In the research to date on government-military relations regarding the Japanese Army, emphasis has been put mainly on the relationship between party cabinets and the military high command. However, during the period between the establishment of a prefectural system to replace Tokugawa period feudal domains and the setting up of an independent general staff office (i.e., during the formation of Japan's modern armed forces), the Army consisted of groups affiliated to the feudal domains, resulting in ambiguity concerning the chain of command. Moreover, in the midst of clear divisions between civilian politicians manning the Cabinet (Sei'in 正院) and military personnel, opinions were divided over how a modern army should be formed; add in the political struggle brewing over the Treasury's jurisdiction over local entities, and there was an eminent danger of the Army disintegrating into smaller factions. Within this situation, the Ministry of the Army was granted broad powers, including control over personnel and military command, and enjoyed relative autonomy from the Cabinet in forming a modern army. However, from 1872-73, during which time the Imperial Guard was reorganized from troops sent by three powerful feudal domains to soldiers from divers regions, a plan was advanced by officers affiliated with Satsuma Domain and Minister of Foreign Affairs Soejima Taneomi 副島種臣 to invade Taiwan, and the Cabinet followed suit with plans of its own to recruit former feudal domain troops to form an expeditionary force. This article interprets these events as a political struggle between the Cabinet and the Ministry of the Army over military authority, and focuses on the participation of the Cabinet's Legislative Bureau (Sa'in 左院) at a time when it was aiming at both the abolition of the feudal status system and constitutional reform. The Legislative Bureau spontaneously cooperated in establishing a military conscription act and approached Tosa Domain with a plan for a "parliamentary body" that would deliberate on military affairs. An examination of this political process makes it possible to reinterpret political-military relations at that time in terms of a triangle involving the Cabinet, the Ministry of the Army and the Legislative Bureau (along with its regional administrators). What ultimately happened was that in June or July of 1873, a group led by councillor (sangi) Itagaki Taisuke of Tosa Domain halted the Legislative Bureau's attempts at constitutional reform by introducing a proposal to invade Korea, which led to political gridlock and the resignation of the invasion supporters in October. This incident should therefore be considered on two levels: constitutional reform vs. centralization of Cabinet power, and the struggle between the Ministry of the Army and the Cabinet over command of the military.

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The custom of marrying daughters of the imperial families of China's central dynasties to non-Han allies on their peripheries (hefan gongzhu 和蕃公主) was adopted from the Former Han period on as a method of appeasement. The first example of the custom was the marriage of a Former Han Dynasty woman to a Hungnu 匈奴 leader of the Mongolian steppe. Since the custom was regarded as disgraceful by the Han people, but also viewed as unavoidable in maintaining amiable relations with the Hungnu people, it was never given very high priority in diplomatic policy making, resulting in a decline in such marriages over time. As the strength of the Former Han Dynasty grew in relation to that of the Hungnu up through the reign of Emperor Wu, the Dynasty attempted to form alliances with third parties like the Wusun 烏孫 in order to further weaken the Hungnu. The Latter Han Dynasty continued the policies of its predecessor, but did not employ marriage alliances as part of its diplomacy, history recording not even one case throughout the whole period. Such was the case for the following Wei and Jin southern dynasties. Throughout this time the custom was not only regarded as shameful, but also as ineffective, in that it actually worked to empower peripheral peoples. However, during the following multi-ethnic Northern Dynasties, Sui and Tang periods the custom was revived and became a frequently employed policy to strengthen alliances with neighboring peoples, without any feeling of disgrace towards the brides involved; rather, there was a new found feeling of goodwill on the part of these central dynasties towards peoples on their peripheries. Then, after the Anshi Rebellion (756-763), as the traditional political and military ideology of the Northern Dynasties was replaced with Southern Dynastic notions, marriage alliances gradually declined until the custom finally disappeared during the Song Dynasty (960-1279), reverting to the original place which it held in Han culture, only to have the custom revived under the Yuan Dynasty. From this historical pattern, the author concludes that the hefan gongzhu, which flourished under the Northern Dynasties, Sui and Tang periods, was fundamentally antithetical to the traditions of dynasties founded by Han emperors, but was adopted in response to incursions of non-Han peoples into the northern territories of the Wei and Jin Southern Dynasties.

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This article examines the role and function of the Rokuhara Tandai 六波羅探題, the Kamakura Bakufu's functionary in the capital of Kyoto, regarding the settlement of disputes involving Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines, focusing on the relationship between the aristocracy and the Bakufu, in order to clarify the reason d'etre and historical significance of the office. After the establishment of the Tandai in the aftermath of retired emperor Go-Toba's unsuccessful military campaign against the Bakufu in 1221, the Rokuhara Tandai was mainly concerned with militarily pacifying disputes that broke out among religious institutions in the capital; but during the appointment of Hojo Shigetoki 北条重時 (1230-47), its functions were expanded to arresting, interrogating and punishing persons ordered prosecuted by the aristocracy, conducting investigations, and delivering orders and negotiating them with religious institutions, as protocols for communications between the Tandai and the aristocracy were established. At that time, the authority of dispute settlement in the capital still rested with the aristocracy as before the incident of 1221, with the Bakufu still playing a minor role, reflecting a spirit of cooperation between Bakufu regent Hojo Yasutoki and Kyoto, so Tandai Shigetoki's involvement in forming aristocratic policy and implementing it remaining a private, behind the scenes affair. While this relationship with the aristocracy continued into the late Kamakura period, changes occurred in Bakufu policy regarding religious institutions that necessitated the Bakufu to intervene directly in disputes involving them. Under these circumstances, the Rokuhara Tandai began reporting directly to the Bakufu and transmitting Bakufu decisions to the aristocracy, as well as officially informing religious institutions of joint Bakufuaristocracy decisions and negotiating them. At this time, in the backdrop of 1) becoming a symbol of fast-track bureaucratic promotion and 2) organizing institutions and personnel into a Bakufu mechanism of control over the capital region and Western Japan, the Rokuhara Tandai was transformed into a close liaison between the Bakufu and the aristocracy, and the locus where consensuses between the two ruling bodies were formed and implemented. The author concludes that the Rokuhara Tandai developed from an individual (family) appointment into an administrative office, whose initial political character evolved into the implementation of law and order in the capital through both policing and juridical activities.

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