Alarmed at Filipinos picking up the practice of opium smoking from Chinese migrants in the Philippines at the time of the United States' colonization of the archipelago in 1898, the Americans took the initiative in holding international meetings to discuss the control of opium trafficking and smoking. This paper examines how Britain dealt with this development. Anti-opium advocates had been vocal in Britain since the 1870s, and the Liberal government's Secretary of State for India, John Morley, was known to be against the Indo-Chinese opium trade. The British House of Commons condemned the opium trade on 30 May 1906, and an Anglo-Chinese agreement to terminate it within ten years was concluded at the end of 1907. Yet Britain did not welcome the international meetings proposed by the United States, because it had gained enormous profits from the export of Indian opium, and colonial governments in East and South-east Asia relied heavily on revenues derived from opium. If the Empire were forced to control opium trafficking and smoking, it would have to intervene into the local society and its customs. This would conflict with the principle of British colonial rule: I. E., to gain as much economic profit as possible without intruding upon local society. Although Britain under the Liberal government did not intend to extract further concessions from China, it was not ready to revise existing treaties and agreements. It seemed to Britain that the Americans were offering their support to China in order to achieve their own goal of "open door" at the expense of Britain's existing interests. Britain tried to avoid international attention being focused solely on the opium question, by insisting that the subject should be examined from a broader point of view. At that time, morphine was mostly produced by British pharmacists, and cocaine by Germans. Britain's strategy resulted in bringing Anglo-German competition into the issue of the international control of drugs.

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In this study, article, the author investigates the meaning that commands issued by the Ashikaga Shoguns had for the daimyo during the Warring States period from two perspectives: the relationship between them out of "utilization and restriction", and the mutual relationship of confrontation among daimyo focusing primarily on those of Western Japan as well as the nature of the effect that trends in such commands had on the behavior. In other words, (1) even during this period, daimyo required a stable relationship with the Shogun due to various circumstances such as the need to obtain legitimacy and to keep hostile forces in check and there was a tendency for them to take advantage of the shogun. (2) While they took advantage of this relationship with the Shogun, however, daimyo were also subjected to various restrictions such as the need to honor the commands of the Shogun (or, the need to honor the wishes of third parties through such commands). This made the commands of the Shogun an important tool in diplomatic relations with daimyo as confrontations between them broadened in scale and increased in complexity during the period. (3) In addition, Daimyo in the Kinki area (Kinai) gained the ability to control these commands by cooperating in the existence of the Shogun and, thereby, promoted collaboration with various other daimyo through the commands, which had become an important tool in the diplomatic relations between daimyo or secured opportunities for them to exercise influence over other daimyo. Various factors such as (1)? (3) above acted to further draw many more daimyo to the side of the Shogun, even after the advent of the Warring States, becoming a factor in the maintenance of a certain degree of influence by the Shogun over the daimyo. This influence of the Shogun on the Daimyo was extremely useful for the daimyo in their diplomatic strategies and was an authority unique to the Shogun on a dimension completely different from the control of the daimyo over their territories. It was therefore not easy for the daimyo to acquire such authority. However, by backing the Shogun, Oda Nobunaga succeeded in gaining the influence 'that the Shogun had over the daimyo and, while gradually exercising that influence, he moved ahead with the task of unifying the nation.

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This paper investigates to what extent the control was maintained over medical treatment by han government around the beginning of the 19th century. Despite the conventional view that this was a function of the Tokugawa Bakuhu, the author considers by examining the meaning of the kept one in the town of Fuchu. The diary by Minagawa, an official physician of Fuchuhan. In Chapter 1, the author turns to the social structure of the Fuchu area, the position of han physicians. Their everyday work involved; (pattending the han lord, cperiodical attendance at the han castle, such as at the beginning-of-the-year congratulatory gift ceremony, and (Dmedical treatment at the han castle. Moreover, a specific communication route existed between physicians and the han, and the status of physicians was not guaranteed unless a certain level of expertise was achieved. In Chapter 2, the contents of three decrees issued in 1843 and 1850 are analyzed. The author points out many ways of how to control non-resident physicians who flowed in from other places. Although physicians working in Fuchu town attained a level of systematization, in order to exist as "residents" the intervention in han physicians was indispensable. This means that the status or the activity of resident physician was guaranteed by indirectly by han physicians, and that medical treatment developed in Fuchu only after the han based social structure regarding physicians was formed.

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