Entre le bas moyen age et le milieu du XVIIe siecle, deux pouvoirs interviennent dans le systeme fiscal de la Normandie : les Etats provinciaux et l'administration royale -- les elections. Le premier cherche a s'approprier la gestion de l'impot, le second a pour vocation d'assurer son recouvrement integral par la royaute. Notons en outre la situation contradictoire de la Normandie : alors que figure dans la Charte aux Normands l'engagement de ne lever aucun impot sans le vote des Etats, la province n'en est pas moins astreinte a une lourde charge fiscale, acquittant le sixieme de la taille du royaume. Au XIVe siecle, les Etats se reservent le droit d'asseoir et de lever l'impot. Les elections n'existent pas encore. Entre le XVe siecle et le milieu du XVIe, les elections se mettent en place. Les Etats cooperent avec les officiers royaux (les elus) a la repartition de la taille, mais ils perdent le droit de la lever. A la fin du XVIe, ils sont exclus de la repartition, ce qui permet d'achever l'unification de l'administration fiscale. Cependant, la royaute ne peut pas abolir les privileges fiscaux conferes aux Etats par la Charte aux Normands. C'est pourquoi elle les respecte de facon purement formelle tout en les vidant de leur substance grace au developpement des elections. Pres de trois siecles seront necessaires pour etablir la fiscalite royale et eliminer la resistance des Etats. En outre, l'organisation financiere de la royaute a laquelle on aboutira au XVIIe siecle presentera des similitudes avec celle des Etats du XIVe. Ainsi, le mecanisme de recouvrement de l'impot en Normandie evolue selon un mode progressif et continu entre le bas moyen age et l'Ancien Regime. Ceci s'explique par la nature complexe et contradictoire de la fiscalite normande decrite plus haut.

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The hekatostai inscriptions are a group of documents which were set up on the Akropolis to show the payment of a tax of 1% on some land transactions by territorial and religious bodies. What kind of land transactions were they? Andreyev and Lewis think the hekatostai inscriptions register the sale of land by these bodies to private persons. Therefore, Andreyev suggests that the prices in the inscriptions have an order : they are divisible by 12.5. This peculiarity of the figures has led to suggestions that a fixed price per plethron was being charged for the land (Andreyev), or that sale by auction at fixed intervals was involved (Lewis). Humphreys says that the prices of public land sold by auction in the inscriptions discussed by Lewis as all multiples of 12.5 dr. does not reflect a fixed price per stremma of land, but reveals the practice attested in Attic leases of computing the capital value of land at 12.5 times the annual rent. Osborne also accepts that the hekatostai inscriptions record leases and not sales. If this interpretation is right, what are the hekatoste and the prices in the inscriptions? In this paper, by re-examining the hekatostai inscriptions the author points out the following. (1)Andreyev's basic contention that all prices are divisible by 12.5 dr. is right. (2)The hekatostai inscriptions do record leases. In this case, the rent was 8% of the value of the property (the value of the property being itself calculated by multiplying the sum paid by 12.5). This would account for the periodicity of the figures given in the texts. (3)The τιμημα of Attica for eisphora-purposes in the 350s, which certainly included the property of territorial and religious bodies, was 6000 talants. Various inscriptions recording public leases mention the eisphora. Eisphorai were also levied on public property belonging to demes, Phratries, and Orgeones. The eisphora was levied on the τιμημα. The rate of levy was a hundredth of one τιμημα. The eisphorai were to be paid by bodies leasing land during 346/5〜306/5 B.C.. These points lead to the conclusion that the prices in the hekatostai inscriptions are τιμημα on the eisphora and the hekatostai in the inscriptions are sums which bodies leasing land paid to the state. If so, these inscriptions deal with the lease of land and with the levy of the Eisphora.

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The financial system during the Qing period was centralized the system and local finance was not legally permitted by the central government. So was really made up of both regular finance, by which the central government collected taxes according to ledgers, and an irregular one, by which local governments collected taxes to cover the cost of local administrations. This dual system was functioning well up until the Qianlong 乾隆 era, but after the Jiaqing 嘉慶 era its function deteriorated when national finances became squeezed because of many rebellions. In Sichuan 四川 the central government began to impose jintie 津貼 and jiansyu 捐輸 (additional taxes on land) for the purpose of procuring the military budjet to suppress rebellions. The Sichuan local government also collected chaiwu 差務 and fuma 夫馬 (new local taxes) in the name of supporting soldiers and procuring military supplies. These new taxes increased the burdens on tax payers at a tremendous rate. After the Xianfeng 咸豊 and Tongzhi 同治 eras, the Sichuan government began to promote the establishment of sanfei-ju 三費局 (an office to deal with sanfei funds) to lighten tax payers' burdens. In the past the majority of local government officials, xuli 胥吏 and yayi 衙役, were unsalaried. They lived on lougui 陋規 (fee) received for criminal suits and trials. Since lougui was freely collected, it oppresed the livelihood of the people and caused arrears in official taxes. So the Sichuan government regulated the collection of lougui and made the sanfei-ju pay officials regularly in compensation for it. In itself sanfei was the fund to give officials actual expenses for criminal suits. But in practice sanfei-ju constantly paid them salary from the fund. In the early Guangxu 光緒 era Ding-bao-zhen 丁宝〓, who was the governor of Sichuan, further promoted the sanfei-ju and laid a tax on butchery to increase much revenue. In 1877 he also abolished the fuma-ju 夫馬局 to prohibit local governments from collecting fuma. Minimum expenses were covered by the sanfei-ju. He also prohibited guili 規礼 that had been a part of lougui and fuma collected by low-ranking officials and customarily given to high-ranking officials for expenses of administration or social expenses. In compensation for this the Sichuan government paid high-ranking officials gongfei 公費 (a kind of salary). In this way Ding considerably reduced local irregular finances and established a stable and regular collection of taxes by the central government. He also strengthened Sichuan finances by means of lijin 釐金 revenue to modernize industry and armaments, and made it independent of the central government.

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