In order to place the origins of the leaders who founded the Tang Dynasty within the Western Wei-Northern Zhou period, the Guanlong 関隴 group has argued that it was the "bazhuguojia" 八柱国家 that formed the core of political power and bore the main burden of supporting and preserving the dynasty through early Tang times. This "bazhuguojia" refers to the families of the eight generalissimos of the zhuguo 柱国 rank listed at the end of Chapter 16 (史臣曰条) of the Zhoushu 周書, with the holder of real power under the Western Wei, Yuwentai 宇文泰, leading the list, followed by Lihu 李虎, the grandfather of the founder of the Tang dynasty. However, both the members and order of this listing of the eight zhuguo and twelve great generalissimos (大将軍) in Chapter 16(and also Chapter 60 [論曰条] of the Beishi (北史) does not correspond to other sources, while the actual term "Bazhuguojia" does not appear in the other sources until the Zhenguan 貞観 era (620s -640s AD), suggesting definite discrepancies in the Zhoushu text. What gave rise to these discrepancies is the creation of the content and order of the listing after the beginning of the Tang period motivated by the Tang imperial family's hope of raising its authority. What made such a move necessary was the original Zhenguanzhizuzhi 貞観氏族志, the compilation of which began in 632 (Zhenguan 6), ranking the Tang imperial family below Cuimingan 崔民幹, resulting in the creation of the "bazhuguojia" concept in response. This is why the term appears in the source materials only after the compilation was begun and a new order that sought legitimization of Tang dynasty authority in the Western Wei period was created and laid out in Chapter 16 of the Zhoushu relating the exploits of the eight zhuguo generalissimos. The revised edition of the Zhenguanzhizuzhi conforms to this new order by ranking the Tang imperial family first above all. Therefore, given the fact that Chapter 16 is more interested in legitimizing the Tang imperial family than describing the great families of the Western Wei period, it is necessary for historians of the period the rethink the viewpoints put forth by the Guanlong group regarding political history from the Western Wei to the Tang period based on that text and reexamine the idea that the origins of the fubing 府兵 system of military conscription can be found in the tradition set down by the eight "bazhuguo" generalissimos.

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The style of costume worn by Japanese imperial and aristocratic families at official ceremonies changed during the twelfth century to the stiff kowa 強 fashion, which made it difficult for its wearers to dress by themselves, giving rise to a new occupation of professional "outfitters" practicing the art of emon 衣紋. In the present article, the author takes up one of these outfitters, the Takakura 高倉 family, who replaced the Oimikado 大炊御門 family of outfitters (but exactly when this change occurred has yet to be clarified) and who has yet to be discussed in the research on Japanese family organization (ie 家). Focussing on ceremonies for enthronement, the offering of first fruits (daijo-e 大嘗会) and male initiation (gempuku 元服), the author introduces some newly discovered source materials that enables her to pinpoint exactly when the Takakuras replaced the Qimikados and discuss the way of life of the Takakuras during the medieval period. The first section takes up Takakura Nagatsune 永経, who attired the Jimyoin 持明院 imperial line, and Nagayasu 永康, who attired the Daikaku-ji 大覚寺 imperial line. It is interesting that during the late Kamakura period, the Takakura family split in accordance with the frequent schisms that occurred in the imperial family at that time. Section two investigates the very difficult techniques of agemaki 総角 hairstyling for boys. The art was first possessed by the Tokudai-ji 徳大寺 family, then taken up by the Oimikado family. Then in 1371, the Oimikados taught the art to the Takakuras, when Takakura Nagasue 永季 was temporarily engaged for the agemaki work in preparation for the initiation ceremony of future emperor Go-Enyu. In section three, the author focuses on haku-shozoku 帛装束, the white garment worn at the first fruits and other ceremonies, and shows that it was at the time of Go-Komatsu's enthronement in 1382 that the Takakuras replaced the Oimikados, a change made possible by shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu 足利義満. That is to say, from the Kamakura period, the Takakuras had always functioned as assistants or representatives of the Oimikado family, never being allowed to appear at major ceremonies. It was only due to the wishes of Yoshimitsu that the Takakuras were first able appear in the limelight by replacing the Oimikados in the emon preparation for major ceremonies. What remains to be studied is the role of the Takakura family in outfitting aristocrats and warriors for ceremonies that continued during the transition from medieval time to late premodern times and the Edo period.

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TAZAWA Yoshiharu (田沢義鋪), a high-ranking bureaucrat, may be considered as the representative of some features characterizing the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Home Affairs under the party cabinets. In this paper, the author aims at clarifying the contents and limits of the discourse carried on concerning political innovation advocated by bureaucrats under the vagaries of party politics during the 1920's by tracing the process of the formation of TAZAWA s view of local autonomy. TAZAWA thought that the corruption of party politics had its roots in the struggle among political parties at the local level, arguing that the solution to such a situation was the exclusion of party politics at local level by means of political education. His aim was to remove the political aspect of local administration, thus turning it into a purely practical one, turning local administration into pure practice meant, above all, the exclusion of the struggle among the political parties at local level by focusing on the public aspect of the local administration and on the common interests of local inhabitants, thus accomplishing a purification of the election system (Senkyo Shukusei Movement 選挙粛正運動). To overcome the rural economic crisis of the early Showa period, TAZAWA tried to organize "staff offices in towns and villages (町村の参謀本部), which would be centers for local inhabitants and bases for the revival of local autonomy. At the same time, such "staff offices" were expected to be the main force in preventing confrontation among political parties at the local level, consent among inhabitants being the major support for them. Consequently, TAZAWA adopted his own view of local autonomy, "small nationalism" (sho-kokka shugi 小国家主義). His argument was based on a unique Japanese idea that attending to state affairs takes precedence over all others, and also contained the viewpoint of identifying local autonomy with state affairs. It provided a theoretical basis for the separation of local autonomy and party politics. His view of local autonomy was applied to the "village meeting" (Buraku Kondankai 部落懇談会), especially in the Senkyo Shukusei Movement of 1935. This meeting from this movement also played role in the exclusion of the party politics and the organization of the state. TAZAWA's view of local autonomy was a result of various movements for political innovation during the 1920's and might be said to have provided the theoretical basis for the exclusion of political struggles at the local level. It also established an image of local authority denying party politics and concerning itself only with local matters. Consequently, his version of Japanese local autonomy was supposed to place local authorities within the framework of a national administration where bureaucrats held power.

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Little attention has been paid to behavior surrounding communal welfare in Nazi Germany. This paper analyses, using the example of Duisburg, the role that welfare offices played in Nazi labor policy. By means of Work-Relief (Arbeitsfursorge), which had been introduced during Weimar era, Duisburg mobilized welfare recipients as labor in public works. Refusal to work in places assigned to them would result in the welfare office cutting off relief, even if recipients were not able to work. Economic recovery of the Ruhr area from the Depression was slow, and had more unemployed persons and relief recipients than the national average. So the Duisburg city authorities considered dispatching the unemployed to the areas where more workers were needed. The city planned to send especially unemployed young men and women into the rural agrarian sector. To promote job-seeking, relief from public welfare for the unemployed young men was abolished, many of the unemployed refused to work in the country side, thus reducing the such number of the unemployed persons that could be sent there. Under conditions, an arrest campaign by the police was instituted in June 1938, and for the city welfare office it become a method to force the unemployed to work. Under the Nazi labor mobilization policy during the late 1930s, the city welfare office on its own initiative decided to select relief recipients according to work ability and exclude those persons who were not able to work from the public welfare program.

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