Ethnic differences are used to be the single most important source of conflict within states, and they are frequently instrumental in arousing critical situations between countries as well. In present day world, the increase of ethnic diasporas and of antagonistic confrontations between or among politicized ethnic groups in most parts of the world, is changing the social and political milieu of the intra- and international relations more than expected. But, the international and, in particular, the trans-state activities of those ethnic groups, have hardly been addressed by students of comparative politics, or international relations. So that the demand for new scholarly efforts to understand their dynamics to find the peaceful and effective management of conflict become urgent. This paper, responding to the demand, is concerned about the political and social configurations of states as serving units to create or sustain systemic ethnic disadvantages and inequalities. And to convey a sense of the generality of ethnic conflicts and to indicate the necessity of the reorientating basic conceptualizations, simultaneously, such concepts as state, nation, integration, and the formation of institutional arrangements are re-examined. Firstly, using the compact illustration of the configuration of ethnic demands and governmental responses, various policy alternatives are relocated and reviewed on the continuum between complete autonomy and complete assimilation. The illustration tells us that ethnic conflicts cannot be expected to be resolved as long as we coexist with different ethnic groups in a single state, and also international frameworks won't be the final alternative to resolve the conflicts. The complete autonomy of ethnically self-conscious groups and their assimilation into the larger social setting in which they find themselves are both no real resolution of the conflicts. The best way of regulating ethnic conflicts has to be found somewhere in a domestic political arena. Secondly, arguing the impracticability of social and cultural unification model both in segmented societies and in international regional systems, the necessity of pluralistic conceptualization of political integration is discussed.
More then twenty years have already passed since the western European countries began to introduce foreign workers from the third world. In each country, such as West Germany, France, Switzerland, Belgium and so on, many social problems relating to foreign workers have surfaced. Now, we are at the stage of settlement of immigrant workers in western Europe because they have little intention to return home. In this paper, I have focussed on several cultural conflicts in contemporary France, where immigrant issues are regarded as “Arab” or “Islam” problems. Cultural conflicts need to be thoroughly analysed as the indigenous people can not live without any contact with immigrants. The first issue discussed is the “second generation” problem. The offsprings of the Arab immigrants face many difficulties in education. Arab children leave school early, which puts them at a disadvantage in the labor market. They also face an “identity crisis” because they belong both to France and to an Arab country. But some adolescents are seeking a “third way” which is based on “immigritude”—that is, they respect both French way of life (individualism, freedom—) and Arab culture. Such a posture cannot survive without a change in French society itself. The second issue is the “gender problem.” In many immigrant families conflicts break out between fathers and daughters. In general, women's rights are restricted to a considerable degree in Islamic countries. The daughters want to free themselves from their father's control. They prefer living in France, which gives them the opportunity to live freely. To return home or not is the most serious problem faced by the immigrant family. There are now a considerable number of mixed marriages between French and Arab, but also a high rate of divorce. Arab men often take their children back home to Maghreb countries without the agreement of their former wives. Such a private and personal controversy is now developing into the international and diplomatic problem. In this we can see the cultural contradiction between Islamic paternalism and women's right or the feminism. At the workplace too, problems are arising. Immigrant workers in the automobile factories are beginning to present religious (Islamic) demands such as installing a room for prayer. In France the religious and the secular are strictly separated, but Islam does not accept this type of dualism. In this way, we can identify serious cultural conflicts, which are due to the social and cultural gaps between France and Maghreb countries. The present situation of immigrants is completely different from that of previous days.
Recently, in Asian and African societies, ethnic conflicts have begun to become more serious. In the Western societies, the ethnic resurgence has been going on. The ethnicity problem has become one of the most crucial issues in the research field of international politics. The ethnicity problem was regarded mostly as a transitional problem in the process of nation-state building and exected to be solved at the end of that process. However, in many cases, the ethnicity problems became more serious actually as the process of nation-state building was going on. The ethnicity problem is the problem of integration and co-existence of ethnic groups. Here, in order to reconsider the ethnic problem, we'll try to analyze the historical and cultural backgrounds of the system of co-existence and integration of ethnic groups and its dissolution, using the case of the Middle East, especially that of the Ottoman Empire and her successor states. The Ottoman society was a typical example of the Middle Eastern societies, which were composed of various ethnic groups. There existed a unique system of integration and co-existence. In the Ottoman society, the identity of the members of the society was mainly based on religion. National or racial consciousness was a secondery factor. Various ethnic groups were grouped according to their religions. The Ottoman system of integration and co-existence was essentially the system of integration and coexistence among religious groups, not national or racial groups. There were two essential categories of group, Muslims and Non-Muslims. Non-Muslims were categoried in several sub-groups. Each group co-existed each other with each own duties and pribiledges. This traditional system of integration and co-existence was not based on the principle of equality, but on that of inequality. Muslims were the essential citizens of the political community. Non-Muslism were the secondery citizens who were merely tolerated to exist. Nonetheless this system functioned rather well during the period when the traditional type of political apathy prevailed in the society. This situation began to change under the influence of the West in the late eighteenth century. At first, Non-Muslim peoples in Balkan began to be politically active under the Western influence. They began to try to build their own “nation-state” of ethnically homogenious composition, instead of seeking for equality in a multinational empire. The Ottomans attempted to transform an Islamic empire into a multinational empire in Western type during the nineteenth century. However this attempt failed. Then Muslims themselves fell under the influence of the Western nationalism from the late nineteenth century. Turkish nationalism, Arab nationalism, and so on began to evolve. After the dissolution of the Ottoman empire, there emerged “nation-states” of Muslim peoples. The traditional system of integration and co-existence totally collusped. The ideal of a nation-state which was ethnically homogenious prevailed. However the ethnic compositions of these societies remained heterogenious. Moreover each ethnic group began to evolve their own nationalism. The new style of integration and co-existence of ethnic groups with new orientation has not yet been established. This situation is one of the important factors in the violent outbursts of the ethnic conflicts in the area.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the interdependence between a national question and a nonaligned foreign policy by focussing on the political process during and after the Croatian Crisis in 1971. Ethnically, Yugoslavia is one of the most heterogeneous countries in the world. The largest group, the Serbs, makes up less than 40 percent of the population, and the second largest group, the Croats, represents approximately 20 percent of the total population. The South Slavs (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrines) were once under the rule of two empires set against each other—Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Consequently the South Slavs have had entirely different characteristics between the so-called northerners and the southerners. The potential for national discord was built into the structure of the country when it was founded on December 1, 1918, as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The conflict among these various nationalities made Yugoslavia practically ungovernable in the interwar years and led to its self-disintegration when Germany invaded in the spring of 1941. In the process of constructing a scialist society the Yugoslav communists have attempted to reconcile these differences. In response to past conflicts, Tito and the rest of the Yugoslav leadership have striven to create a political system that strikes a balance between a recognition of the diversity throughout the country, on the one hand, and the extent of centralization essential to the maintenance of an integrated state, on the other. In contrast to the Soviet Union, where a major requisite for Communist rule is the dominance of the Russians, Communist rule in Yugoslavia is most likely to be maintained only if no single nationality is permitted to become too strong. Since the middle of the 1960's—the economic reforms of 1965 and Rankovic's downfall in 1966—Yugoslavia's leaders have established a pattern of decisionmaking characterized by decentralization, inter-regional consultations, and consensus. In this situation Croats began to insist on political and economic decentralization, while in the southern underdeveloped republics they favored the “firm hand” of the federal organs for their development. Given these competing cross-currents, the policy of nonalignment constituted a viable compromise giving partial satisfaction to all. Any deviation from nonalignment in favor of the Soviet Union would have created major repercussions in Slovenia and Croatia; any explicitly close affiliation with the West would have alienated important party elites with the southern constituencies. A nonaligned foreign policy enabled the Yugoslav government to keep a balance between all states externally and all nationalities domestically. The fate of multinational Yugoslavia lies in the fact that she must achieve equality among diffirent nationalities by the principle of balance-of-power as an unstable system. It may safely be said that the only alternative compatible with this is nonalignment.
Calling the Kurds a minority is a misnomer, for they constitute the overwhelming majority in Kurdistan. Their tragedy is that the borders of five countries crisscross Kurdistan making them a minority in all of these states, namely, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria and the Soviet Union. From the nineteenth century onwards, the Kurds have been struggling for autonomy in the process of which they have tasted moments of exhilaration as well as despair. Shortly after the Second World War, in January 1946, the Kurds in Iran proclaimed the establishment of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in Iranian Kurdistan only to see its demise before the year was out. Later, the focus of their struggle shifted to Iraqi-Kurdistan. The charismatic leader, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, led a series of heroic struggles against Baghdad before, during and well after the Second World War. After his final defeat in 1975, Kurdistan experienced an uneasy period of peace. The revolution in Iran, however, opened up the opportunity for the Kurds to assert their autonomy for the third time since the end of the Second World War. Taking advantage of a brief decline in the authority of the central government, the Iranian Kurds began to demand autonomy. But the revolutionary government has not complied, for it is apprehensive about the possibility of other minorities following suit, which it fears could lead to Iran's dismemberment. Ever since 1979 a civil war has been fought in Kurdistan. The start of the all-out war between Iraq and Iran strengthened the Kurdish resolve for autonomy, for Iraq openly supported the Iranian Kurds. Iran countered by aiding the Iraqi-Kurds against Baghdad. As the fortunes of war shifted on the southern front from Iraq to Iran, so did the situation in the north. By the summer of 1983, after regaining control over its part of Kurdistan, Tehran, aided by the Iraqi Kurds, sent its army into Iraqi Kurdistan. With the concentration of the Iraqi forces on the southern and central fronts, and with the support of both Iran and Syria, the Iraqi-Kurds have steadily expanded their control over substantial parts of Iraqi-Kurdistan. They are already in a position to threaten the pipe-lines and the highway that run through Kurdistan, linking Turkey and Iraq. They also provide sanctuary for the Turkish Kurds who in 1984 started a wide spread guerilla campaign against targets inside Turkey. Thus, Kurdish agitation has spilled over into Turkey. Ankara retaliated first by bombing targets inside Iraq and later increasingly by sending troops across the border into Iraq, straining its relations with Iran and Syria. Also Turkey's intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan has fueled speculation that Turkey might occupy Iraqi-Kurdistan, should the Ba'athist regime in Baghdad show signs of imminent collapse. It seems that under the darkening shadow of the Gulf War, “the third wave” of the Kurdish struggle for autonmy has been building up momentum towards an explosive climax over the fate of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Generally in Africa, it is rare indeed that political power can be passed on peacefully, but Julius Nyerere did pass on power to his successor, Ali Mwinyi. Ali Mwinyi took over as the President of the United Republic of Tanzania following the retirement of Julius Nyerere after 24 years. Ali Mwinyi was sworn-in as the Second President of Tanzania in November 1985 after a landslide election victory. This election demonstrated that political power in Africa could be passed on peacefully. It marked the beginning of a new chapter in Africa's political history; it is a model of a peaceful handover with approval in taking democratic procedures. On August 15, 1985, the National Conference of the sole party CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi) endorsed All Mwinyi as the only candidate for the Presidency of the United Republic of Tanzania. At the same time, it was reported that Abdul Wakil was nominated by the NEC (National Executive Committee) of the CCM as the only contender for the Presidency of Zanzibar. Before the nominations, the Meeting of the CC (Central Committee) of the CCM was held under the chairmanship of Julius Nyerere on August 12, 1985. It was scheduled to take one day, but was prolonged until the next day. It was suggested that there were a lot of difficult hurdles in the course of deliberations on suitable candidates for the Presidencies. It is true that behind the spectacle of an apparent smooth transition of power lay acute struggles among three political power blocks which were present in the highest organs of the CCM. The most influential block was said to be the ‘True Northerners, ’ or Kurias, as they are known, who hail from North Tanganyika, especially Mara. Two other blocks vying with each other for ascendancy in Zanzibar's incestuous “politics of intrigue” were said to be the ‘Liberators’ and the ‘Frontliners.’ The ‘Liberators’ were seen as the legitimate heirs of the late Abeid Karume, the First President of Zanzibar. They were bent on reviving the policies of the defunct ASP (Afro Shirazi Party), which was based in Unguja (Zanzibar). The ‘Frontliners’ were acknowledged to have played a pivotal role in the resignation of Aboud Jumbe, the Second President of Zanzibar. They were bent on reviving the policies of the defunct UMMA party, which was based in Pemba. In April 1964, Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged to form the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, later Tanzania. The two countries remained separate in many areas. In February 1977, the TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) and the ASP merged to form the CCM. The politics of Tanzania depend on how the Union works. For the United Republic of Tanzania, the most vulnerable point, or Achilles tendon is the so-called Zanzibar problem, that is, the complicated relations among Tanganyika, Unguja and Pemba.
In this paper, the administrative aspects of Aboriginal issues are discussed. Constitutionally, the federal government is responsible for the status Indians and Inuits because of the British North America Act of 1867. Section 91 (24), and one particular department, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) has this responsibility. However, on careful examination, this perception is not entirely correct. Administrative interaction is extremely complicated, and any single generalization may not illustrate the entire picture. First, when we study the relationship between governments and the aboriginal peoples, we can point out at least seven types of government administration. For example, the status Indians could benefit from government programs such as free education and medical care as long as they reside on Indian reserves. And a band government, which is recognized by DIAND as a legitimate political unit on a reserve, is responsible for policy initiation and implementation. In this case, we can find a bilateral relationship between Ottawa and the band government, and the BNA Act recognizes this interaction constitutionally. However, due to federalism (division of powers between federal and provincial governments) there are different types of exceptions to aboriginal administration in Canada. Second, at least three policy trends in recent aboriginal policy can be identified: functional decentralization, federal-provincial coordination and native participation. In the past decades, only DIAND was responsible for the status Indians and Inuits. But since the early 1970's, several federal departments and agencies began to provide their services to native Canadians. Approximately, one-third of the budget for the native program is implemented by non-DIAND departments. The federal-provincial coordination covers many areas of service such as policing, education and health care. The Native Canadians also began to assert their views and demands when the native programs were implemented. As these trends indicate, the administration of native policy in Canada cannot be carried out without referring to the transformation of Canadian federalism. Third, several provincial governments began to establish native branches such as SAGMAI in Quebec. How do we evaluate the Canadian situation theoretically? Here, it is possible to identify two approaches to aboriginal (or ethnic) administration: liberal integration and pluralism (or special status). The liberl integration approach indicates the eliminations of a special status — no ethnic group would be given special programs or rights by a government, and equality of all citizens as well as all ethnic groups is assumed. While the second approach may not abandon liberal-integrationism completely, a group could possess a special status or right as a result of historical and geographical reasons. In Canada, many Native peoples support a theory of “citizens plus, ” which recognizes the Aboriginal Canadians' unique historical status in North America. While this paper deals with only the Canadian situation, it seems relevant to examine administrative/policy aspects of ethnic/minority problems comparatively.
Intervention in the domestic conflicts of Third World countries is one of the most significant features of regional conflicts since WWII. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the interventionist behavior of regional actors in Central America. To do this, the author first set up a model of intervention in the region by comparatively studying 6 OAS cases which had been conciliated or brought up for discussion since 1948. Based on this model, a theoretical framework was built in order to study why the regional states and political exiles decide to cooperate in order to control the structure of political authority in the target state. Focusing upon the motivation of the regional states, this papeer hypothesizes that regional powers decide to intervene under the following conditions: (1) the intervening state is strongly motivated to take ideological advantage of the target state: (2) the target state poses a serious security threat to the regime of the intervener; (3) the intervener regards the risk of escalation into border war with the target state as low; and (4) intervention does not involve the risk of strengthening domestic opposition in the intervening state. The case studies support the hypothesis that ideological competition and a regime's security are the most important factors involved in the decision of regional powers. It also suggested that these two issues are closely connected in the political structure of Central America. The findings lead to the need for further inquiries. Under what conditions do regional powers perceive ideological heterogeneity as a security threat? Or, in what circumstances do nations with different political values come to mutually recognize the legitimacy of their regimes? The author argues that these are among the cardinal questions in the field of international relations.
This article explains the historical transition of Japanese fishery policies using the ocean regime to postulate the structural variables of the international political system. For this purpose “Issue-cycle” is introduced to conceptualize the global regime change. The territorial sea disputes from 1920 to 1980 are presented in terms of the issue-cycle, i. e. the sequence of genesis, crisis, ritualization, dormancy, decision-making, and authoritative allocation. The discussion identifies the relationship between Japanese fishery policies and these stages of the changing international regime. It is important to understand how Japanese interests were preserved in earlier international arrangements such as the North Pacific Fisheries Convention (1952) and the Japanese-Korean Fisheries Agreement (1965), and were not preserved in the later negotiations in 70s. Regime analysis is necessary to explain these consequences. It posits that not only are the interests and bargaining powers between contending countries important to understand the outcomes, but also the rules, disciplines and expectations which were structurally given for every participant are indispensable. It also posits that some politically institutionalized disciplines central to the ocean regime have decisive functions for national economic behavior in the fishing industry. Japanese officials were keenly aware of this linkage, as reflected in Japanese fishery policies throughout this period. It is of course difficult to generalize according to these conclusions, which highlight the characteristics of this specific issue. Nevertheless the current increase in politicized economic issues suggests that regime analysis may be usefully applied to this field of studies in the future.