Germany's foreign policy has been characterized by continuity since its fundamental course was defined by the Federal Republic's first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. Even unification in 1990 did not have much impact on the continuity of both foreign policy and European integration policy. The transatlantic alliance (NATO) and the European integration (EU) have remained the basic pillars of the Federal Republic's foreign policy. It was imperative that Germany embed itself in both NATO and the EU.
With the end of the cold war the security environment in Europe drastically changed: the meaning of security changed from territorial defense to crisis management. Accordingly the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) of the EU developed rapidly in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The German federal government led by Chancellor Schröder and foreign minister Fischer continued its commitment to the transatlantic alliance and to the further development of European integration. Since the federal election of 2002, however, the Iraq war has overshadowed the German-U. S. relationship.
This article analyzes the issue of continuity and change in German foreign policy within this new security environment. The first part of the article outlines the course of German foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, focusing especially on the problem of using the defense force, the Bundeswehr. In the second part, using the case of the 2002 federal election, the entanglement of domestic politics and foreign policy is discussed. In the third part, the new characteristics of current foreign policy are discussed. The debates over the “German Way” and “Civilian Power” in foreign policy are examined in order to explain both continuity and change in the transatlantic relations. German policy toward the institutional development of the EU and European security policy is also discussed.
The red-green government led by Schröder/Fischer introduced a new style to German foreign policy with its more direct and self-confident approach. Ongoing economic globalization and the developing EU are both generating change within German foreign policy. Nonetheless, the multilateralism of German foreign policy will not change. For Germany, the use of the UN, OSCE and EU remains the fundamental basis for its policy, even though Germany is increasingly asserting its own interests and preferred methods in those organizations. Germany's desire to promote world stability through civilian methods, for example, are well-suited to an approach that works through multilateral institutions. At the same time, even though the European security environment has changed, the U. S. A. remains the most important security partner for Germany. The transatlantic relationship remains inevitable for Germany's security and economy. Germany has to balance its key transatlantic relationship with the demands of European integration.

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The purpose of this research is to explore the role Japanese ambassadors to the United States has played in diplomatic relations between the two nations in the postwar period. They are the only diplomats who are official representatives of Japan and are stationed permanently in the U. S. Despite this, little significant research on this topic has been conducted. Considering the authority of this post, the function as main official channels in Japan's diplomacy toward the U. S., and the role individuals can play in international relations, the importance of research about these figures must be acknowledged.
This study empirically shows that the significance and limitations in the regular functions of Japanese ambassadors to the U. S. First, they supported negotiations and policy-making of the home government by information gathering and reporting. Second, they offered opinions to their home government and thus affected policy-making. Third, they relayed messages of the home government to representatives of the U. S. government precisely and implied nuances by unofficial statements. Fourth, they were involved in a part of negotiations or exercised jurisdiction over entire negotiations. Fifth, they conducted public diplomacy on behalf of Japan toward the American public. On the other hand, as for their limitations, first, their intelligence sources in the U. S. tended to slant to diplomatic circles. Second, their jurisdictions were eroded by other actors of Japan.
The author also clarifies that the role of Japanese ambassadors to the U. S. contained not only implementation of the regular functions but also that of the irregular functions by the unique ambassadors. First, they tried to taking the lead in policy-making. Second, they conducted enlightenment of public opinion back home. Third, they implemented lobbying on behalf of Japan in the Congress. At the same time, first, the irregular functions often faced the rejections from their home government and thus it seldom accomplished. Second, the irregular functions included the risks turning into political issues even if it could get confirming from the home government.
Why did the role of Japanese ambassador to the U. S. change between regular and irregular, and face limitations? First, it is based on the personalities of ambassador. The second factor is the degree of autonomy from the home government which depended on the political situation at the time, presenting ambassadors with a dilemma as to that degree. Third, the change in the dynamics of Japan-U. S. relations led to the diversification of issues and actors and thus the ambassadors had to address these changes and interact with these new actors. The results of this research conclude that Japanese ambassadors to the U. S. played a significant and wide range of roles in Japan-U. S. relations through their regular and irregular functions even though these were some limitations.

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‘Identity’ has become one of the focal issues in the study of international relations along with the epistemological turn in international relations since the late 1980s, the so-called the Third Debate. There are broadly three perspectives in the study of identity; the first approach is constructivism that focuses on scientific and objectivist approaches in examining identity; the second approach is post-structuralism that emphasises the politics of the border on construction of identity; the third approach is historiography that interprets the construction of national identity from historical context.
The aim of this paper is to re-constitute Japanese foreign policy analysis from the standpoint of national identity by properly combining three perspectives above. With critical reading of constructivism, this paper employs post-structuralist discourse analysis that uncovers politics of the border in constitution of particular identities that have been historically articulated. This paper investigates the emergence of national identity in confronting with the U. S. anti-Japanese immigration law in 1924 as a case study. This is because this case was characterised by the politics of the border in constructing national frontier (i. e. Asia/Anglo-Saxon). Remarkably, numerous discursive practices relied on universal rhetoric, such as Seigi or Kodo [Justice]. It was the articulation of particular national frontier via universal principles (in other words, the politics of the border between justified Asia/injustified Anglo-Saxon)
This paper is composed of six parts. The first part summarises the epistemological debate in the study of international relations theory and history, and introduces three approaches to identity: constructivism, poststructuralism and historiography. The second part compares two theoretical approaches to identity: constructivism and post-structuralism. The third part also considers how post-structuralist's politics of the border and historiography of national identity can be synthesised. The fourth part examines methodological relevance of discourse analysis. The next two parts concern the case of the emergence of national identity in the aftermath of anti-Japanese immigration law. The fifth part explores the role of universality and particularity in articulating national identity. The sixth part investigates the emergence of national identity.

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This article examines the diplomatic process of Japan's joining in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and illustrates that Japan's participating in the OECD should be regarded as its struggle for expanding its diplomatic space in the Free World, searching for both political and economic interests.
The OECD, which was reorganized from the Organization European Economic Corporation (OEEC) under the initiative of the United States in 1961, was a forum established with the purpose of coordinating economic, trade and foreign aid policy among its members. Almost all the developed countries in the so called the “Free Word” or the West, including the US, Western European nations and Canada joined the OECD as its original members, but Japan was not one of them. This caused Japan to hold serious concerns about its isolation from the Free World. Japan had already established bilateral relations between the US, through which Japan and the Free World were only linked together. In that situation, Japan had an aspiration for expanding its diplomatic space in the Free World beyond its relations to the US, by participating in the OECD. Moreover, Hayato Ikeda administration, which wanted Japan to be equal footing with the US and European countries, considered that the membership of the OECD was essential to keep its economic growth. Thus it can be said that Japans' aim of joining in the organization was to pursue both economic and political interests.
For the part of the US, Japan's participation in the OECD was regarded as its own interest, since it might enhance Japan's cooperation on economic assistance to the developing countries and strengthen its relation to the Free World stronger. Hence Japan was allowed its membership in the Development Assistance Group (DAG) of the OEEC in 1960. After OECD set on, the DAG was reorganized as the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which was one of the main committees of the OECD. The biggest obstacle to Japan's joining in the main body of OECD was that European countries, which were the majority of the organization, opposed to it.
Japan made diplomatic efforts to gain the support from European countries with the assistance of the US. Prime Minister Ikeda's visit to the European countries including the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and so on paved the way for the membership of the OECD. Through the discussion with Ikeda, the heads of these countries agreed to Japan's joining in the OECD. In March 1963, the OECD ultimately accepted Japan's full membership.

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In this article, a simple simulation model of domestic armed conflict will be introduced with its empirical application. While many theoretical approaches to the domestic conflicts have seen them within a context of some relationship between given social and/or cultural groups, usually derived according to some common trait (e. g. ethnicity, religion, class), this model does not start from such aggregate analytical units. Rather, it tries to theorize the conflicts with an emphasis on the accompanying process, a process in which many inhabitants are politically mobilized and then divided. For this purpose, the spatial multi-agent simulation technique and its methodological characteristics are fully utilized.
In essence, the model is a kind of stochastic process involving many agents, but the underlying idea and the guiding logics are quite clear. It constructs an “artificial state”, consisting of territory, inhabitants, and government, in computer, and then stochastically “stages” rebellions there. The inhabitants are spatially distributed over the territory and differentiated from each other according to several social/cultural traits. The government and the insurgent organizations, while fighting each other, mobilize the necessary supports and resources from the inhabitants by manipulating “symbols”, which specify for what kind of inhabitants the state shall be constituted.
Following an overview of this model, its application to the civil war in the Sudan since 1983 will be reported. Using simplified ethno-linguistic and religious distribution maps of the Sudan as a crude approximation of the country, simulations were run in this “artificial Sudan”. The purpose here is understanding, and, as for the Sudanese civil war, this means constructing logics elucidating and connecting its following two aspects with the aid of the model: (1) the prolonged division of territorial rule between the northern-based government and the southern-based insurgent organization, the SPLA, and (2) the political aspect of this division, namely the competition between the ethnically and religiously exclusive government and the ethnically and religiously inclusive insurgents.
The simulation results and their analysis suggest that the two aspects are indeed inseparable. One of the important implications is that both of the inclusive and the exclusive symbols upheld by the two antagonists have some “fitness” (i. e. difficult to uproot) in their respective localities, leading to the political, as well as military, deadlock in the country.

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African political scene after the end of the Cold War has been characterized by two major issues: development of the political liberalization and frequent outbreaks of armed conflict. The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the relationship between these two issues. Most of African countries started the political liberalization from the beginning of the 1990s. The same period witnessed frequent outbreaks of armed conflict. Nevertheless, political liberalization can not directly explain the outbreaks of armed conflict. The paper insists that the relationship between the two issues can be understood by taking the peculiar characteristic of the postcolonial African states into account. The African states after the independence tended to have had patrimonial characters under personal rule. The economic crisis and the change of international environment after the 1980s, however, compelled them to launch the transformation, through which three types of consequences were appeared: countries advancing successfully for transformation into “Polyarchy” in R. Dahl's sense; countries having fallen into severe armed conflicts; and countries in which the authoritarian rulers managed to survive in introducing superficial measures of political liberalization. The characteristics of the political change after the end of the Cold War should be therefore understood as transition processes of the post-colonial African states.

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