The malt tax riots, which broke out in June 1725 in Glasgow with a general discontent at the imposition of the malt tax, has long attracted some attention of historians. From the viewpoint of recent development of political and social history, however, it has been investigated unsatisfactorily. This article deals with the malt tax riots and focuses on its two aspects : the actual situation of the three-day disturbances, that is, actions of the crowd and measures taken by the Glasgow magistrates, and a war of words that surrounded the riots. In the disturbances, crowd abused the excise officers and interfered violently with the officers' work to gauge the malts. They also attacked the neo-palladian house of Daniel Campbell of Shawfield, MP for Glasgow burghs, and it was completely demolished. Two troops, sent from Edinburgh in advance to assist the excise officers, shot at the crowd that allegedly threatened the troops. Some were killed on the spot, and the crowd became extremely enraged. In this field of hostility emerged a bitter friction between the local community and the representation of the state force. The provost chose to take sides with the local community, and issued some instruction to a captain of the train bands of the town to pursue the troops. In the war of words, the pro-government press represented Glasgow as disaffected, while pro-Glaswegian writers campaigned for and exploited Glasgow's loyalism to the Revolution settlement and the Hanoverian monarchy to justify the town. The magistrates of Glasgow were supported by the people by reason of their conduct during the disturbances, creating the solidarity of the town. The disturbances functioned as an integrative factor. The self-appointed name of the magistrates, 'the Revolutioners', epitomized the solidarity and loyalism of the town.

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How does a nation cope with a situation in which its sovereign cannot convene the parliament? This is exactly the problem that arose in Japan when enacting the Wartime Emergency Measures Act at the end of the Pacific War. The research to date has made two points : 1) the Emergency Measures Act was "legislation of the highest delegated authority," and 2) the Diet resisted the government by criticizing the relation between this bill and Article 31 of the Constitution, which provided for emergency powers. The author of the present article focuses on the fact that the mainstream opinion in the Diet was that the Emperor should exercise emergency powers and concludes the following. The Dainihon Seijikai was intent on making the Wartime Emergency Measures Committee a de facto standing committee, and in making this a reality, supported the imperial exercise of emergency powers. On the other hand, the Gokoku Doshikai and Koseikai stood together on the issue in principle, but the former intended to use those powers in continuing the War, while the latter thought that they would help control the military and realize a peaceful settlement. A group of Diet members from the Godo and Nissei parties led by Funada Naka attempted to create a political regime committed to an all out war of resistance through emergency powers governance based on a "national guard" formed in alliance with the Imperial Army. Given the inability to convene the Diet, this "national guard" took on the split personality of a legislative body of Diet members and a symbol of "national leadership," the latter character functioning to institutionalize the organization's internal workings. Under such a "national emergency" situation, it became possible to reinterpret the constitutional views held by the two former leading parties in terms of Article 31 instead of provisions related to the Diet. Although the question of what would happen if the Diet could be reconvened under such conditions was rendered moot in the midst of Japan's defeat, it was to become a point of debate within the process of promulgating the new constitution. Here, we can confirm the intent of political parties at the time to perform the dismantling and rebuilding necessary to transfer emergency powers exercised by the emperor under the Meiji Constitution to the Diet as the holder of ultimate political authority.

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The research that has been done on the ancient Japanese state governed under the ritsuryo 律令 codes, which is based on the pioneering work of historians Ishimoda Sho and Yoshida Takashi, has recently been deepened by Otsu Tooru in his comparison with the Tang Dynasty. However, research has yet to be done on the Ritsuryo State from the point of view of fiscal administration on the local level and how this local character was transformed beginning in the tenth century. The present article is an attempt to delve into such matters. Local matters of the Ritsuryo State system were put in charge of sub-provincial district (gun 郡) administrators (gunji 郡司), who were supervised by the central government through provincial governors (kokushi 国司), whose performance was monitored by inspectors called yodo-no-tsukai 四度使. These central government inspectors submitted reports on both local administrative and fiscal affairs during the term of office of each successive governor. Local fiscal administration was based on taxes levied on yields of arable land allocated by the state to individuals (so 租), a part of which was accumulated in district storehouses as shozei 正税, and lent to cultivators at interest to defray administrative expenses. In this sense, the ritsuryo system was operated on a dual structure. The momentum for the system's transformation was provided by growing ties of dependency between members of the central aristocracy and commoners to whom land had been allocated (hyaku-sho 百姓) in the midst of a decline in the administrative authority of gun administrators. The central government began appoint ing tax farmers as deputy provincial governors (zuryo 受領) to take direct control over the hyakusho under their jurisdictions. Ac cording to the procedure that was instituted in a ministry of state order issued in 902 AD, the central government and provincial/districts were to allocate arable land to local hyakusho and collect from them a part of the harvest (sozei 租税) and a part o the fruits of their labor (choyo 調庸), together referred to as kanmotsu 官物, resulting in a system that fiscally unified the center and the provinces. This system, characterized politically as a "dynastic" state (ochokokka 王朝国家) was fiscally supported by taxes collected in accordance with the ritsuryo codes being channeled into stipends and rewards for the central aristo-bureaucracy (including state controlled religious institutions) on the strength of tax farming and proxy provincial administration conducted by zuryo. In addition to stipends from public tax stores, both the secular and religious aristocracy was allowed tax exemptions on their own proprietary holdings and permitted to organize their own labor forces (yoriudo 寄人) However, such privileges were not the results of grabbing exclusionary or feudal rights of coercion and ownership, but rather depended on controlling the administrative mechanism linking the center and the provinces. The result was a totally centralizes political entity created by unifying the dual structure characterizing the Ritsurvo State.

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In medieval English history, the loss of Normandy during the reign of King John (1199-1216) is regarded as marking the end of the "Anglo-Norman Realm," a territorial union between England and Normandy which existed from the "Norman Conquest" in 1066. Some scholars have attributed this loss to John's inability in military affairs, while others have cited the fiscal weakness of the government at that time. To discover the true cause of the loss, however, the presence of the barons who formed a personal network across the English Channel must also be considered. This article attempts to show how important a role these "cross-channel" barons played in maintaining the Anglo-Norman Realm based on an examination of scutage, a tax levied on tenants-in-chief by their lords during wartime, in particular changing attitudes concerning payment of that tax. During the reign of King Richard I, a time when the cross-channel barons were politically active during the king's absence, three scutages were levied : one was for the king's ransom, and the others for campaigns to defend English territories on the Continent. Judging from the related sources, the cross-channel barons appeared rather cooperative in paying for the king's ransom, but they seemed not only reluctant in paying for campaigns on the Continent, but also tried to obtain exemptions from payment. During John's reign, four scutages were levied, all to finance campaigns on the Continent before the loss of Normandy. Although some historians point to John's adamancy in collecting the taxes and a certain improvement in collection, which is evident in the figures presented in this article, more cross-channel barons were exempted from payment at that time than during Richard's reign, and even those who did pay seemed to no longer willing to do so. To gain their support, King John had to grant large amounts of land to these reluctant barons resulting in a decline in his own revenues. It was in this way that the cross-channel barons, who had once played an important role in supporting the Anglo-Norman Realm, became an equally important factor in its demise.

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