The purpose of this study is to observe modalities in the process of exercises of the controlled association which dures for a considerably long period and to contribute herefrom to the study of thinking. It seems to me that, heretofore, the experimental conditions were not strict enough in the study of association for example, numbers of trials for one problem were too few . Under such conditions it is natural that we can not treat adequately the introspectional reports of the subjects.
Now, of what significance are the introspected contents such as images and inner speaches to the reactions in question? And of what sign is the “gefühlmässige Erlebnis” which was brought about by the transition of the problem? When we express naively to “think” implies this “Erlebnis.” And yet the psychologists of the Würzburg school established a special “Denkelernent” rejecting images and this “gefuhl massige Erlebnis.” But must the essence of thinking be the “Erlebnis”?
We distinguish two sorts of reactions in the process of the controlled association, namely the passive reaction and the active reaction , according, usually, to the modes of phenomena intervened between the presentations of stimuli and the reactions. But can this distinction signify the essential difference?
In the experiment of this sort we can get true knowledge of the process of the reaction only when our experimental conditions work as true conditions. It is useless to indulge in the analysis of the phenomena which appear under ambiguous conditions.
To correct some of defects of the previous studies, I planned the system of my experiment in the following manner; namely, the problems were limited to the response with the superordinate concepts and the subjects exercised these problems for 30 days using 20 new stimulus-words every day. The instruction is as follows.“Response quickly with an adequate superordinate concept to a given stimulus-word.” After the reaction the subjects make the introspectional renorts freely.
When we examine the reports of the exercise during 30 days we notice that
(1)There is a remarkable reduction in the reaction time inspite of the fact that we used new stimulus-words every day.
(2)The number of reports of the so-called interpolated phenomena, which get place between the presentation of the stimulus and the reaction, decreases; moreover the grade of the “Eindringlichkeit” of these phenomena diminishes also.
(3)The reaction-word becomes more adequate either when we conoider it from the objective side or when we examine it from the introspection of the subject.
Now in this advanced process we can name the superordinate concepts immediately in spite of the fact that the stimulus-words were new every day; and the so-called interpolated phenomena are diminished. Can we not assert that in an intended act it is things of no importance that there appear various “nsychische Gebilde” in the consciousness?
Against this assertion perhaps many people may say that it is impossible to react without the understanding of the stimulus. To Lc sure a functional action of understanding of stimulus is necessary. But it is not necessary to appear in the consciousness.
The more smooth is the completion of the intended act the simpler is the subjective side of this act. This simple conscious phenomena, i. e, “Eigenbewusstsein,” can not become the direct object of our study.
I was disappointed in the analysis of the introspe tional facts of the psychological study of thinking. And I asserted that to the completion of an intended act the conscious efforts were of no importance. To this one may make the objection that the very basis of this conscious efforts is the facts of thinking.

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I. Problem.
We have numerous studies concerning asociation process, but we may say that the “Ferd” of their investigations is quite limited, that is to say, the objects of them are association process in a naive “Ferd” i. e. the “Ferd” based upon the normal mental attitude of the subjects, corresponding to the mode of our daily life.
Hereupon I intended to study association p ocess in a special “Ferd” where the mental attitude of the subject aims at the inhibition of the naive association process which is quite natural from the view-point grounded upon the mode of our everyday life. This problem, in an aspect, aims to help the consideration of the interesting question of “negative type” introduced by Dr. Marstonsu.
II. Experiments.
My experiments dealt with two types of reactions.
(1) Inhibitory reaction: In response to a stimulus-word which belongs to one of three categories-animal, botany and mineral, the subject has to name either of other two categories. (e.g. “Botany” or “M ineral” to the stimulus-word “Dog.”)s
(2) Normal reaction: To a stimulus-word the subject has to mention the category to which the stimulus belongs. (e. g. “Animal” to “Dog”.) [Experiment A] The comparison of the inhibitory reaction and the normal one with regard to the mental attitude as the actual condition. I tried to control experimentally the “latent” mental attitude of the subject by means of stimulus-constellation.
Results. When the “latent” mental attitude aims at the inhibitory reaction, generally
(1) the normal reaction takes longer time than the inhioitory does.
(2) normal reaction involves more complex pheno ena of consciousness than the inhibitory one.
[Experiment B] The investigation of the practice process of the einhibitoryreaction.
Results. The inhibitory reaction tends to be done automatically without accompanying any inhibitory experience.
III. Consideration of the Results.
There should be something in common between the process of the inhibitory reaction and that of the deception with respect to the inhibition of the developmental tendency of a mental fact to appear phenomenally, to be persevered and moreover to develop to a word reaction. The fact that the inhibitory reaction could be done automatically might suggest that, when the inhibitory mental attitude acts effectively in case of the inquiry or the diagnostic association, the deceptive answers, apparently natural, or the reactional words having no concern with crime would come into existence directly and without accompanying any confusion of consciousness, eventhough the inquiry or the critical stimulus is received significantly by the subject. Hereat, considering the results of Exp. A, I think I may safely say that the possibility of being of the “negative type” should not be negated in a certain process of deception.
Anyhow, we could not expect the conception based on the naive “Ferd” corresponding to the attitude of daily life to have the generality applicable to all process. In applied psychology the attention and the caution concerning this point should always be demanded. The results of my experiments, at least, obviously indicate that it would be one of the most essential problems in case of the method of diagnostic association or the judgement of deception by the inquiry.

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There were many instances in psychology where technical terms carelessly used brought about unexpected misunderstandings and unnecessary debates among those who were interested in the same subject.
In scientific investigation, we give phenomenological description of facts as well as transphenomenal explanation of them, usually using common expressions for both, and thus occurs, occasionally, unnecessary misunderstanding. This must be avoided.
In order to get rid of this inconvenient circumstances, it is to be recommended to make a clear distinction between the terms in the phenomenal description and those in the transphenomenal (functional) explanation. An attempt of this kind was shown by the present author in his previous article pertaining to the perception of space, in which all phenomenal description was strictly distinguished from causal or conditional-genetic explanation in terminology.
In an example from the field of auditory and tactual experiences, carelessness in this respect is shown to the effect fatal to the scientific consideration. The same physical process, i. e. the vibration of such and such a frequency, may cause an auditory as well as a tactual vibratory perception, as is known from the investigation of D. Katz. Now, the vibratory process as such is not at all auditory in its nature, so that the term ‘sound’ or ‘tone’ applied to this physical process, as it happens usually in the ter inology of physicist, is often misleading and by no means adequate to our science. Such an expression as “the sound may be experienced as well by auditory sense (hearing) as by ‘vibration-sense’ (Vibrationssinn)” should be abolished in psychology.
Strict distinction of terminology between phenomenal and conditionalgenetic points of view is required in this field of investigation as in other fields of sensory psychology. Even if the usual terminology, in which the term ‘sound’ stands as well for experienced fact (phenomenal) as for condditional physical process (transphenomenal), is allowed in psychology, we must be careful to notify the difference of its scientific significance, in order to avoid any possible ‘experience-error’ (Köhler).
Precaution is also required in application of the term keitai or form' in order to indicate so far the notion as that of gestalt. In biology the term keitai has been used to denote morphological pattern in general for a long time, and as long as there was no intimate relation between biological and psychological sciences, the terminological usage in biology seemed to have nothing to do with psychological signification. Psychology is now well called a branch of biology in principal consideration, and appreciable interrelation between both sciences must be expected as a matter of course. Having no connection with biological conception, we can hardly perform any psychological investigation at present.
The development of our science in recent years have brought about, first in the field of sensory psychology and then in that of emotion and will as well as in genetic psychology, radical change in its fundamental ideas. All the functional problems can be solved only in the light of the dynamics of the processes in the whole structure. The focus of interest in gestalt psychology is found now-a-days not so much in sensory organization itself but in the dynamical character of functional whole.

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Die “Kan-otu”-theorie in der japanischen Musiklehre ist ein wichtiges Problem uber die Tonqualität (nach Révéz). Die wahre Bedeutung der “Kan-otu”-theorie enthält die Aehnlichkeit der Oktaventöne und noch dazu das Verhältnis der Quintentöne (od. Quartentöne).
Vor etwa sieben hundert Jahren, erschien diese Theorie in der japanischen Musiklehre ;besonders in den Büchern über “Gagaku” und “Syômyô” (“Gagaku” ist eine kaiserliche Bofmusik, und “Syômyô” eine buddhistische Musik in Japan).
Das Verhältnis der Quintentone zu den Grundtönen hat Analogie zu dem der roten Farbe zur grünen Farbe. Daher bin ich der Meinung dass Quinteutöne oder Quartentöne Komplementärtöne sind. Halten wit Quintentöne ars ein wichtiges Verhältnis der Tonqualität, so können mehrere akustische und musikalische Phänomene wohl geprüft werden.
Künftig will ich die genauere Besehreibung dieser Theorie in “Thhoku Psychologica Folia” berichten.

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