We are now on a high tide of interest in the occupation studies. The postwar society of Japan, no doubt, is a product of occupation policy as well as that of her own historical heritage. The decisive importance of the occupation reforms for the reconstruction of postwar society has compelled Japanese scholars to engage in research on that period since early 1970, when U. S. governmental documents relating to occupation policy were widely declassified and made available for researchers.
This volume is an attempt to add the newest analyses to the increasing amount of preceding studies on the occupation. It consists of the following three parts: first, the international environment with regard to occupied Japan; second, the political process in the early stage of the occupation; and third, U. S. policies toward Japan at the termination of the occupation.
When it comes to international contexts of the occupation, it is only natural that we pay much attention to U. S. policy first, and British policy second. But it is not proper that we pay little attention to the positions of Soviet Russia and China with respect to the occupation of Japan. Here in this volume, Hirai's article analyzes the Russian interest in early postwar Japan based on Russian documents, and A. Ishii's article, based on Chinese documents, deals with the difficulties of the Republic of China in having an influence on occupation policy for Japan. Also included is Manabe's article which examines U. S. economic policy for occupied Germany, which is an important precedent to the policy for Japan.
Needless to say, Japanese scholars are particularly interested in the various reforms under the occupation and formation of postwar society. This volume has two papers on this aspect; Shindo's article stresses an importance of Hitoshi Ashida's liberal position within the conservative camp in postwar Japan based on newly published sources of the Ashida diary under his own editorship, and Masuda's article gives a detailed account of the formulation process of GHQ's purge policy based on a vast amount of new materials.
U. S. documents concerning the completion period of the occupation were only recently made available to scholars, which makes it possible for this volume to have three detailed analyses on this phase; Kajiura's article examines how J. F. Dulles treated the territorial problem of the Northern Islands; O. Ishii's paper analyzes how U. S. economic policy towards Japan was formed, trying to make her economy self-supporting in the cold war context of international relations; and Miyazato's paper traces how the Administrative Agreement on security problems between the U. S. and Japan was formulated immediately after the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and how the status of U. S. forces in Japan was defined.

抄録全体を表示

When the Soviet Union declared war on Japan in August 1945, the latter was almost exhausted after over three years of the Pacific War. Ironically enough, at that moment Japan was trying in vain to find a way out of the war by means of the good offices of the Soviet Union. Because of such circumstances, the people in the Soviet Union seemed to be apathetic at best to another round of war after the deadly fighting with Nazi Germany. Thus, to justify the war with Japan, Stalin felt it even necessary to cite the old humiliation due to the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 to 1905.
Until August 1945, a major concern of Stalin was how to adroitly find an opportune moment to enter into the war against Japan. After the Japanese surrender, he was very resolute in trying to ensure the Soviets a proper place as a great victorious power. The present paper intends to show what Soviet Russia attained and how, through joining her allies in defeating Japan.
Though Stalin wished to expand the Soviet security zone as far as possible, he also recognized that such an advancement of Soviet power would be possible only in areas subdued by Soviet armed forces. In this sense, his foreign policy reflects his trust in strength. General V. Chuikov, designated a military attache at the Soviet Embassy in Chungking in autumn 1940, records an interesting statement suggestive of Stalin's future policy in Asia after the war. Stalin told Chuikov then that as long as Chinese communists were less able than the Kuomingtang to resist Japanese aggression, the USSR could not help but bolster Chinese nationalists despite her ideological sympathy for the communists, because any Chinese prolonged resistance would lessen the Japanese threat to Soviet far eastern borders (V. I. Chuikov, Missiya v Kitae, 1983).
Such a view about the importance of strength in foreign policy may be considered an ingredient of a general belief system rather than a circumstantial perception. Consequently, this “operational code” probably convinced Stalin, after the Second World War, that the Soviet Union should be cautious in conducting her occupation policy in Japan. The Soviet Union was prepared to accept U. S. predominance in Japan provided that Soviet basic security requirements would be satisfied. Besides this precondition, all Stalin wished for was an apparent equality with the U. S. in controlling Japan.
The Soviet Union and the United States had heated arguments over the allied control machinery regarding Japan. The United States was in a much more advantageous position because of the sheer fact of the existence of American armies in Japan. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union also had a lever for influencing the U. S. policy in Japan. This lever was her dominant status in Eastern Europe. If the United States wanted to gain some concessions in Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union, the former was obliged to make concessions regarding Japan. Thus both countries could, before the end of 1945, come to a compromise to establish the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan. Afterwards, with the advent of the Cold War, the Soviet Union became more and more antagonistic towards U. S. conduct in Japan. But that is another story.

抄録全体を表示

This paper deals with the change in the Republic of China's policy towards the Japanese Occupation. First, this paper examines the Republic of China's principal policy toward the Japanese occupation just after the end of World War II.
The discussion paper dated August 12, 1945, submitted to the Supreme National Defence Council, the supreme command in the War of Resistence in the Republic of China, revealed that China's attitude toward Japan was considerably harsh in the beginning. For instance, the revision of the Meiji Constitution, the return of the Emperor's prerogative to the Japanese people, and demilitarization of Japan were insisted on in the paper.
But both the domestic situation caused by the recurrence of the civil war with the Chinese Communist Party, and America's change of occupation policy towards Japan forced the Republic of China to change its policy towards Japan.
As for Chinese participation in the Japanese occupation, in August 1945, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek expressed a desire to send one army of three divisions. But because of the unsettled conditions in China, he had to postpone sending Chinese troops to Japan. On this subject, a draft agreement was signed in Tokyo on July 20, 1946 between General Chu Shih-ming on behalf of the Chinese Government and General Paul J. Mueller on behalf of General MacArthur. According to this agreement, the Chinese occupation forces would be allocated to Aichi prefecture, in the middle of Honshu Island, and Chinese troops would disembark at the Nagoya Port. But, after all, the Chinese army could not land in Japan. In summer 1946, overall civil war between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party broke out.
As for the reparations policy for Japan, the Republic of China's position was very firm and Chinese leaders often insisted that they were most desirous of obtaining a larger share of reparations out of the current production from Japan.
On October 24, 1947, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, Foreign Minister of the Republic of China, met with General MacArthur in Tokyo. General MacArthur then pointed out that China had already received a tremendous share of Japan's external assets in the form of capital goods within China, Manchuria and Formosa, and asked Dr. Wang how the Chinese could possibly expect Japan to produce sufficient goods and turn over a substantial amount of them to China, when Japan itself was just barely keeping alive with American assistance. The General indicated that in fact there was practically nothing to be given or taken from Japan. The United States had already determined to reconstruct and “foster” Japan facing a critical situation under the Cold War. Under these conditions the Republic of China's demand on reparations had to be weakened.

抄録全体を表示

In January 1947, President Truman asked former President Hoover to undertake an economic mission to Germany. Hoover had a wide range of experience in relief and reconstruction in World War I. In addition to that, in the Congressional election of November 1946, the Democrats were overwhelmingly defeated by the Republicans. Truman badly needed Hoover's help, more than ever, to pass the foreign assistance bills in the Congress, for Hoover had been in close contact with influential Republican congressmen.
Before U. S. participation in World War II, Hoover took a firm isolationist stand. He had served all presidents except one in the quarter century after World War I. His arguments were clearly against Roosevelt's and the New Deal's domestic and foreign policies. During the seccond World War he argued for Christianhumanistic relief to the occupied areas, and immediately after the War he also argued for food relief to Germany.
The main aim of his second mission of 1947 was the recommendation of a new policy for Germany, rather than a survey of food supplies, which was the purpose of the first mission in March 1946. In March 1947, after the second mission, Hoover presented his plan for Germany to President Truman. This Hoover Plan was very “soft” towards Germany and “hard” towards the Soviet Union. This plan was in complete contrast to the Morgenthau Plan. Morgenthau insisted on the “hard peace line” towards Germany, namely the containment of Germany, and the “soft line” toward the Soviet Union. This was the corollary of Roosevelt's policy of the anti-Hitler wartime alliance. One of the most impressive aspects of the Morgenthau Plan was the destruction of the “war-potential” i. e. “heavy industry” of Germany, but, for Morgenthau the relief and restoration of Germany was out of the question.
After the death of Roosevelt and V-E Day, the U. S. policy for Germany moved rapidly from the “hard peace line” de jure in Washington and de facto in the OMGUS in Germany. U. S. policy was revised, but the policy of Western Allies for Germany could not immediately be revised. The Hoover plan was on behalf of Germany. The reconstruction of the European countries invaded by Germany seemed to be secondary in the Hoover Plan.
The U. S. wanted cooperation from Western European countries, especially from France. But the French stuck to the firm “hard peace line”. The State Department was facing difficult problems. Even if the Hoover Plan was the best answer for the restoration of Germany, it was very difficult to put it into practice. As a new comprehensive solution to this dilemma, the Marshall Plan emerged.

抄録全体を表示

The recent conservative trend in political science has been accompanied by the emergence of conservative interpretations of the occupation period. Among these revised views, the most conspicuous one is the high appraisal of Yoshida Shigeru, which elucidates Yoshida's politics as mainstream within the postwar Japanese conservative party. Yoshida is now seen as a main figure who contributed to the postwar political stability and economic prosperity of Japan.
My close examinations of the first-hand historical materials of the postwar occupation period, such as the diaries of Ashida Hitoshi, however, have led me to question the validity of this conservative interpretation. Moreover, that interpretation contains the following theoretical defects. First, it has somewhat ignored the systemic approach of history. That is to say, this interpretation has underestimated the significance of discontinuity between prewar and postwar Japanese society. Consequently, feudalistic aspects of prewar Japanese society as well as the significance of the democratization of postwar Japanese society have been neglected. Naturally enough, this has led to the neglect of Yoshida's feudalistic values and a tendency to evaluate Yoshida as a liberal-conservative. The conservative interpretation has ignored the fact that Yoshida regarded the USSR as an expansionist state and his anti-communist stance has been somehow ignored.
These interpretations have brought about, on the other hand, an oversimplified appraisal of Ashida as an “ultra-nationalist.” Accordingly, the importance of the Katayama-Ashida coalition government between the Japanese Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Party has not been emphasized adequately in these evaluations of the occupation period. The objective of this article is to attempt a reappraisal of the occupation period, particularly in the period of the coalition government as well as the politics and diplomacy of Ashida. This article is closely based upon the diaries of Ashida Hitoshi, which I recenty co-edited in seven volumes.
The article contains the following major points:
1. The conservative trend in interpretations of postwar history
2. Continuity and discontinuity: the meaning of democratization in the postwar period
3. Historian's interpretations of the “Konoye Memorial”
4. Ashida's views on world affairs prior to the surrender of Japan
5. The complexities of the Japanese constitution-making process
6. The rise and fall of the coalition government
7. The unknown battle over reform of the Imperial Household
8. The partisan struggle for national control of the coal industry
9. Economic recovery and the democratization of Japanese society
10. A gap in Japanese historiography: A dilemma within Japanese liberalism

抄録全体を表示

This article aims to clarify the process of formulating the purge directives, SCAPIN-550 (Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Personnel from Public Office) and SCAPIN-548 (Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Associations, Societies and Other Organizations) which MacArthur's GHQ on January 4, 1946 ordered the Japanese government to execute. Despite the decisiveness of the purge in the demilitarization and democratization of Japan in the post-war period, this has hardly been studied in Japan or in the United States.
As for the formation-process, Colonel Kades and the other members of GS/GHQ worked on the policies of the directives until December, 1945 pursuant to JCS 1380/5-15, after PWC and CAC in the Department of State had drawn up the purge program in 1943-44. Needless to say, there were a lot of conflicts, not only between GS, CIS and G-2 within GHQ, but also between the Departments of State and War and the JCS in Washington.
There appeared three characteristics in the formulation-process: firstly, that SCAPIN-550 was gradually recognized as being more important, especially for the coming election, than SCAPIN-548 although the former seemed to be subordinated to the latter in the beginning. This transition coincided with the increased American stress on democratization rather than on demilitarization of Japan. Secondly, there appeared many differences between the purge in Germany and in Japan in the final stage, although the purge policy in Japan originally followed the German example. In other words, the purge in Japan was meant to be a “preventive” policy against remilitarization, in comparison with the “punitive” purge in Germany. And finally, the original, severe policy towards ultranationalists was gradually moderated by internal politics in GHQ, as seen by the decreasing number of purgees and of organizations, except the range of military officers.
With the formulation of the purge directives, which the Japanese were forced to execute after February, 1946, two hundred-thousand Japanese were eventually removed and excluded from public office until March, 1948.

抄録全体を表示

One of the causes of the Northern Territories Problem was the failure to apply to the territories “the principle of non-aggrandizement” which the Allied countries, including the Soviet Union, confirmed during World War II. Why did such a thing happen? In an attempt to solve this problem, I will analyze how the Northern Territories were dealt with in the policy of the United States when the Japanese Peace Treaty was drafted by John Foster Dulles.
The provisions of the treaty concerning the Northern Territories are as follows. In Article 2, Japan renounces the Chishima Islands and Southern Karafuto. We can find two problems here. First, “the Chishima Islands” are not defined. Second, the future status of the Chishima Islands and Southern Karafuto are not defined. According to Dulles, Article 22, which provides that a dispute concering the interpretation or execution of the treaty could be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice, is of use for solving the first problem. But, the article is practically useless, because the Soviet Union would not sign the treaty. Moreover, due to Article 25, the Soviet Union cannot gain “any rights, titles or benefits” by the treaty. Therefore, the second problem also was not settled in the treaty.
Article 26, too, has a problem. It says, “Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.” In 1956, when Japan was about to recognize the possession of the Chishima Islands and Southern Karafuto by the Soviet Union in the bilateral peace negotiations, Dulles intervened on the grounds that if such a settlement was realized, the United States also should be rewarded with the Ryukyu Islands by Article 26.
Why has the treaty, drafted by Dulles, a competent lawyer, presented so many problems regarding the Northern Territories? Dulles tried to make the Soviet Union sign the treaty with the bait of the Northern Territories, and he had to overcome the difference of opinions regarding the disposition of Taiwan with the United Kingdom. He also had to take the opinions of the Senate and the Pentagon into consideration. Moreover, Dulles was afraid that the Japanese would be dissatisfied with the separation of the Ryukyu Islands and would then arouse anti-American feelings. Therefore, he devised such provisions that the Japanese would be more frustrated with the Soviet Union over the Northern Territories.
Dulles adopted realism and power politics, treating the Northern Territories as a bargaining chip. This was one of the main reason why “the principle of non-aggrandizement, ” which conformed with idealism and democracy, was not applied to the Northern Territories.

抄録全体を表示

In the early 1950s the United States government pursued conflicting policies with regard to Japan. While anxious to see a post-occupation Japan become economically self-supporting, Washington initiated a rigid trade restriction policy against mainland China after China's military intervention in the Korean War, and forced Japan to observe a China embargo list which was stricter than that for the other European allies. Since mainland China was Japan's traditional market and source of raw materials, this policy created serious friction between Japan and the United States. This article describes the following—utilizing United States government documents:
(1) During and after the Allied occupation of Japan, the United States wished to see Japan become a loyal western ally with a healthy, self-sustaining economy;
(2) When Japan expressed its desire to take part in the COCOM, the United States tried to create a separate organization for Far Eastern trade—chiefly out of its desire to maintain the existing stricter controls on China than on the European Soviet Bloc. The major advocates of this hard-line policy within the United States government were the military and the Commerce Department;
(3) When this attempt failed, the United States government obtained a promise from the Japanese government—in the form of a secret bilateral agreement—to maintain stricter controls on Chinese trade than the other COCOM countries except the United States and Canada;
(4) This created a dilemma for top Washington officials who were deeply concerned with the economic condition in Japan and with the mounting pressure within Japan for relaxed trade with China. Great Britain and France also pressed on Washington for freer East-West trade;
(5) After twenty months of negotiations between Japan and the United States, Washington officials finally decided in early 1954 to nullify the bilateral agreement with Japan, and accord Japan an equal status with the European COCOM countries in terms of China trade control.

抄録全体を表示

While the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951 has been analyzed extensively, the Administrative Agreement of 1952 governing the status of U. S. forces stationed in Japan following the Peace Treaty has not been so adequately analyzed, perhaps due to the relative lack of primary sources. In recent years, however, U. S. documents, in which some important Japanese documents are included, have been released. The purpose of this article is to analyze the making of the Agreement by using these U. S. documents, thus filling the missing chapter in Japan-U. S. relations. The article focuses on interactions among U.S. officials rather than on bilateral interactions, though it does briefly analyze them whenever sufficient materials are available.
Part 1 traces the process of drafting the first U. S. draft by analyzing NSC 60/1 (September 8, 1950), impact of the Korean War, and the Dulles Mission's visit to Tokyo in early 1951. Part 2 deals with interactions among U. S. officials, particularly among the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the State Department, which led to the final draft presented to Japan in early 1952 as the basis of negotiation. The issues analyzed rather extensively are articles on criminal jurisdiction, areas and facilities, and the joint U. S. -Japan command. Part 3 analyzes the bilateral negotiations in Tokyo in early 1952, but it limits its analyses to the joint command issue, not only because it was the only article that was revised due to persistent Japanese requests, but also because the two other important articles (criminal jurisdiction, and areas and facilities) have been adequately analyzed by Kumao Nishimura who, as a member of the Japanese negotiating team, participated in the negotiation.
Major findings are: 1) an often disputed proposition in the bureaucratic politics model that “stands depend on positions” seems largely relevant in this case, of particular interest in this respect being the stands taken by CINCFE in Tokyo, who was responsible for defending Japan from external attack, thus demanding the maintaining of the status quo, but was also compelled to honor Japan's integrity as a sovereign nation; and 2) the major articles mentioned above were outcomes of much bargaining among U. S. officials, which resulted in compromises in which none was fully satisfied; and 3) the fact that the article on the joint command was revised in the Tokyo negotiations was due largely to Dean Rusk's strenuous and skillful coalition-building both in Tokyo and Washington as well as skillful negotiation on the part of the Japanese.

抄録全体を表示