The volume in the series Senshi-sosho entitled Headquarters of the Imperial Army I holds the view that the imperial defense policy (IDP) was hardly changed by its first revisions and its nature and policy was maintained. Research conducted after the publication of "Senshi-sosho" also basically reinforced this view. This paper argues that the IDP was fundamentally and drastically revised by its first revisions in 1918. The strategic thought behind the original IDP was formulated on the supposition of a short and limited war against one single country either Russia or the U.S.. Therefore, the Army and Navy requested 50 divisions in wartime and 2 fleets consisting of 8 battleships and 8 cruisers. On, the contrary, the revised IDP was devised on the assumption of a long, all-out war against the U.S., Russia and China at the same time from the lessons Japan learned during WWI. The Army upgraded the strategic force from "divisions" to "corps", and the necessary size was determined as 41 corps in all-out war, and the Navy requested. one more fleet of 16 battleships and 8 cruisers. What changed the nature of the IDP on such a large scale ? "The Necessity of a National Mobilization Plan" proposed by vice-chief of staff Tanaka Giichi was approved in 1917. It assumed that Japan would fight a war against several nations simultaneously and denied the strategic concepts based on the lessons from the Russo-Japanese war. It was proposed to make a defense policy that desired a short and limited war due to limited resouces, but also understood that Japan may have to fight a long and enduring all-out war. In its "Explanation of the Budget" to the Ministry of Finance in 1919 in accordancey with the new IDP, the Ministry of the Army requested funds for the construction and maintenance of a main force of 22 corps in peace time and 41 corps in wartime to fight an all-out war against several enemies. The idea of creating corps-oriented forces, however, was not realized; and the force was returned to the 40-42 divisions structure in 1920, because of popular opposition to any kind of enlargement of the army, the financial crisis caused by the depression, and disagreement inside the Army over how to organize an all-out war posture. The first IDP revision had two significant points. First, the concept of "National Mobilization Posture" made clear the vulnera-bility of Japan's limited resources and low manufacturing capacity. Therefore, a consensus was built up not only within the military, but also among politicians, that Japan should seek its insufficient resources in China and build a self-sufficiency structure. As a result, the strategic area of the new IDP was expanded to all of East Asia, including mainland China. As more and more Japanese made their way into China, the U.S.-Japandde rivalry grew more fierce, and the possibility of Anglo-Japanese confrontation heightened. Soon Japan became internationally isolated. Secondly, ideological confrontation over the posture fot an all-out war emerged within the military. Tanaka Giichi and Ugaki Kazushige found an all-out war posture essential and advocated a transformation of the army, while Uehara Yusaku and Fukuda Masataro regarding an early stage of war as vital, insisted on the maintenance of the status quo. This rivalry continued into the Showa era.

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The present paper investigates two sutra copying offices in eighth century Japan, the Hosha Goshyukyo-jo 奉写御執経所 and the Hosha Issaikyo-shi, 奉写一切経司 in order to show the relationship between the administrative office known as "tokoro" 所, which was not organized according to the ritsuryo system's four-grade structure, and extra-ritsuryo offices, or "tsukasa" 司, with four-grade structures. To begin with, the author confirms that the sutra copying "tokoro" had only one officer and explains that this is What the word essentially means as a "place, or specific spatial area" where sutras were copied. On the other hand, the sutra copying "tsukasa" had a four-grade bureaucratic structure, making it an extra-ritsuryo office with a ritsuryo-style organization. Then he shows that the former was actually transformed into the latter, establishing one example of a "tokoro" becoming a "tsukasa". Moreover, in preparation for this transformation, the officers of the sutra copying "tokoro" were given the status of lower bureaucrats in the Bureau of Central Affairs (Shinbu-sho 信部省) and were then made into top-grade officers in the Office of Archives (Zusho-ryo 図書寮). Furthermore, the author offers an example of the reverse process in the eighth century, by which a "tsukasa" became a "tokoro" in the case of the extra-ritsuryo Bureau of Edicts (Chokushi-sho 勅旨省). However, in the ninth century the bureaucratic mechanism Changed, as exemplified by the Kurodo-dokoro 蔵人所, which played a very important role as the imperial secretariat without having to be upgraded to an extra-ritsuryo "tsukasa" with a full blown ritsuryo-style organization.

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The aim of the present paper is to analyze the process by which one family, the Sasaki-Nagatas, took control of transportation points on Lake Biwa during the Japan's late medieval period. The discussion proceeds in terms of the idea of "transportation patterns", a concept for clarifying the formation and substance of inter-regional exchange. Beginning in the sengoku era and continuing into the regime of Oda Nobunaga, the Nagata family was able to control through its extended family ties the major points of water transportation. on the shores of Lake Biwa, including Katsuno 勝野, Funaki 舟木, Sugaura 菅浦, Okushima 奥嶋, Okishima 沖島. There are five reasons why. First, the families main estate, Otowa-no-Sho 音羽荘 in Takashima-gun 高島郡, had functioned from ancient times as the major point of transportation on the Lake. Secondly, the family belonged to the TakaShima-Shichigashira 高島七頭, an alliance of local powerful proprietors (kokujin 国人) based on the Lake's western shore. Thirdly, the family maintained strong ties with the such elite powers of the period as the Muromachi Bakufu, the Rokkaku 六角 family, which was the Bakufu's appointed protector of Omi province, Enryakuji 延暦寺 temple, Oda Nobunaga himself, and Honganji 本願寺 temple. Next, the family aggressively built contacts with the major transporters in Omi Province. Finally, despite all of the above affiations with various influential powers, the family, both its main line and branches, maintained very close internal ties. One very important point is the fact that one branch of the Nagata family became vassals of the Rokkaku family, which enabled the Nagatas to advance to the east end of the Lake and eventually expand its proprietary holdings and base of operations.. Also important is the fact that the branch who became Rokkaku vassals maintained mutual ties with the west end Nagata main family line (who had pledged allegiance to the Bakufu) throughout the Sengoku era. It was this set of circumstances that formed the means by which. the Nagata extended family could control water tranportation points on both the east and west shores of the Lake and thus consolidate its power in the region. It was in this manner that the Nagata family formed a network linking its extended members and various influential groups by means of water transportation on Lake Biwa. As a result, no superior, despotic political power was able to establish a hold on sengoku era Omi Province. Rather, the province was ruled by locally-based holders of proprietary rights (zaichi-ryoshu 在地領主) who were equipped with the ability to negotiate with each other for the purpose of maintaining multi-directional relationships and holding their rivals in check. These characteristics also seem to be Common to such early medieval period zaichi-ryoshu of the Kinai area and western Japan as the Watanabe family of Settsu Province and the Yuasa family of Kii Province, and those who Controlled wider areas of distribution, like the Ship owner/merchant of Ise, Shima Domyo. Therefore, the Nagata family represents a specific type of late medieval jocally based proprietor that expanded its area of influence by aggressive1y exploiting opportunities related to water transportation.

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After examining the policy carried out by Yuan Shikai (袁世凱), the Governor-General of the metropolitan province of Zhili(直隷省), to send local government officials and elites to tour, Japan this paper analyzes the contribution of these travellers to the modernization of education in Zhili during the early 20th century. In the late Qing Dynasty, Zhili Province was a fine example for how to set up modern schools. In this process, the cooperation and enthusiasm of the local officials and elites played an important role. For Governor-General Yuan Shikai, his policy could not be successful unless the school administrators themselves went abroad to tour schools and learn something from them. In July 1905, he presented to the emperor a petition entitled "Methods for Sending Officials and Local Elites Abroad on Tour" and ordered that officials and elites in the 152 prefectures (府), departments (州), and counties (県) must go to Japan on tour for three to four months before they assumed their posts as school administrators. The implementation of such a policy greatly promoted the spread of modern education and was an important factor for modernizing the ideas of officials and local elites at the time. The two main points made in the present paper are first, after the War between Japan and Russia, China was deeply impressed by the victory of the former and strove to imitate Japan's policy to develop "national education" for "making its country prosperous and militarily strong" and "being loyal to the sovereign and devoted to the country". In order to maintain rule by the imperial court, Yuan Shikai carried out a whole set of policies to reform Zhili Province and placed high priority on developing human resources that could meet the need of realizing modernization in the shortest possible time. While making national education universal and compulsory in Zhili Province, Yuan Shikai mainly depended on the local officials in departments and counties, as well as elites who were influential in local affairs. Secondly, educational reform in Zhili Province during the late Qing Dynasty was carried out by reforming the local administrative system and introducing the Japanese way of dividing educational districts. Such being the case, it was important for local officials and elites who were mainly in charge of local affairs to tour Japan, so as to deepen their understanding of modern administration, including the educational system. Their experiences prove valuable in playing an active part in the modernization of education in Zhili Province.

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