The special issue on “From the Sino-Japanese War to the Japanese-Anglo-American War” has been organized in order to seek new avenues of reseach in the political process leading to the Pacific War. The basic archival materials relevant to reseach in the 1930's have progressivly been opened to scholars, especially in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and Japan. In most of recent studies relating to the theme of this issue, notable trend which can be observed lies in the growing tendency to research both the nature of the Anglo-American relations in East Asia and foreign policy making process of the great powers as deeply as possible. Each of the articles in this issue, especially Kurosawa, Shoji, Tobe and Takahashi, attempts to re-examine a particular phase or aspect of Japanese foreign policy or military policy in the interwar years. Kurosawa's article examines the perceptions of the Japanese army towards the United States in the 1920's. Shoji's article discusses that the New Order in East Asia Declaration of Konoe Fumimaro in 1938 based on his philosophy of international justice would be an attempt to escape from the Washington Treaty System. Tobe discusses that the Japanese army in the late-1930's regarded it as necessary to prepare for a next World War which would break out in 1942, because the War was expected to provide a good opportunity to eliminate the Soviet threat. Takahashi's article attempts to reexamine the controvercial issue of Wang Ching-wei's participation in the Pacific war. The, interpretative frameworks of these articles are varied; but each of them attempts to shed new light upon the subject which it deal with. It is our hope that these articles could make some contributions to scholarly understanding of the pre-war or the wartime Japanese diplomacy. For the Nazi-Germany, declaration of war on the United States in 1941 was not suicidal, nor a part of Hitler's agressive war plans. Why did Hitler declare war against the United States? Both Yoshii and Ohki reconsider the motives and political process of Germany's decision to start the war against the United States. The “stratified structure” of the Nazi-German foreign policy, examined by Ohki, may help us to understand the succsess of Hitler's regime in the arena of the international politics in the 1930's. Also included is Shiozaki's article which examines the role of “the Round Table” movement in the completion of the Anglo-American alliance in 1941. With his examinations of the nature and ideas of the Round Table movement, our understanding of the peace talks in Washington could surely be deepened much more. Needles to say, this issue intend to be not a definitive work on the given theme, but just a starting point.
This article aims at examining how the Japanese army understood the U. S. A., mainly in the 1920's. Inquiry into this problem has been neglected up till now. For it has generally been believed that the Japanese army had little interest in the U. S. A., because their hypothetical enemy consistently has been the U. S. S. R. (or Russia). Neverthless research indicates that there were many sources concerned with the U. S. A. in the 1920's. This study, making use of these sources, will examine the perception of the Japanese army towards the U. S. A. Chapter 1 explains the army's motives for its inquiry into the U. S. A. after W. W. 1 under four points: (1) interest in the U. S. Army which had previously been largely disregarded. (2) interest in its remarkable accomplishments of the World War. (3) rivaly over the Far East & the Pacific Area (mainly China) with the U. S. A. who had become a world power. (4) interest in the U. S. A. as one example of the transformation of domestic structure and the military system. Chapter 2 analyzes how the army understood the military education for the nation in the U. S. A., based on the fourth point in Chapter 1. This analysis makes clear that the army relatively rated their military education for the nation high, and that this estimate corresponded to the understanding of the ‘Taisho Democracy’ by the army at that time. The army was specially interested in the fact that American's participated in and supported military education voluntarily and actively. After W. W. 1, war was transformed in to a total war, consequently the significance of the nation in a war remarkably increased. And then, how the nation could been awakened to a voluntariness became the most significant problem in the Japanese army at that time. The army found in the democratic regime, the culture, and their nationality reasons why Americans was awakened to a voluntariness. Finally, I conclude that the understanding of the Japanese army towards the U. S. A. in the 1920's was calm and objective, and that the army directed their attention to the American domestic affairs, such as the military education for the nation, because the army did not count the U. S. A. as a hypothetical enemy in any immediate war or as an ideological enemy.
Konoe Fumimaro served three times as prime minister for over almost three years in prewar Japan. He played an important role in the Sino-Japanese War, the Axis Alliance and the advance to southern French Indochina to guide Japan closer to war. In ideology he was very complicated making efforts for peace with the Allied Nations at the sacrifice of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, while he claimed to break the status quo from his youth (For example his article ‘Ei-Bei Hon'i no Heiwa Shugi o Haisu’) In the postwar period the estimates of him were divided broadly into two categories, namely, those who felt he was a tragic premier and those who saw him as a warmonger. Konoe himself regarded his cabinet as having only a weak existence manipulated by the army. But was he usually passive or not.? The aim of this paper, therefore, is to examine how Konoe saw international relations and how Japan's diplomatic policy was influenced by them in the first cabinet from the Marco Polo Bridge-Incident to the New Order in East Asia Proclamation. A true peace based on international justice which Konoe stated immediately after the inauguration of the new cabinet put emphasis on the justificaiton of Japan's policy towards East Asia from the Manchurian Incident. But international justice converted from negative to positive meanings would lead to the New Order in East Asia through Sino-Japanese War. It was not the result of no clear prospect on the future of the war, but the embodiment of Konoe's world view. On the other hand though Konoe tried to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact, the issue split the Konoe cabinet to lead to a general resignation by the rejection of key ministers of the Cabinet. After all the Axis Alliance was concluded in the second cabinet. In spite of such hard-line policy of the Konoe cabinet toward Britain and America, Konoe himself did not intended to appeal to arms. He flattered himself that Britain and America would recognize Japan's situation sooner or later if Japan checked them more strongly. In any case the New Order in East Asia based on international justice was an attempt to escape from the Washington Treaty System in Japan's Diplomacy.
This article attempts to shed light on the heretofore little known aspect of the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations during their protracted war of 1937-1945. More than fifteen years ago, John H. Boyle published a highly commended book on Wang Ching-wei's peace movement and his Nanking regime, China and Japan at War, 1937-1945. But among the important topics he did not deal with in detail (but rather discussed only in passing) was the controversial issue of Nanking's participation in the Greater East Asian War. It is hoped that this short article will make some contribution to better understand the missing part in the wartime history. If there was anything Wang Ching-wei and his followers has least dreamed of or dreaded most, it was the outbreak of a new war in the Pacific between Japan, their sponsoring nation, and the U. S. In spite of the seemingly close ties between Nanking and Tokyo due to the latter's heavy multi-faceted commitments to the former, the Japanese government did not make any advance notice to Wang Ching-wei about its decision to open hostilities with the United States and its allies. On the eve of the war, it even decided unilaterally to prohibit the Nanking regime from joining the Japanese by declaring war against the Allies. The Pearl Harbor attack was a sudden jolt for the nucleus of the Nanking regime. Above all else, Wang had been surprisingly optimistic about the prospect of the peace talks in Washington. The other side of the coin of this optimism was Wang's great frustration with and serious disappointment at the prospect of his regime under Japanese occupation. Peace with Chungking looked dim and almost impossible. Japan's demands and impositions on Nanking after Pearl Harbor were rising, and, as was rightfully pointed out by Chen Kung-po, Wang's foremost disciple, the regime was seriously beset with major problems of low morale and profiteering attitudes. Now that the Sino-Japanese War had to be fought and eventually settled in the context of World War II, Wang made a critical decision to live and die with the Japanese by declaring war against the Allies. However, Nanking had to wait long until Tokyo, after many turns and twists, reached a consensus to signal a green light. This article treats at length the decision-making process of the Japanese side, and tries to analyze the gradual shift of views, from a flat “no” to a more conciliatory attitude, held by the Japanese politico-military leaders. As the trends of the war in the Pacific became increasingly less favorable, they came to realize the need to beef up politically the Nanking regime, and the idea of letting Nanking declare war against the Allies became more receptive to the Japanese. However, this idea proved to be contradictory and self-defeating, as Japan wanted to use Occupied China as a rear base to keep their war machine rolling.
Until September 1939 the Imperial Japanese Army expected that a next World War would break out in 1942. It regarded preparing for the War as well as settling the China Incident as the most important tasks of the country. Why did the army deem it necessary to prepare for the War while it was bogged down in China? And why did it anticipate the War in 1942? For years the army aimed at eradicating or neutralizing the menace from the north. Soviet Russia was supposed to interfere most vigorously with Japan's implementation of her national policy to build an autarchical block in East Asia. Japan, however, was militarily inferior to Russia. In June 1934 Japanese forces in Korea and Manchuria were estimated as less than third of Russian armies in the Far East. So the Japanese army had to increase its strength against Russia. Its build-up program which started in 1937 was intended to be completed by 1942. After the outbreak of the China Incident in July 1937, the army considered it more urgent to strengthen its troops against the Soviet Far Eastern forces, in order to keep Russia from intervening in the Incident and to prevent her from encouraging anti-Japanese groups in China. But Japan would remain in an inferior position vis-à-vis Russia in military terms even when she completed her build-up program in 1942. Therefore the Japanese army hoped that Soviet Russia would get embroiled in an European conflict, a next World War. Russia, then, would have to transfer a portion of its troops from the Far East to the European theater, or at least could not send reinforcements to the Far East. The military situation there would then turn favorable to Japan. It is well known that the army continued to insist on the conclusion of a military alliance with Germany and Italy until August 1939. According to the army's reasoning, the main objectives of this alliance were preventing the outbreak of a World War until 1942, and containing Soviet forces in European theater if the War came about. The army did not think that the China Incident would develop into a World War. It expected that the Incident would have been settled and its build-up plan have been completed when the War broke out in Europe. The army hoped that the War would offer it an excellent opportunity to fight the Soviet forces in militarily favorable terms. The World War was supposed to come about between Germany and Italy on the one hand, and Britain, France and Russia on the other. Japan should enter the war against Russia, but fight neither Britain nor France. So the war against Russia in the Far East would be a part of a next World War in Europe, but at the same time would be virtually separated from it. The Japanese Army regarded it as necessary to prepare for a next World War because the War was expected to provide a good opportunity to eliminate the Soviet's threat. The army anticipated the War in 1942 because its build-up program would have been completed and its military position have become better by then. But the actual Second World War did not offer the opportunity to fight Russia, owing to the conclusion of Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact. And the War broke out too early for Japan.
The aim of this article is to reconsider the motives of Germany's declaration of war on the United States by examining the talks between Japan and Germany over the conclusion of the “no-separate-peace” treaty in November/December 1941. The Japanese cabinet led by Hideki Tojo was on the one hand making its last efforts to conclude some agreement with Washington, but on the other preparing to re-approach Germany in case the negotiation across the Pacific broke up. In late November Japan asked Germany unofficially if they would conclude a treaty, that prohibited making a separate peace with Britain or the United States, and if it would open war against the United States in case Japan entered first. Although there is no document that shows directly how Hitler reacted to this Japanese inquiry, telegrams in the Magic documents and in the archive of the Japanese foreign ministry suggest that Hitler began to take a hard posision against the United States on November 28 at the latest. Hitler did not declare war, however, immediately after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7. It was because he wanted to wait for the “no-separate-peace” treaty to be concluded in order to give “a good impression” to the German people by announcing it on the same day as declaring war on the United States. Japan was anxious about this German delay of declaring war, but the Japanese did not consider the German co-entry into war as their essential condition of starting the war against the United States. In a series of meetings of the Liaison Conference between the government and armed forces preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, they discussed the question case Germany should ask Japan to take part in the war against the Soviet Union in return for their entry into war against the United States. They had concluded that if Germany brought up this question, they would give up concluding the treaty with Germany. Some historians still regard Japan's bold action was encouraged by Germany's pre-assurance on their co-entry into war with the United States, but Japan, especially the navy, did not calculate Germany's co-entry as a neccesity. For Germany, declaration of war on the United States was not suicidal, nor a part of Hitler's aggressive war plans. Hitler went into war with the United States because the war seemed unavoidable, and also because Japan, whose war potential was over-estimated by the German Navy, was at Germany's side this time unlike the situation in the First World War.
In 1941, England was determined to continue the war against Germany, and the collapse of German blitzkrieg-strategy against Soviet Russia was evident to any one. Despite the situation, Germany declared war on the third great power, the United States. Why? The purpose of this paper is to answer the question and to analyze its political process. Adolf Hitler who had failed to defeat England in 1940, decided to overthrow Soviet Russia with the intentions of taking over the hegemony of the Continent and of compelling England into peace negotiations. But in the meantime the United States was applying strong measures against Germany. Germany would have to fight the United States sooner or later, but American rearmament was not yet complete. So judged Hitler the state of affairs from the reports of military attache in Washington, D. C. and other Capitals. And he expected Japan to enter the war on England, or England and the United States with the hope of diverting Anglo-American military efforts into the Pacific. But Joachim von Ribbentrop, German foreign minister, had another conception: the conception of a continental bloc of four powers, Germany, Japan, Italy and Soviet-Russia. He had the same perception of America as Hitler, its incomplete militarization, and he intended to bring England to its knees, to detain the United States in neutrality and to turn over the warlike policy against Soviet Russia indirectly, by enticing Japan into the war against England. Yet the “traditional group” in foreign ministry (Ernst Frh. v. Weizsäcker and others) was anxious about war in Russia, and dissented from the underestimation of America and anti-American measures. It was important above all for them that Germany put all her energies into the Anglo-German war, so they attempted to urge Japan into the war with England. German navy insisted that they had to carry out the war on merchant shipping to defeat England, even if it caused war with America. But Hitler who was afraid of accidental war against England and America while fighting in Russia, prohibited the navy from the use of arms against American ships. The Navy also expected Japan to take action against England for the sake of tying down Anglo-American forces in Far East. From so various reasons, “actors” in the German decision-making process consented in appearance to drive Japan into the war against England before the beginning of Japan-United States negotiations and the German invasion into Russia. However the outbreak of Russo-German war in June, 1941 deprived Ribbentrop and diplomatic “traditional group” of the precondition of their one-front war policy-only against England. So they made overthrowing of Soviet-Russia their primary object, and switched from “against England” to “against Soviet Russia” in cooperation with Japan. But Hitler was so optimistic in the conflict with Soviet Russia that he expected victory before Japan entered the war against England. Here was displayed the duality of German policy towards Japan, the Hitler-Navy vs. Ribbentrop-“traditional group” in foreign ministry. And the escalation of American hostile actions in the Atlantic made the German Navy demand the removal of the restrictions upon attack on American ships more acutely. Hitler also came to consider the war against America more seriously. Yet Ribbentrop's policy was to keep the United States out of the war, and the diplomatic “traditional group” approved of this. Thus in the policy towards America, confrontation between the Hitler-Navy and Foreign ministry appeared. But this opposition in the political process did not become serious during the German advance into Russia. However the obscure attitude of Japan concerning Japan-United States negotiations and American hostile actions stalemated German foreign policy. And once the lack of ability to conquer Soviet Russia within 1941 became clear from
The Round Table movement, an exclusive organization centered in London with overseas branches, was set up in 1909 by Milner's “Kindergarten”, which consisted of graduates of New College, Oxford. The “Kindergarten” was devoted to the promotion of the union of South Africa after the Boer War. In 1910, the “Kindergarten” started The Round Table, which aimed at studying imperial affairs and achieving imperial federation. The intellectual origins of imperial federation were attributed to Milnerism, a policy of imperial reform in response to growing German militarism, and Hamiltonian Federalism, a constitution of the union under federal government. The two eminent Round Tablers, Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian), took throughout, responsibility for promoting the movement. For the next 10 years, the movement was looked upon so favorably that an élite class of the British Empire eagerly supported it. During the First World War, some of the Round Tablers rose to decision-making positions in both private and public sectors. After the Versailles Peace Conference, the Round Table group set about forming another movement to found the Institutes of International Affairs which were later realized respectively as the following; The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, Institute of Pacific Relations. These organizations had the same initiator and promotor, Lionel Curtis, who was called the “prophet”. In addition to Curtis' enlarged plot, Lothian advocated the establishment of the Anglo-American Federation that was encouraged by Streit's Federal Now. In 1939, though Lothian was stigmatized as an appeaser, he was appointed Ambassador to the U. S. by N. Chamberlain with Halifax's strong recommendation. Without Lothian's able and persistent mediation between the U. S. government and the U. K., the Destroyers Deal of 1940 could not have been concluded ahd the Lend-Lease Agreement could not have been reached. Anyway, it should be noted that Lothian's successful contributions could not only be found in the solution of the Atlantic defense problem, but also the Pacific defense problem. Lothian was determined to maintain the Status Quo against Japan's New Order policy in Asia and the Pacific. Considering the outbreak of the Anglo-American-Japanese War, 1941, the completion of the Anglo-American alliance that exhausted Lothian until his death, was said to be indispensable to the U. K's victory in the War against Japan. With the study of the Ideas and History of the Round Table movement, our understanding of the last World War in the Far East Theatre could surely be deepened much more.
The Warsaw Rising of 1944 has been one of the most controversial topics in modern Polish history. Two of the main points of contention concern 1) why the Polish Government-in-exile in London started the Rising, and 2) why the Soviet Union did not help the Warsaw insurgents. This article examines these two questions, using recently published sources, and tries to determine how the Rising affected the political struggles for power between the London Poles and Polish communists at the end of the Second World War. The Polish Government-in-exile originally preferred sabotage activities in the rear of German communications line and did not put much emphasis on the strategy of “powstanie (rising)”. The worsening of relations between the Polish Government-in-exile and the Soviet Government, however, made the London Poles feel they should play a more active role in the struggles against the Nazis. Thus, the “rising” was planned to demonstrate their political cause more effectively to the Soviets as well as to the Western allies. When the Rising broke out on the 1st of August, 1944, Stalin promised to help the insurgents. But soon the Soviets changed their attitude toward the Rising and became inactive or even hostile; the Soviet Government began to attack the “power seeking criminals” of the underground leadership in the latter half of August. It might well be that Stalin then assigned top priority to the grand military strategy of controlling the whole of south-east Europe, rather than becoming involved in local battles like the Rising. But new sources indicates that the political consideration of weakening the power base of the London Poles figured prominently in the change in Soviet policy. The tragic defeat of the Rising mainly damaged the London Poles. They lost not only a promising generation of future leaders, but also the prestige in Polish society. The Polish communists, however, could not take advantage of the defeat. The impression that these Soviet-oriented Polish communists betrayed the Polish cause in Warsaw made their prospect to seize power with wide support of the Polish masses, almost impossible. After the end of the Rising, the Communists changed their tactics and radicalized their original moderate social and economic programms. Thus After the Warsaw Rising, it became very difficult for the Polish and Russian communists to establish new regime in Poland without sovietizing it. At Yalta, the dispute over the future Polish regime became one of the most fierce political struggles between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, foreshadowing the rifts in the postwar settlement that would soon solidify into the Cold War conflict.