When we examine the diplomatic thoughts and ideas in modern Japan stretching over some hundred and thirty years since Commodore Perry (1794-1858) forced the gates of Japan in 1854, the following three features can be traced: First of all, under the Tokugawa Shogunate's policy of seclusion, which lasted well over two centuries, Japan's diplomatic ties with the outside world were secured almost totally. However, Perry's visit to Uraga changed the whole situation: the sudden influx of Western civilization made the Japanese highly sensitive to what was going on in the newly experienced world; and “Westernization” became their keyword, whereas they began to show contempt for China and Korea whose “Westernization” processes fell far behind Japan's. Many diplomatic issues in the early Meiji period grew out of troubles with these two countries, which were attributable not only to the conflict of interests but to the divergence of Weltanschauungen.
Secondly, massive pressure from the West resulted in a policy of datsu-A nyu-O (_??__??__??__??_), or leaving Asia and identifying with Europe; and hardly any Japanese, either government officials or civilians, entertained doubts about this policy. But after two wars with China and Russia (1894-95 and 1904-05 respectively) Japan obtaind the status of an “imperialist” nation, and she took an extremely conciliatory attitude towards her Western superiors. On the other hand, among the oppsition elements was heard the criticism that this very attitude had been narrowing Japan's free hand in deciding her independent policies; hence appeared a design of datsu-O nyu-A (_??__??__??__??_), the very opposite of datsu-A nyu-O, in other words, a trend towards Pan-Asianism. With this as a background, not a little confusion, was seen in Japan over her diplomatic undertakings as well as in the field of thoughts and ideas. In short, there was in a relatively short period a radical oscillation of Japan's view towards the West.
Lastly, it is said that Japanese diplomacy has lacked generalization; and this is the so-called “diplomacy-with-no-concept” syndrome on the part of Japanese diplomats. On the contrary, not a few civilians have presented highly idealistic plans that they think Japan should follow. In modern Japan these two extremes have been coexistent.
This special number consists of nine papers on Japan's diplomatic ideas and thoughts in the Meiji, Taisho and prewar Showa periods, and one paper on postwar Japanese diplomacy. They are obviously different in their standpoint, but the editor believes that each has its own merits in employing new methods or unearthing new historical materials.

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Japanese views of East and West has been one of the most popular research topics relating to the study of diplomatic thinking. Refraining from repeating what I have already written on this topic on various occasions, here I would like to focus my argument on methodological problems.
Reseach on Japanese views of Asia has often confused the macro view with the micro. In a macro sense, Japanese views of Asia did not change greatly from the end of the Tokugawa period to the victory over China in 1895. In spite of the fierce conflict between pro-Westernism and anti-Westernism, almost all Japanese leaders, both within and without the government, maintained a very low estimate of China and Korea. The notion that “Japan should not repeat Chinese mistakes” had long been a commonly held view among the Japanese elites. In this sense, Japan had already “escaped from Asia” more than twenty years before FUKUZAWA Yukichi wrote his famous essay entitled “The Argument for Escaping from Asia” in 1885.
In a micro sense, however, China was a great power which had often hindered Japan's expansion into Taiwan and Korea. Until the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, Japan's intention to control the Korean government was frustrated by China two or three times.
As the result of the great gap between the macro and micro views of China, repeated contradictions in the writings of Meiji leaders within and without the government can be found. For example, FUKUZAWA Yukichi, one of the greatest thinkers of Meiji Japan, changed his view of China four times within the ten years between 1875 and 1885. In 1875, FUKUZAWA described China as a declining empire which could not understand the importance of the policy of “enriching the nation, ” Six years later, however, he criticised China for its lack of a policy of “building up military power.” One year later, FUKUZAWA changed this picture of China again, and warned the Japanese that Chinese military power was one of the greatest threats to Japan. In 1885, he changed this view of China for the fourth time, and predicted China's decline within a decade.
These striking inconsistencies disappear when we differentiate FUKUZAWA's macro view of China from his micro one. Like many other thinkers and political leaders in early Meiji Japan, FUKUZAWA was consistent in his macro view of China: China would never succeed in carrying out modernization. China thus became a negative model for Japan's modernization, and therefore FUKUZAWA could describe it without paying any attention to China's real situation. He and other Japanese often made statements such as “if we Japanese do not concentrate our efforts on industrialization, our future will be that of China today” or “if we do not endeavour to strengthen the military, our fate will be that of China today”. Here it is clear that Fukuzawa was arguing from the standpoint of a macro view of China and not a micro view.
When FUKUZAWA began to speak of the real China (or his micro view of China), his contempt disappeared and he gave a high evaluation of its strength and influence. As many historians of politics and foreign relations have pointed out, a micro view of a foreign nation is related deeply to its concrete domestic, political and economic situation, as well as to its actual foreign relations. In the final section of this essay, I have analyzed some of the concrete influences of Japan's foreign and domestic conditions on the Japanese micro views of China and Korea.

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About November 1882, England and France changed their relations from that of collaboration to that of rivalry, at least concerning their colonial policies. Not long after that the Japanese government gained information on this change. From 1883 to 1884, the French government worked upon Japanese authorities through various channels in quest of a ‘union’ with Japan, in need of a China policy, against which the Japanese government officially clarified, in July 1883, the intention of rejecting the proposal of the French government. On the other hand, about December 1883 England, working on the United States, Germany and Russia, devised a military cooperation plan for neutrality in Chinese ports and at the same time attracted Japan to that united operation. In response, in January 1884, the Japanese government had given previous consent to take part in the operation proposed by England. Thus, when a de facto war between China and France broke out, two Japanese warships had already taken part in military cooperation with Western Powers for neutrality on the Chinese coast.
Throughout the Japanese-French and Japanese-English negotiations, Japan was treated as an equal partner for ‘union’ by both England and France. That is, Japan was given status as an equal partner by England and France through those political processes, and we can conclude that Japan was, through these events, incorporated into the western state-system in the sense of power politics.

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Before the outbreak of war with Russia, top-level leaders in the Japanese Government, who well knew the limits of the nation's power and resources, hoped to confine the hostilities to a limited theater and a short time: the Japanese army was to fight in Manchuria no further than Harbin; the war itself was to last about a year. Within these limitations, Japan would have a good chance against Russia; Japanese leaders hoped for a mediator to come forward before the war went any further, to end it and make peace between the belligerents.
For Japan, then, it was crucial to avoid an expanded war at the level of world war, and particularly to avoid being perceived as a common enemy of the Christian countries of the West. In this regard, it was absolutely necessary to prevent a revival of fears of the “Yellow Peril” (primarily raised by Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany around the end of the Sino-Japanese War 1894-5) during the war with Russia.
At the outbreak of the war in February 1904, therefore, two special envoys were sent overseas to counter this potential anti-Japanese sentiment: Baron KANEKO Kentaro to the United States, and Baron SUYEMATSU Kencho to Europe. Both were proficient in English, fluent spokesmen for their Government. They spent over a year on their mission with remarkable effectiveness; with the Anglo-French Entente of April 1904, the danger of an expanded war was eliminated; there was no resurgence of anti-Oriental feeling—and of course no new crusade—in either the United States or Europe, despite Japan's successes against Christian Russia.
Japan found its mediator in American President Theodore Roosevelt; the Treaty of Portsmouth in September 1905 ended the Russo-Japanese War as the Japanese leaders had hoped. Japan accomplished her war objective, which was to safeguard her independence from Russian aggression in the Far East. But in the victory of an emerging island empire in the East over an old and powerful European nation, the “Yellow Peril” was felt to have become a reality for the West. Fear of the “Yellow Peril” manifested itself, thereafter, in the immigration policies of the United States and the other “white” countries of the Pacific basin. It became a continuing source of diplomatic friction.

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World War I, I believe, was a very important epoch for our country, and it took place in the period when a man called TERAUCHI Masatake was the prime minister of Japan. The TERAUCHI Cabinet was not only leading Japan during World War I, but it also made an important move towards the Continent. The policy on the Continent, however, can be represented by the so-called “NISHIHARA-Loans”, which were mainly planned by NISHIHARA Kamezo, a wirepuller of the TERAUCHI Cabinet. The men who conducted this policy were the Premier TERAUCHI, the Finance Minister SHODA, and NISHIHARA. These three were known as the “Korean Group.” They lent a great amount of money to China, and by this, tried to draw the Continent near to Japan.
In my opinion, this policy should be studied from the period before the Cabinet was formed, but somehow, this has not been done satisfactorily. The TERAUCHI Cabinet itself has been treated too lightly up to now, even though the Cabinet was leading Japan when we were facing the problem of “how to deal with the Powers of the world in the new situation”.
This paper focuses especially on NISHIHARA and his movements: how he acted before World War I and what he actually tried to do on the Continent. In this way, I believe we can form a new view of the “NISHIHARA-Loans, ” and the situation of Japan in that period.
NISHIHARA believed in “Kingeraftism-Asianism, ” influenced by KOMUCHI Tomotsune, which can be rephrased as, “assimilative-subordinativism, ” an idea which makes much of the benefits and the interests of the colony. He went to Korea in 1905, when the protectorate-treaty was signed, and in 1911, when the Korea and Manchuria Railway was completed, he went on into Manchuria. Soon after that, World War I broke out, the political situations of China changed, and the TERAUCHI Cabinet was beginning to take shape. These conditions made NISHIHARA go into the problem of China.
NISHIHARA thought that the next war would break out as a result of competition among the Powers for concessions in China, but he wanted to prevent China from being Balkanized. NISHIHARA felt the necessity to build up Japan-China relations during World War I.
Therefore, when Yuan Shih-K'ai died, he went to China and conceived of a plan called the “Loans to the Bank of Communications.” This was the first step of the “NISHIHARA-Loan, ” in order to complete the “Eastern Monroeism” before the end of World War I, by investing a colossal amount of money in China. Also we can say that it was Japan's countermove in the competition among the Powers, i. e., not be left behind in the situation of the time. Here, I believe we can find the main idea of the TERAUCHI Cabinet.

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From the early 1910s, ISHIBASHI Tanzan, a journalist of the “Oriental Economist, ” consistently expressed his sympathy for both the Chinese revolutionary movements and nationalism while criticizing not only the imperialist Japanese foreign policy toward China but also public trends such as the contempt shown toward Chinese people. In addition, he insisted that Japan should abandon all of its colonies including Manchuria, which was said to be a “sacred precinct.” He argued from various viewpoints including the political, diplomatic, economic, and strategic. The main reasons were as follows. (1) although Japan possessed rights and interests in China, Chinese people continued anti-Japanese movements because their nationalism was deeper and stronger than the Japanese government and people supposed; therefore, ISHIBASHI insisted that Japan abandon those interests in order to trade and co-operate with China; (2) all the colonies such as Manchuria were virtually worthless in economic terms; (3) to hold Manchuria the Japanese government had to over-expand itself militarily; thus, national life became worse and worse; and (4) as a result of Japan acquiring interests from China, Japanese-U. S. foreign relations worsened and Japan was isolated.
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to clarify ISHIBASHI's opinions, the theoretical structure of his arguments, and the controversial declarations he made during the Washington Conference of 1921-22.

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When considering the Manchukuo as a whole, we shall have to reexamine a Daikoraikoku plan conceived by SUENAGA Misao (1869-1960).
Against that background, there were radical changes both at home and abroad; and a new trend toward antirationalist ideas increasingly grew out of the rationalist ideas that had been dominating since the Meiji period.
Gondo Seikyo's doctrine of a Shashoku State, backed by a self-ruling society, was also based on this trend. The image of state developed in the Daikoraikoku plan was a product of this indigenous idea of his.
On the contrary, concerning the international affairs of the time, we can point out three changes. Firstly, an independent movement of Koreans in South Manchuria and Primorskij Kraj became active under the influence of the 3.1. movement in Korea. Secondly, Manchuria was in a power vacuum in the midst of big change in East Asia caused by Japan's withdrawal of troops from Siberia.
Thirdly, the upsurging of a trend of anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States, which was shown in the new immigration and land laws, made a considerable impact upon Japan and influenced the Japanese “Return” to Asia.
The Daikoraikoku plan was proposed as a solution to these changes in and around Japan. And it also included the principle of Odo Seizi (Righteous Way) and Minzoku Kyowa (Racial Harmony) propounded at the time of the setting-up of Manchukuo.

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We have not had a deep critical study yet on “Shina Kakumei Gaishi” (an Unofficial History of the Chinese Revolution) written by KITA Ikki, perhaps because of its difficulty.
One thing which makes this book difficult is that KITA employed complex rhetoric in order to avoid supression. One of the rhetorics he used was the style of ‘Kanso’ _??__??_ which used to be employed by the retainers to remonstrate their lord during feudal ages. This style produces an illusion on the part of the readers which make them believe as if something impossible were possible. Another rhetric is that KITA purposefully says things which contradict themselves.
Secondly, another factor which makes this book difficult is the standpoint of his thinking: his Greater Asianism. KITA's Greater Asianism is the theory of Sino-Japanese community bound together by common fate, with radical anti-Anglo Saxonism, whose characteristic is pro-German and pro-American.
It shows a striking contrast to the so called Greater Asianism which is hostile to both Europe and America. Moreover, KITA advocated his pro-Germanism during World War I, when it was quite impossible to put it into practise.
The third point which makes KITA's thought rather incomprehensible is his Anti-Capitalist Idealism. This is quite unrealistic but it does not seem so unrealistic in the environment of anti-utilitarian idealism which prevails among the Japanese in general. In this concept, the opportunism which supported his thought reflected the thinking of the Japanese people at that time.
All these three points testify to the unreality of an Unofficial History of the Chinese Revolution. KITA intended to corner the Japanese government by making such unreasonable demands which could not be realized in the current international situation. In this sense, it can be said that his Greater Asianism corresponds to the doctrines of ‘Revere the Emperor and expel the barbarians’ which was advocated during the Meiji Restoration.

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The aim of this paper is to examine SHIRATORI Toshio's views and thoughts on Japan's foreign relations, as one of the typical advocates of Kodo Diplomacy in the 1930's. The main reason why his diplomatic thought should be the subject of careful study lies in the fact that he was regarded as a “philosopher” of Japanese diplomacy by the younger bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry and he influenced their thoughts and behaviors.
With the impact of the Manchurian Incident, SHIRATORI began to declare that Japan should return to Asia. He attacked the evils of Western Civilization and denounced the Washington Treaty System as an international order in the Far East which symbolized the interests of the Occidental (especially Anglo-Saxon) powers, though he had not challenged it in the 1920's. Then he sought an ideological basis to guide Japanese diplomacy, and tried to construct a conceptual framework of a New World Order based upon Japanese morals and interests.
At first he looked upon Soviet Russia as the arch enemy whose influences had to be driven out of the Far East. But, as Japan had been bogged down in a war of attrition with China since 1937, he refrained from saying that Russia was the enemy of Japan and the other peoples of Asia. He stressed the global confrontation between the “have” countries, which championed the Popular Front, and the “have not” countries, whose ideological basis was totalitarianism. His search for a new moral world order was joined with Nazi Germany's world view. He began to advocate the tripartite alliance among Germany, Italy and Japan, and then a quadruple one between these three powers and Russia. Britain, which he had regarded earlier as a partner of Japan in driving out Russia from the Far East, became his (and Japan's, in his view) arch enemy. At last he emphasized the wickedness of Jewish financial capitalism which ruled the Anglo-Saxon powers, and in the spring of 1941 he predicted that a war between Japan and the United States would be inevitable, though he was suffering from mental ill health at that time.
Did his attempt and effort to seek an ideological or moral basis for Japanese diplomacy achieve satisfactory results? This question is answered in the conclusion of this paper.

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This article aims to reappraise the official diplomatic historiography on Japanese-American negotiations from April to December 1941. The foreign minister, MATSUOKA who was alienated from SHIRATORI, kept in mind a grand strategic design that would be a peace resolution between Germany and Britain through the intermediary of Japan and the United States. MATSUOKA was sure that it was difficult to negotiate equally with the United States unless Japan was powerful.
At first, KONOYE, MUTO and the “Reformist” group approved MATSUOKA's world-policy, the Tokyo-Berlin-Rome-Moscow entente. KONOYE's New Order group made efforts to end the Sino-Japanese War and may have had in mind the completion of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, keeping the United States out of the war.
But on the coming of the peace negotiations between Japan and the United States, each of the many factions in the Foreign Office and the Military Section of the Government reacted differently to Drought's peace proposal-a proposal was later strategically adopted by F. D. Roosevelt through F. Walker.
Except for the MATSUOKA and SHIRATORI group, the moderate “Reformists” in the Foreign Office, e. g. the ARITA group, had aimed at a resolution of the Sino-Japanese War, being short of going to war with the United States.
It seems possible a peace-bargain could have been made between Japan and the United States before the Russo-German War.
Japanese-American negotiations were dominant in “backdoor diplomacy” because of a strategic bargain. Thus the full story of the outbreak of the Pacific War can not be really described without the framework of the official negotiations from “Draft Understanding” to “Hull Note.”

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It was only after the end of World War II that the Japanese people became fully conscious of the importance of basic human rights as a universal principle for all human beings. I interpret this principle to be the fundamental principle of the Constitution of Japan established in 1947. We respect and try to secure basic human rights for ourselves as well as for any other people. That is why we renounce war and war potential in Article 9. I also interpret that, under Article 9. on the same fundamental principle, people are endowed with the right of self defense, but the state is not, as Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru rightly stated in the session of Parliament in 1946 which examined the draft Constitution.
But, another line of interpretation of the right of self defense in Article 9 has become predominant, taking advantage of the so-called “ASHIDA amendment” by which the phrase “in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph” was added to the second paragraph of Article 9. Today Japan posseses the eighth largest war potential in the world.
Prime Minister YOSHIDA accepted the US-Japan Security Treaty (“US-J Ampo”) before Japan regained independence in 1952. This he did through secret diplomacy and on the basis of the theory that the Constitution did not prohibit Japan's dependence upon foreign states in military affairs. If the above stated interpretations of the Constitution had been maintained, such a theory could not have been accepted. The distinction between Japan's own war potential and that of a foreign state makes no sense.
As a result of YOSHIDA's action, which superseded the Constitution, the “US-J Ampo” became the supreme, supra-constiutional norm in Japan and he and his followers and officials have had to continually follow a tactic of the “amendment of the constitution by interpretation.” Even the Supreme Court has been unable to adopt a judgement declaring the “US-J Ampo” as un-constitutional.
Such processes and contradicting interpretations and theories on the Constitution have caused confusion in the thought and ideas of the Japanese people about national policies on peace, defense, security and even on diplomacy. Among intellectuals are many who have “peace thought and ideas, ” as Glenn D. Hook describes in his article in International Politics No. 69, 1981. But, intellectual coordination between them and the officials responsible for diplomatic matters has been scarce, the latter merely sticking to the “US-J Ampo” ideology.
How can the diplomatic thought of Japan be rescued from such a situation? My suggestion as to the dilemma between the Constitution of Japan and the “US-J Ampo” is as follows. In Article 10 of the “US-J Ampo” it states: “This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Goverments of Japan and the United States of America there shall have come into forth such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.” This was a special formula to terminate the “US-J Ampo” during a ten year period until 1970. That period has already passed, but it may be worthwhile for us to give further considerations to the idea of a “UN-Ampo” as an alternative to the “US-J Ampo”.

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Railway construction by rival powers led to conflicting economic and political claims at the close of the 19th century. At the bottom of Russian and Japanese clashes over the issue of the Seoul-Wiju railway lay international competition for control of the northern half of the Korean Peninsula. Britain and Japan constructed the Peking-Mukden, the Seoul-Pusan and the Seoul-Wiju railways respectively to counter a Russian threat in the Far East through the control of the Siberian and the Chinese Eastern railways. This is the basic background of the Russo-Japanese War.
Additionally, from the view point of railway construction, the Russo-Japanese War may be said to be a battle over different gauges, because both Russian railways were broad gauged whereas the British and Japanese railways were standard gauged.
Even the technological aspect of railway building had political implications. It was no coincidence that the Anglo-Japanese railways were both standard gauged in opposition to the broad gauged Russian railways.

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