の失敗をケースに―
    張 雲
    2016 年 2016 巻 184 号 p. 184_1-184_15
    発行日: 2016/03/30
    公開日: 2016/11/22
    ジャーナル フリー

    No one doubts that mutual mistrust is responsible for the unprecedented dangerous deadlock between China and Japan. There is a wealth of research on Sino–Japanese mutual mistrust. However, the conventional wisdom typically focuses on unique Sino–Japanese relations in shaping mutual mistrust. Over-emphasizing the uniqueness of Sino–Japanese relations has produced an “unproductive intellectual confrontation”. In reality, both China and Japan have demonstrated their intentions and efforts for building mutual trust, but the mutual mistrust has deepened. Why has this seemingly abnormal situation happened? The representative case is the failure of the 3.11 disaster diplomacy between China and Japan. Why was such an unprecedented opportunity lost despite the initial relatively high expectations from the both sides? Furthermore, why did disaster diplomacy not contribute much in improving bilateral trust, but rather seems to have enhanced the mistrust between China and Japan? The existing literature seems to be largely insufficient to provide convincing explanations. It is necessary to reconstruct and re-theorize the research on Sino-Japanese mistrust.

    To these ends, this paper introduces, first, the theories of misperception and mistrust in international relations. Then it uses the failure of Sino–Japanese disaster diplomacy around the 3.11 Great East Japan Earthquake as a case study, showing that even the initial gestures of goodwill could be distorted by entrenched biases to produce even more mistrust. Due to the negative mutual perceptions that began to solidify in 2010, even incoming goodwill messages from the other side have been unconsciously filtered or processed to fit with solidifying misperceptions. The fundamental problem originates in the different over-expectations of China and Japan from disaster diplomacy. The lack of timely and efficient communication enhanced the misinterpretation of the other side’s intentions, which was followed by frustration and suspicion. When the public and the media have raised frustration and suspicion, political elites have generally lost domestic space to counter mistrust or tensions between states.

    The paper shows that misperception and mistrust can be replicated unconsciously and unnecessarily in many scenarios. There is both theoretical and policy relevance in this project. The project tries to integrate Sino–Japanese relations research with more general international relations studies. In so doing, it would be helpful to provide an alternative intellectual explanation of Sino–Japanese relations with a more universally acceptable understanding. In terms of policy implications, the project will provide insights as to how the process of the formation of misperception and the replication of mistrust between China and Japan have evolved. Lessons can be drawn from this research in order to avoid or minimize unnecessary misperception in the future.

  • ―アイゼンハワー政権期米韓の為替改革をめぐる協議過程を中心に―
    高 賢来
    2016 年 2016 巻 184 号 p. 184_16-184_29
    発行日: 2016/03/30
    公開日: 2016/11/22
    ジャーナル フリー

    This paper examines talks on exchange rate reform between the U.S. and the ROK during the Eisenhower Era (1953–1961). The ROK achieved rapid economic growth through an export-oriented industrialization strategy from the early 1960s onward. Exchange rate reform was a factor in enabling the ROK to begin export-oriented economic growth.

    The 1980s witnessed a reinvigoration of empirical research on ROK politics in the 1950s, yet this research was based on normative thinking that the ROK should achieve an ‘independent national economy’ with a ‘self-sufficient reproduction system’. As a result, it judged the 1950s negatively on account of the perception that this period had increased the subordination of the ROK’s economy to the U.S. and Japan. However, as such empirical research began to amass during the 1990s the question of continuity between the periods before and after the start of export-oriented growth garnered much attention. Arguments that witnessed continuity were primarily based on the critical stance that demanded that the process of the formation of initial conditions of export-oriented growth in the 1950s must be taken into consideration in order to explain which factors enabled the ROK to begin rapid economic growth from the 1960s onward. This paper shares this critical stance, and takes an historical approach and focuses on talks surrounding exchange rate reform between the U.S. and the ROK. By analyzing documents produced by both governments, it attempts to shed light on the process of the formation of the initial conditions.

    In August 1955, the U.S. agreed to adopt a fixed-term fixed exchange rate with the ROK that overestimated the value of the ROK’s local currency in return for the ROK’s pursuance of policies to stabilize prices. Thereafter the US depended on the ROK’s economic development, as a result of which, they recognized a unitary exchange rate to be indispensable. However, since the U.S. valued incentives to institute policies for price stabilization within the ROK’s existing exchange rate system, they did not immediately attempt to carry out exchange rate. In 1959, however, pressure from congress forced the Eisenhower administration to demand exchange rate reforms from the ROK, and in February 1961, the ROK unified plural exchange rates to a single rate and adopted a floating rate system. This paper argues that it was these changes and experiences within U.S. policy that affected the exchange rate reform in the mid-1960s when export-oriented growth started.

  • 劉 仙姫
    2016 年 2016 巻 184 号 p. 184_30-184_43
    発行日: 2016/03/30
    公開日: 2016/11/22
    ジャーナル フリー

    This paper analyzes Chung-hee Park’s ambition for nuclear capability and the U.S. response under the Ford administration during the 1970s. The Republic of Korea (ROK)’s nuclear development program became the touchstone for the U.S.-led nuclear non-proliferation regime particularly after India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974. The main purpose of this research is to examine the decision making process and negotiations until ROK and the U.S. finally reached their compromise. The intensive archival document analysis elucidates that the U.S.-France negotiations concerning ROK’s nuclear program at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) meetings and the role of Richard L. Sneider, the U.S. ambassador to ROK, were mutually interrelated and influenced cancellation of the ROK’s plan for reprocessing plant in 1976.

    The diplomatic negotiations proceeded as follows. At the early stage of negotiations, Canada took the initiative to exert diplomatic pressure on ROK, since the U.S. had a prudent attitude to the issue. While the Department of State initially tried to avoid any unilateral U.S. action, the ambassador Sneider pushed the U.S. government to take immediate and resolute action. Under such circumstances, The Department of State intended to inhibit ROK access to sensitive technology and equipment through the development of common NSG policies. Therefore, the U.S. emphasized the importance of the export restrictions and the strengthening of full IAEA safeguards by the NSG. However, the NSG meetings were insufficient for the international consensus.

    The moment that the Canada-ROK negotiations turned out to be at a deadlock, the U.S. made use of the negotiations with France so as to justify the point of view of the U.S. in persuading ROK. In dealing with the issue, Sneider’s diplomatic skill was another noteworthy aspect of the U.S. diplomacy. While he conveyed the U.S. firm attitude about the resolution of the problem, he also considered that USG objective of discouraging nuclear proliferation by blocking reprocessing facility in Korea could be achieved without forcing confrontation and humiliating loss of face and prestige for President Park. The consideration of the ROK’s prestige became the basis for peaceful settlement by the U.S.

    The U.S. managed to make ROK cancel its nuclear development program by proposing continued nuclear cooperation to higher and more regional levels. On the other hand, ROK looked at the multinational reprocessing facility to see if there was room for ROK access to sensitive technology. It was regarded by ROK as vitally important to its own interests.

  • ―WTOドーハラウンドを事例に―
    長久 明日香
    2016 年 2016 巻 184 号 p. 184_44-184_58
    発行日: 2016/03/30
    公開日: 2016/11/22
    ジャーナル フリー

    This article aims to analyze the change of Japan’s negotiating strategy for the trade liberalization. Among various negotiations of trade liberalizations which Japan has involved, the most difficult issue has been agricultural liberalization. In the previous studies, this issue has been studied from the viewpoint of strong political influence of agricultural protection group, such as Nokyo (Japan Agricultural Cooperative), MAFF (Ministry of Agricultural, Forestry, and Fisheries), and LDP representatives (especially agricultural policy specialists).

    However, as a result of electoral reform in 1994, Japanese farmers’ power has declined, and Japanese consumers’ political influence has increased. With this changing political circumstance, Japan’s agricultural negotiating strategy should change. These changes can’t be derived by framework of previous studies which focus on only producer. Therefore, this paper focuses on consumers which have been disregarded so far. Especially, this paper pays attention to the consumers’ concern for increased food risks as a result of liberalization. In the economic theory, consumers are presumed to support trade liberalization because they favored the price decline. However, in the countries like Japan which has already a liberalized agricultural market to certain degree, consumers have concerns also for liberalization risks such as food safety or food security, and thus the representatives and officials need to deal with these issues.

    According to this framework, this paper takes agricultural negotiations in the WTO Doha Round as a case. In the negotiation process Japan cooperated with “friend countries” by using the universal concept of “multi-functionality of the agriculture” and appealed the maintenance of the agricultural various functions. Moreover, Japan’s negotiating proposal in 2000 emphasized that the multi-functionality was supported by the Japanese consumers. This proposal came from lessons in the Uruguay Round that Japan was criticized for having advocated food security only from the aspect of producers and it has little impacts on the negotiation. Japan’s strategy in the Doha Round succeeded to some extent as the concept of multi-functionality was included in the Doha ministerial declaration as “consideration to non-trade concerns of the agriculture”. Afterwards, Japan formed G10 with food importing countries and continued proposing its position with them. Especially, about food security, Japan proposed making concrete rules for the unilaterally export regulation of agricultural exporting country and it was reflected for the latest chairperson text.

    Japan’s strategy still includes demands to protect agriculture, however, demands specialized to farmers have decreased considerably and it has been reflecting more consumer’s concern for the liberalization compared to before. Such changes of the strategy cannot be understood by only a producer centered conventional framework, and the framework focused on consumers’ risk as described in this article will become more important.

  • 林 載桓
    2016 年 2016 巻 184 号 p. 184_59-184_73
    発行日: 2016/03/30
    公開日: 2016/11/22
    ジャーナル フリー

    This article explores domestic political conditions under which dictators choose to go to war. Drawing on recent growing literature about authoritarian foreign policy behavior, it seeks to establish an alternative logic of dictator’s war choice and test its observable implications against the case of China’s war with Vietnam in 1979.

    This article first critically reviews recent quantitative accounts on autocratic conflict behavior. In doing so, it makes it clear that despite attempts to embrace new insights from comparative authoritarianism, most extant research still focuses on identifying what type of authoritarian regime is more or less likely to initiate international conflict, falling far short of investigating specific causal mechanisms shaping authoritarian conflict behaviors.

    Taking account of preferences and survival strategies of dictators, this article then presents two distinct logics of autocratic war choice. First, dictators have an incentive to capitalize on the use of force to obtain private goods to distribute to the core constituency within the regime. Second, dictators are incentivized to go to war when he faces a political crisis which he thinks may be circumvented by the conduct of war. Equally important in dictators’ calculation are the political risks that a crushing defeat or large-scale military and popular mobilization may entail.

    China’s war with Vietnam in 1979 offers a useful case study to examine polity effects on dictator’s war choice. Using newly available materials, the article clarifies the political condition under which Deng Xiaoping decided to initiate and execute the war as it unfolded, confirming that the logics for dictatorial war choice discussed above are empirically valid.

  • ―貿易交渉権限を巡る議会と大統領の攻防―
    冨田 晃正
    2016 年 2016 巻 184 号 p. 184_74-184_88
    発行日: 2016/03/30
    公開日: 2016/11/22
    ジャーナル フリー

    This article explores the fluctuation in the trade regime that supported the United States trade policy from the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 to 1991, from the perspective of trade actor’s expansion and changes in public opinion due to globalization. The United States trade policy’s most important trade regime is the delegation from the Trade Promotion Authority of the Congress to the president. Prior to 1934, the United States trade policy’s most important feature was that the Congress had the authority to conclude trade agreements with foreign countries. This authority was derived from the United States constitution and led to the inclusion of protectionist policies in the United States trade policy. Members of Congress preferred the profit from electoral constituencies over overall profit of the United States because they needed the support of their electoral constituencies for re-election.

    In 1934, this situation changed as the Congress delegated trade initiatives to the president in order to obviate protectionist trade policies. This was the most important change in United States trade policy. This regime, namely the delegation from the Trade Promotion Authority of the Congress to the president, formed United States trade policy in the Cold War era and led to the implementation of the free trade policy.

    In the era of the delegation of trade authority, between 1934 and 1991, the free trade policy was implemented consistently in the United States trade policy. But from 1991 to the present, this trade regime has been fluctuating. What is the cause of this fluctuation? In other words, why did the Congress refuse to delegate trade decisions to the president from 1991? This article analyzes this question by using the eclectic approach which integrates the interest group and institutional approaches, the typical perspectives employed for examining the United States trade policy. Even while this eclectic approach admits the importance of the framework of the regime, it is not necessarily considered in isolation from political influences. Even after the regime introduced the delegation from the Trade Promotion Authority of the Congress to the president, the Congress hadn’t completely lost control of the trade policy; the Congress allowed the president to take the initiative although it had the power to influence the trade policy. Depending on the national and international political and economic situation, this approach indicates that the Congress may have, in fact, limited the ability of the president to make such decisions. This article explains the reason for the Congress’s attempts to regain the trade initiative from the president. This implies that there was an expansion of trade actors promoting protective trade preferences and advocating for change in public opinion to change the free trade regime to a protected trade system.

  • ―衝突する規範の妥協と二重基準論争―
    濱村 仁
    2016 年 2016 巻 184 号 p. 184_89-184_102
    発行日: 2016/03/30
    公開日: 2016/11/22
    ジャーナル フリー

    What are we to make of recurrent acrimonious debates over “double standards”—the injustice of treating like cases differently—in international politics (e.g. the nuclear nonproliferation regime)? I argue that this is best understood as a product of constant clashes among mutually-opposed universalist norms in international society and fragile compromises or “cease-fire lines” that have developed out of them. Those unstable “cease-fire lines” arouse fierce debate over “double standards”: rejectionists would reject outright the need to compromise; revisionists would seek to re-demarcate the line while quietly accepting the need for a compromise; conservatives would be keen on preserving the status quo. A “ceasefire line” can be stabilized either by gradual accumulation of legitimacy via conventionalization or by promotion of the perception that cases that are treated differently are actually different in nature.

    In the case of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the “cease-fire line” centered around the NPT had emerged out of clashes between two diametrically-opposed universalist norms about the legitimacy of nuclear weapons: self-defense and humanitarian concerns. This compromise was made possible by two “segregations” of the norms, one temporal and the other spatial. The temporal segregation allows self-defense to prevail for some time and humanitarian concerns thereafter concerning five NWSs. The spatial segregation allows self-defense to prevail in NWSs and humanitarian concerns in NNWSs. Since the spatial segregation amounts to illegitimate institutionalization of NWSs’ fait accompli, efforts were made to legitimize it by the temporal segregation, the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and a subtle distinction between “responsible NWSs” and “irresponsible NNWSs” implied by the “proliferation” metaphor. Citing the “double standard” of the treaty, however, even some of those that are qualified as NWSs like France and China refused to sign the NPT until the end of the Cold War.

    The fragility of the two “segregations” allows the dissatisfied to challenge the “cease-fire line” and thereby arouses debate on the “double standards” on several fronts. Firstly, ambiguity of the line between peaceful and military use of nuclear energy allows a NNWS to disguise its military program as peaceful, thereby spatially expanding the sphere where self-defense prevails while accusing NWSs of doing the same thing, albeit of the temporal kind. Secondly, lack of legitimacy in the outright approval of NWSs’ fait accompli makes it vulnerable from further attempts to spatially expand the sphere where self-defense prevails since a “latecomer” can also create a new fait accompli by acquiring nuclear capability. Thirdly, ambiguity of the time frame for disarmament allows NWSs to keep their nuclear weapons almost indefinitely, i.e. to temporally expand the sphere where self-defense prevails while accusing NNWSs of doing the same thing, albeit of the spatial kind.

  • ―記憶と国民的結合を巡って―
    大嶋 えり子
    2016 年 2016 巻 184 号 p. 184_103-184_116
    発行日: 2016/03/30
    公開日: 2016/11/22
    ジャーナル フリー

    Recognising memories of past perpetrations or not is often an issue connected with responsibility and reconciliation between victims and perpetrators. This has been for a long time an issue vexing French authorities.

    In the 1990’s, French government and parliament began to recognise memories related to the colonisation and the independence war of Algeria. Although French authorities had kept silent on those dark events to which many fell victim on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea, they started to recognise memories related to Algeria by erecting memorials, opening museums and making laws.

    This article aims at elucidating why the French parliament made laws recognising memories related to Algeria. Making memory-related laws, called “memory laws (lois mémorielles)”, is a particular way to France to recognise certain perceptions of the past, and is different from other memory recognitions as it has a binding force.

    I thus considered two laws, made in respectively 1999 and 2005. The law passed in 1999, that I will call the “Algerian war law”, replaces the term “the operations in North Africa” with “the Algerian war or the battles in Tunisia and Morocco” in the French legislative lexicon. It officially recognises that the conflict in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 was a war, whereas it has been long reckoned to be a domestic operation aiming at maintaining order. The law enacted in 2005, that I will call the “repatriate law”, pays homage to former French settlers in Algeria for their achievements and emphasises the “positive role of the French presence abroad”.

    This study shows that those two laws were made in order to reinforce national cohesion among French people, instead of fostering dialogue between Algerians and French. By examining the wording and the law making processes of the two acts in question, especially the debates conducted at the National Assembly, it sheds light on how French elected representatives tried not to acknowledge France’s responsibility for the damages caused during the colonisation and the independence war and how they attached little importance to reconciliation with Algeria. Both laws indeed do not contain memories of Algerian people harmed under French rule, except some parts of the memory of Harkis, who fought with the French army during the war.

    The recognition of memories by official authorities of former perpetrators has significant repercussions and can encourage reconciliation between antagonists. It however tends to avert eyes from victims’memories in France when the past related to Algeria is in question. Issues connected with memory do not only concern relations between France and Algeria, but also involve the larger question of how to remember perpetrations caused by discriminatory policies and how to overcome them to accede to reconciliation between victims and perpetrators.

  • ―強要における過信と楽観―
    松岡 智之
    2016 年 2016 巻 184 号 p. 184_117-184_131
    発行日: 2016/03/30
    公開日: 2016/11/22
    ジャーナル フリー

    With the ending of the Cold War, the U.S. has failed in coercing far weaker states – such as Serbia,Afghanistan and Iraq – to comply with its demands, despite its overwhelming military superiority. Conventional wisdom holds that a stronger state’s superiority ensures the credibility of its threat, and that the weaker state will accept the demands because the ex-ante uncertainty of any conflict’s outcome (namely,the target’s defeat) almost does not exist. In reality, however, weaker states frequently resist stronger states’ threats, sometimes fighting hopeless wars instead of complying with their demands peacefully. This paper explores this puzzle of asymmetric compellence failure and asymmetric war.

    Commonly, asymmetric compellence failures are explained by focusing on other states’ interventions or the domestic factors which reduce or extinguish asymmetry. Alternatively, they are regarded as reassurance failures, in which commitments to future self-restraint are deemed incredible. The weaker state resists the threat to defend its reputation for resolve. In contrast, this paper argues that power asymmetry undermines the credibility of the threat itself.

    Why do such counter-intuitive phenomena occur? This paper argues that an asymmetry in relative capability necessarily implies an asymmetry in mutual threat perception. When power is symmetrical,each state’s power represents a serious threat to the other. If conflict occurs, the threat is automatically prioritized by both states. Therefore, in securing their existence (and as the vital interests of both are at stake), they will symmetrically display the maximum levels of resolve and willingness. In the instance of power asymmetry, however, the stronger state’s existence is unquestioned, with lesser conflicts not receiving priority. Contrastingly, the weaker state’s resolve will be stronger, as its existence is at stake. This asymmetry undermines the stronger state’s compellent threat, constructing it as incredible, precisely because the coercer’s resolve is in doubt.

    In instances of power symmetry, it is not a balance of resolve but capabilities that affects the conflict’s outcome – the balance of resolve remains symmetrical. Ex-ante uncertainty is chiefly concerned with the competitor’s relative capability, not resolve. However, in instances of power asymmetry, the balance of resolve is uncertain. Ex-ante uncertainty is here principally concerned with relative resolve – capability is materially objective, while resolve is psycho-subjective, and thus less measurable. This variability/flexibility and invisibility leads to mutual misperceptions, which contribute to the failure of negotiations in cases of power asymmetry.

    For example, while a stronger state’s increase in resolve – which originates from changes in its perception of the threat presented by a weaker target – may be clear to itself, this may remain unclear to the opponent. Consequently, the coercer may overestimate its own credibility (because it knows its true resolve) while the target underestimates its credibility (because it sees the coercer’s resolve as weak). These differences in credibility perception lead to asymmetric compellence failures. This logic is illustrated with reference to the 2003 Iraq War.

  • ―東地中海の「帝国の残滓」と同盟の狭間、一九七四年―
    伊藤 頌文
    2016 年 2016 巻 184 号 p. 184_132-184_145
    発行日: 2016/03/30
    公開日: 2016/11/22
    ジャーナル フリー

    This article explores Britain’s diplomatic action during the Cyprus crisis in summer 1974, considering the co-relations between the British concerns about its ‘remnant of Empire’ in the eastern Mediterranean and the disputes within the Western alliance in the region.

    It is often emphasised that post-war British foreign policy was radically amended by the decision of withdrawal from ‘East of Suez’ in January 1968. This decision, however, did not mean Britain’s total retreat from post-imperial presence in the world. In the regions where the Cold War confrontation intensified, its influence and commitment continued, although British capability to contribute to the Western alliance was declining.

    The eastern Mediterranean, where Britain’s historical ties and strategic bases were maintained, became a typical case of this dilemma. Matters were further complicated by Greco-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, which witnessed ethnic conflict originating during British colonial rule. Both Greece and Turkey were the members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and, along with Britain, the co-guarantors of independent Cyprus. Britain’s remaining commitment, namely the ‘remnant of Empire,’ and alliance politics were thereby connected over Cyprus.

    The Cyprus crisis of 1974 involved three guarantors and other alliance members. As a guarantor of Cyprus and the leader of Commonwealth, the British government led by foreign secretary James Callaghan played the central role for a diplomatic solution. Pursuing the stability of the region, at first Britain condemned the Greek junta, which had direct responsibility for the crisis. At the same time, it needed to restrain Turkey from unilateral military action.

    In order to prevent the situation from escalating, the coordination between Britain and the United States was essential. However, American authorities, headed by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, were primarily concerned with the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union and NATO’s stability in the region rather than British interests. It was obvious to Kissinger that the Greek junta was already corrupt and Turkey was much more important for NATO than Greece, and therefore he was reluctant to bring pressure either on the Greek junta or on the Turkish jingoists. This precipitated Turkish military actions and the breakdown of peace talks among the guarantors.

    Callaghan and British policymakers were irritated by Kissinger’s unsympathetic attitude. Although it lacked the possibility to achieve the diplomatic solution unilaterally, caught by its historical legacy Britain could not compromise on Cyprus with Kissinger. Therefore, as Callaghan complained after the crisis,Britain had the ‘responsibility without power’ for the eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus.

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