国際政治
Online ISSN : 1883-9916
Print ISSN : 0454-2215
ISSN-L : 0454-2215
1986 巻 , 81 号
選択された号の論文の17件中1~17を表示しています
  • 伊東 孝之
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 1-9,L5
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The foreign policy was long understood as something divorced from domestic political processes, as exemplified in the words coined by Leopold von Ranke: Primat der Außenpolitik. The credit for having questioned this traditional notion and established a linkage between foreign policy making and internal politics goes probably to the German-American historian Georg Hallgarten, author of the monumental work Imperialismus vor 1914. After the Second World War the domestic roots of foreign policy came to be accepted as something self-evident by the specialists in the West, especially in the United States.
    As regards the foreign policy of Communist countries, however, the traditional notion continued dominating until recently. This relates perhaps to the peculiar understanding of political power in Communist countries: It is neither based on, nor controlled by, society; it exists as if suspended in the air. The study of the foreign policy of Communist countries, therefore, concentrated on the person or persons in power; it was most kremlinological of all kremlinological studies.
    The reality in the Soviet Union under Stalin as appeared to the outside observers may be blamed for keeping this traditionalist view alive among the West. However, the changes in the Soviet Union since Khrushchev and the developments in Eastern European countries especially since 1956 increasingly called Western specialists' attention to the domestic roots of foreign policy of these countries. Thus, “foreign. policy is coming home” also for students of Communism, as Alexander Dallin aptly puts it.
    The present volume is not compiled so as to do justice to all the aspects of the subject-matter. The contributors are invited to discuss related topics according to their current research interest and research progress. It is, therefore, rather a matter of coincidence, if the volume more or less succeeded in covering the main aspects of the subject-matter. The introduction is followed by nine articles in four chapters: Historical Perspectives; Political Process and Foreign Policy; Ideology and Foreign Policy; Dynamics of Bloc Diplomacy. For the contents of the individual contributions, see below.
    Understandably the present volume leaves many important gaps to be filled. Here is a tentative list of topics for future study: 1. Social pressures and foreign policy. 2. Ethnic or regional problems and foreign policy. 3. Belief or value systems as actually operative among the ruling strata, including attitudes or national prejudices, and foreign policy. 4. Case studies of domestic input into the foreign policy. 5. Drawing of a. tentative flow chart of formal and/or informal inputs from domestic politics to foreign policy and feedbacks from foreign policy to domestic politics.
    The volume intends to be not a definitive work on the given subject, but just a starting point. If it serves as an encouragement to young ambitious scholars to embark on this still uncharted risky, but rewarding field, its main task is fulfilled.
  • 藤本 和貴夫
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 10-25,L6
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This paper deals with the internal and foreign policy of the Soviet Government during the first months of Soviet rule, between October 1917 and the spring of 1918. The essence of the so-called “Revolutionary Diplomacy” which was adopted by the Soviet Government in this period did not lie in the principles of the Peace Declaration, but in the actions of this Government. The Soviet Government tore up the treaties on the continuance of the war and won broad support from the masses which demanded for peace at that time. On the other hand the Allies could not intervene at once, though they reacted strongly against the peace policy of the Soviet Government. They were obliged to admit the facts that the Soviet peace policy had the overwhelming support of the masses and that they could not disturb the strong movement for peace among the masses.
    The policy for general democratic peace, which was adopted by the Soviet Government, met with the disregard of the Allies and the demand for annexation from the Central Powers. At this moment, the political struggle over the peace policy within the Soviet Government and the Bolshevik Party reached its climax. This struggle, which is generally described in terms of the antagonism between Lenin/Bukharin and Trotsky, was actually caused by the disagreement between two wings: Lenin and his followers, and the big radical party organizations such as those of Petrograd and Moscow. The political appeal, “No peace, no war”, was proclaimed by Trotsky in his draft of compromise. The final victory of Lenin was brought about by the start of the attack of the German army. This victory of Lenin, supported by foreign pressure, continued the above-mentioned struggle up to the summer of 1918.
    After the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, the Soviet Government made use of the “breathing space” and tried to build a centralized state. But this tactic did not succeed. Therefore, the principal foreign policy of the Soviet Government turned against the armed Powers of both neighbouring Germany in the west and Japan in the east. In its actual policy at this moment the Soviet Government chose compromise with Germany, but did not offer its hand to Japan, who was supported by England and France. This is why the geopolitics centering on Soviet Russia was widely influential.
  • 横手 慎二
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 26-41,L7
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    Many students of the Soviet foreign policy are turning increasing attention to the domestic aspects or factors which condition the making of Soviet foreign policy. Their general approach is to analyze the activities of the responsible personalities triggered by the imminence or occurrence of some important politicized issues. Though this approach is effective in making clear the dynamic nature of the seemingly static politics, it has pitfalls in itself. For example it inclines to set the routine decision making process in the blind spot. In order to comlement this methodological shortcoming, more attention should be paid to the systems, in which diplomatic ploblems are normally dealt with without or before becoming politicized issues. The purpose of this paper is to describe the change of these systems in the inter war period.
    In this period three elemental foreign policy making systems can be discerned: the collective deliberation system in 1921-1927/8, the more complicate one of the 1930s, at the center of which stood the Politbure commission on foreign affairs, and the Stalin-Molotov consultating system.
    In the first system, in which the members of the Politburo consulted with spokesmen of People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (PCFA), Chicherin's role in policy making seemed to be more substantial than his party rank suggested. Partly because he had conducted foreign affairs exclusively with Lenin for a long time, and partly because party leaders were too busy in party strife to keep their eyes on the foreign affairs after Lenin's death, Chicherin could exert significant influences in this area, though he had to fight with Litvinov in PCFA.
    In the second system Litvinov's commissariat was challenged in the function of assembling and evaluating informations from abroad firstly by Karl Radek's small group at the private secretariat of Stalin, and then by the Foreign Section of the Central Committee Secretatiat. Though Litvinov was under tighter control of the party leadership, he could contribute to policy making above all through his direct advices to Stalin.
    After the removal of Litvinov in May 1939, this cumbersome system gave way to the simpler one, in which Stalin played a more active role. In this system Molotov seemed to remain not so much a foreign policy specialist as a mere executor of his superior's orders. Perhaps it was due to the purges and Molotov's non-creative leadership which greatly atrophied the diplomatic apparatus. With this point in view it should be reconsidered that Molotov. and his Ministry played only the limited role in the postwar Soviet foreign policies.
  • 皆川 修吾
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 42-60,L8
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    one might expect the conduct of bureaucracy of such modern industrial country as the Soviet Union to be governmnet by the norms of rationality, anonymity and universalism. Yet, it has been widely noted that informal alignments based on interpersonal, sectional and functional commitments are one of characteristics of the Soviet bureaucracy. This paper seeks to establish a few common and distinctive features of the “physiology” of Soviet informal groups, namely, clientelist group, sectional group, and functional group. Then, it attempts to identify how they work and what part they play in the Soviet policy process.
    A patron-client relationship is an alliance between two persons of unequal status, power or resources, each of whom finds it useful to have as an all someone superior or inferior to himself. The clientelist group is made up of officials of divers institutions cutting right across regional and organizational boundaries. Soviet clientelist activity connected with efforts to establish a dominant position within the ruling oligarchy inevitably takes on policy content. Sectional group has a similar set-up as that of clientelist group, but it is hierarchical, and is made up of officials of a single organization. This group is linked with every aspect of the policy processes. Functional group is made up of functional specialists of (mainly) research institutions. In the Soviet Union of the late sixties and early seventies specialists did participate widely in a variety of areas.
    Power politics among contending clientelist groups that inevitably takes policy content may invite participation of sectional and functional groups. Although the nature of censorship strengthens the tendency for policy relevant alliances to remain compartmentalised within these sectional and functional groups, it largely depends on a clientelist group that has an ability to mobilize as a wide base of support of sectional and functional groups as possible for a clientelist leader's initiatives in the Soviet bureaucracies. However, informal groups' activities in policy processes may take varying forms depending on the political circumstances, the nature of the particular regime, and/or the nature of the policy under consideration.
    An uneasy but culturally agreeable symbiotic relationship between these three groups nevertheless operates as systemic adjusting mechanism in Soviet policy processes.
  • 長谷川 毅
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 61-80,L9
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The weapons procurement process in the Soviet Union is crucial in understanding the interaction between foreign policy and domestic politics as well as the interconnection in the domestic political dynamics among politics, economy and military factors. This article aims to examine the political dynamics in the Soviet weapon procurement process.
    The article is divided into three parts. The first part, “the static anlysis of the weapons procurement in the Soviet Union, ” explains the actors and their role in the process. Specifically, the three-layered structure consisting of the party, the military, and the government is examined. The actors explained here include: the Politburo, the Defense Council, the Central Committee Secretariat, the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, each military service, the Council of Ministers, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, the Military Industrial Commission (VPK), each military industrial ministry, its research institutes and design bureaus, and its enterprises.
    The second part, “the dynamic analysis of the weapons procurement process, ” examines how these actors interact each other in the actual process of weapons procurement. Requests for weapons development usually originate in one of two ways: from below and from above. From below each military service may request a development of new weapons sytem necessitated from operations requirements. In actuality, it may originate from design bureaus trying to push their new designs. The request must be approved by the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, the Defense Council, the VPK, and the Politburo. When a request originates from above, the VPK will translate the decision into an actual policy. When a decision is made to develop a weapons system, the VPK, through the appropriate military industrial ministry, begins the process of design competitions among design bureaus. Two or three design bureaus are allowed to proceed to the construction of a prototype. After the prototype is tested by the State committee, only then a decision to proceed to a series production is made. Design bureaus and the voenpredy sent by the military service serve to control the quality of the weapons produced in enterprises.
    The third part singles out some of the salient characteristics of the Soviet weapons procurement process. First, the Soviets take several measures to ensure the high quality of weapons systems within the framework of the planned economy. These measures include high priority given to the military industry, the existence of the consumer's sovereignty in the military industry, free competition among design bureaus, and stability of the weapons procurement elite. But the high quality of Soviet weapons does not mean efficiency of the military industy. In fact, it has caused waste and delays in modernization. The deepening Soviet economic crisis and the sharp rise in the unit cost of weapons production will no longer make it possible for the Soviet government to treat the military industry as a sacred cow. Second, history and the organizational restrictions have led the Soviets to develop a unique design philosophy, which stresses three principles, “simplicity, ” “commonality, ” and “evelutionary revision.” This approach has both advantages and disadvantages: it helps the Soviet military to be provided with inexpensive, mass-produced weapons, easy to operate and maintain. But the Soviet weapons procurement process is not conducive to generate innovations. Therefore, the systemic crisis of Soviet economy will inevitably engulf the military sector, which has been successfully insulated from the inefficiencies of the command economy.
  • 岩田 賢司
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 81-96,L10
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    This article has two major goals. One is to make clear the relation between Soviet economic foreign policy and domestic politics during the period from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. Another is to explain the domestic background of the Soviet détent policy by analyzing the result of the debate upon domestic economic policy and the power struggle between General Secretary of the CPSU Leonid I. Brezhnev (or the party apparatchiki) and Prime Minister Alexei N. Kosygin (or administrative technocrats).
    Brezhnev's course in economic affairs may be called a “rationalised centralism” approach. He intented to increase the efficiency of the Soviet economy by means of introducing the computer system without removing of central power. The policy of unifying enterprises, which was started with the initiative of Brezhnev and the party apparatchiki, had two purposes: to abolish decentralization centralization and to establish centralization. Consequentry, Brezhnev and the party apparatchiki were confronted with Kosygin and admisnistrators on the subject of the optimum relation between decentralization and centralization.
    Brezhnev and the party apparatchiki exceeded Kosygin and administrators in strength in policy debates and power struggles, and Brezhnev penetrated into the economic field which had been monopolized by Kosygin during the late 1960s. Brezhnev learned from Kosygin's and the administraters' failure at economic reform in the 1960s and recognized the difficulty of reforming the Soviet economic system by its own power. As a result of the failure of technological innovation from within he changed the view. He admitted a change for the worse of the achievements of the Soviet economy in comparison with the economies of Western advanced capitalist countries and advocated a policy of the introduction of Western high technologies into the USSR.
    In the last analysys, Brezhnev and the party apparatchiki tried to recover “the leading role of the CPSU” and to establish “the party's right of control” (_??__??__??__??_ _??__??__??__??__??__??__??__??_) in administrative offices by struggling against the sectionalism of ministries and agencies. As a result of this, they could overcome the obstacle against the introduction of Western high technologies into the Soviet economy and change the policy for the passive interdependece with the Western economy and the permanence of detente policy.
  • 下斗米 伸夫
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 97-114,L11
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The notion of “contradiction” in Maxist terminolgy is rather commonplace, but “contradiction under socialism” had seldom been discussed in Soviet Academic circles. However, there have been developed a new phage in it: The rise and fall of “Solidarity” movement in Poland, coupled with the economic “difficulty” in the USSR, gave rise to the new discussion on the contradiction amongst the party and philosophical circles. Vice President of the Academy of Sciences Fedoseev was the first to launch controversial debate over the “antagonistic contradiction under socialism” in 1981, though he saw it in exceptional circumstances. Editor of “Problems of Philosophy” Semenov and a reseacher named Butenko were the strong advocators of “Antagonistic contradictions under socialism, ” though Butenko's analysis on it was surely one of the most critical and far-reaching analysis of “developed socialism” ever made in the USSR, even though his analysis lacked class approach. Although public debates took place in the academic circles in 1982-84, some philosophers like Fedoseev and Ili'chev who were more or less innovators and a more orthodox ideologue, Medvedev, became critical towards Butenko's analysis, and public discussion seemes to have been terminated by the middle of 1984.
    Still the discussion itself seems significant on three planes; fivstly, this was an indirect but academic discussion on the impact of the Polish affair on theory and practice of existing socialim. Some apparently departed from the stereo-type image of “counter-revolution” in Poland, and Bukenko even discussed the possibility of “deformation of socialism”.
    Secondly, this was also a discussion on the necessity of economic reform. Fedoseev and others arged for the change of economic system and “productive relations” which lag behind the “productive forces, ” the basic contradiction of socialism was attributed to it.
    Thirdly, conctradiction controversy apparently reflected the new discussion on the future of Soviet society. The party programme was to be changed in the 27th Communist Party Congress, and Fedoseev, Medvedev and other participants in the discussion were also the members of this draft commission.
  • 吉川 元
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 115-130,L12
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    The aim of this paper is to examine the development of the Soviet human rights movement which started in the early 1970s under the impact of detente between U. S. -Soviet relations. In view of the possible infiltration of “bourgeois ideology” into the Soviet and East European societies, Soviet leaders sought to restructure alliance relations among the Soviet bloc countries by institutionalizing consulting system at every level. Accordingly the 1970s saw a rapid progress of integration of the bloc on interstate and inter-party relations at the highest levels.
    It is at this time when the Soviet human rights movement started. Under the tightened and unified ideological control in the bloc, the Soviet dissident movement, which was isolated socially at the time, was forced to make an attempt to win popular support and international aid. The approach adopted by the movement was legal and non-ideological one with special emphasis on the protection of human rights. Based on Soviet constitution and international law, the newly born Soviet human rights movement began to demand the Soviet government to observe its own law, and to appeal to international public opinion to interfere in the internal problems of the Soviet Union.
    It is the concluding document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that made great impact on the development of the Soviet human rights movement. Now that the Soviet government has signed the document which reaffirms unbreakable relation between international peace and the protection of human rights in a country, the movement has found legitimacy in calling upon signatory countries of the document and international public opinion for international humanitarian interference. At the same time, while winning wider popular support in the society by focussing its aim specifically on human rights issue, the Soviet human rights movement has spread to East European countries. Because of the common goal and strategy among many ethnic movements in the Soviet bloc, there came to appear a loosely unified human rights movement in the second half of the decade.
    The internationalization of the Soviet human rights problems and the international humanitarian interference by the West in Soviet internal affairs, however, has made little contribution to the improvement of the problems. On the contrary the movement has come to suffer from harsher political suppresion particularly with the beginning of Carter's human rights policy, and the U. S. and the Soviet governments came to be confronted as the human rights issue became one of the most important issues between the two governments, The rise and fall of the Soviet human rights movement may suggest that, firstly, under the conditions of the detente human rights problems of the Soviet Union can not be immune from the impact of international concern on human rights problems, and, secondly, only the legal and non-ideological approach can successfully internationalize human rights issue.
  • 秋野 豊
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 131-145,L13
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    According to Hugh Seton-Watson the process of East European revolutions from 1944 to 1948 can be broken down into three stages: 1) geniune coalition; 2) bogus coalition; and 3) monolithic regime. Through the prism of this three-stage formula an interesting spectrum of the communist takeovers in question is gained. Yugoslavia and Albania passed directly to a “monolithic regime, ” Hungary and Czechoslovakia plunged into a “monolithic regime” from a “genuine coalition” without experiencing a “bogus coalition.” Romania and Bulgaria starting with a “genuine coalition” reached a “monolithic regime” through a “bogus coalition”, and Poland, where the stage of a “genuine coalition” was simply omitted, proceeded from a “bogus coalition” to a “monolithic regime.” Hence we can now classify these seven takeovers into three groups:
    A. Yugoslavia and Albania
    B. Hungary and Czechoslovakia
    C. Romania, Bulugaria, and Poland.
    This grouping does make geo-political sense. Group A consists of countries historically not bordering the Soviet Union; Group B, countries bordering the Soviet Union since the end of WWII; Group C, countries geographically the closest, therefore the most important for the Soviet security. As we see from the grouping, the geographical proximity of each country to the Soviet Union is of especial importance for the latter's security. The closer a country was to the USSR the more naked were the Soviet interventions. This can be reckoned to be a reason why the three-stage formula is most applicable to the countries in Group C and more those in Group B than to those in Group A.
  • 松井 弘明
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 146-160,L14
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
    There are a number of books on Rumanian foreign policy autonomy from the Soviet Union. Much of what has been written has focused on the country's economic policy as well as its international relations.
    I have approached writing this paper from the point of view of power struggle in Rumanian Communist Party.
    There were, roughly, two main factions competed for leadership in RCP. The one of them was called “home communist” who had spent the WWII years in Rumania, some of them were imprisoned. To this group belonged Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Chivu Stoica, Gheorghe Apostol and Nicolae Ceausescu.
    The other faction was called “Moscovite”, who has spent most of the war years in the Soviet Union. Well known leaders of this faction were Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca. Since 1940's struggle between these two factions has been recognized.
    In 1952, Pauker and Luka were purged during the period of attack against “Titoist”, although “Moscovite” groups registered victory in almost all other east European countries but Albania.
    In the process of de-Stalinization, Dej gave up the position of First Secretary of RCP, entrusting it to his old comrade Apostol in 1955, only after he executed his powerful rival Lucretiu Patrascanu.
    Soon after Malenkov was oustered from CPSU in the Soviet Union, Dej resumed the firstsecretaryship again and the next year of Hungarian revolution, he oustered Chisinevski and Constantinescu from Politbureau.
    On the other hand, Dej reinforced his position by instalation his reliable comrades Ceausescu, Stoica and so on to the important positions in the Party.
    By the early 1960's, the political power of the opposition had been efficiently wiped out and Dej began openly autonomous policy from Kremlin.
    Dej's vicotry in power struggle and been essentially necessary to go to autonomous domestic and foreign policy in Rumania.
  • 松尾 正人
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 161-178
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 庄司 真理子
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 179-195
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 安藤 次男
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 196-200
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 山口 定
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 200-204
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 御巫 由美子
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 204-208
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 玉木 一徳
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 209-212
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 伊東 孝之
    1986 年 1986 巻 81 号 p. 216
    発行日: 1986/03/25
    公開日: 2010/09/01
    ジャーナル フリー
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