The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the Russian Empire established its rule over the Kyrgyz nomads by analyzing the activities of Kyrgyz tribal chieftains, "manaps", and the circumstances faced by them. The formation of the rule of the Russian Empire over the Kyrgyz nomads was a dynamic process in which the eastward migration of the Kyrgyz nomads, who after the collapse of the Jungarian Empire sought to obtain new pasture lands, interacted with the military expansion of the Russian Empire toward the heart of Central Asia and which was even more complicated by the presence of other neighboring powers. The Russian Empire opened up direct relations with the Kyrgyz nomads when it took an arbitrator's role in the Kazakh-Kyrgyz frictions of the late 1840's. The Russian Empire eventually came to see manaps as mediators with the local population. From the end of the 1850's, when the Russian Empire activated its efforts toward the conquest of Central Asia, the Kyrgyz nomads were put in a borderline position facing closely interwoven issues of the military expansion and the governance mechanism establishment. The Russian Empire sorted manaps out based on their loyalty and reliability and tied the selected ones up to the local military governance mechanisms. Moreover, the Russian Empire built a hierarchy among the manaps by introducing the institution of appointed senior manaps ("starshii manap"). In such a situation the manaps managed to extend their power and expand their pastures by not only emphasizing their own military exploits in the conquest wars but also by exaggerating the questionability of loyalty of their rival manaps-thus in both cases utilizing the factor of presence of the neighboring powers. Such policy of the Russian Empire and strategies used by the manaps continued even after the establishment of the governor-generalship of Turkestan in 1867. The Temporary Statute of 1867, which in principle was aimed at dismantling the "tribal principle" including the authority of the tribal leaders, was flexibly utilized by the local colonial authorities for the purpose of setting up the hierarchy and selecting the able manaps who might be useful for establishing and exercising the Russian imperial rule over the Kyrgyz nomads and conducting further military expansion. On the other side, some of the manaps sought the office of the volost headmen ("volostnoi up-ravitel") to strengthen their power, while others purposely turned down the offered position in order to avoid restrictions implied by the post and retain their freedom of maneuver. Among these latter manaps, there appeared such influential figures as Shabdan who expanded their influence by skillfully making use of the multitiered structure of the governance system involving the Russian colonial officials.

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One of the most important rights of kingship in medieval France with regard to regional control was the exercise of jurisdiction. The aim of the present article is to clarify how the attitudes toward and intervention by kings regarding the settlement of disputes changed during the late medieval period, a time which saw the royal exercise of jurisdiction develop by leaps and bounds. Within the lively debate that has arised of late on the subject of dispute settlement, it has been found that in France from the last half of the 13th century on, the frequent tendency to settle disputes out of court by mediation, reconciliation, etc. became dominated by settlements adjudicated in the king's court. Therefore, one clue to further clarifying the role of kingship in dispute settlement would be to better understand the actual situation surrounding the king's efforts to administer the provincial society. In this article, the author focuses on disputes that arose over privileges granted to merchants by the city of Rouen, as one instance of how the Capetians ruled over regional society by settling legal disputes there. He concludes that in the early stage of royal intervention in dispute settlement, prior customs, practices and privileges were given priority; however, during the 1270s, emphasis came to be placed on royal approval and the interests of the king, meaning that the king's will tended to take precedence over traditional rights and customs. Then at the turn of the 14th century, a new aspect of settlement dispute by the king was introduced in the form of "the public interest," which resulted in the elimination of Rouen's right to grant commercial privileges. Although the element of "public interest" in the process of adjudication took into consideration the demands of a wide spectrum of persons, one can assume that it also included the king's prerogative. Therefore, the author argues, the king's arbitrary use of "public interest" in his settlement of disputes should be interpreted as one attempt to overcome regional custom, meaning that dispute settlement by the medieval French kings played an important role in crushing deep-rooted "regionalism" throughout their realms and establishing a centralized state.

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During the Kyoho Era (1716〜1736), the number of Chinese smugglers active in Japan skyrocketed due to trade restrictions imposed by the Tokugawa Shogunate. Seeing this as a serious problem, the Shogunate ordered its feudal lords (daimyo) in the coastal regions, in particular the domains of Hagi 萩, Kokura 小倉 and Fukuoka 福岡 to expel the culprits. This article discusses Shogunate and daimyo attitudes toward the expulsion of smugglers. During 1717-18, the shogunate gradually tightened its policies, emphasizing the necessity to expel Chinese smugglers and even sink their ships in the case of any resistance. Nevertheless, the Shogunate's top priority was to control smuggling, and thus adopted identical measures in dealing with all Chinese vessels regardless of whether they were smugglers or not. During 1719-20, when several Chinese ships were found engaged in smuggling far inland from the coastal area, the Shogunate ordered its daimyo to punish smugglers by seriously damaging their vessels, but the daimyo insisted that sinking them would be the most effective measure. The Shogunate took a position of disagreement; and after the daimyo of Fukuoka sunk a Chinese ship in 1720, the Shogunate began insisting that this kind of military response was unfavorable. On the other hand, the Shogunate ordered its daimyo to take immediate military action to expel any Chinese ship appearing on their coasts. When in 1726, the daimyo of Hagi sank a Chinese ship, a Shogunal investigation of the incident concluded that when an expelled ship is damaged too seriously to be able to escape, it is very likely to sink, resulting in an order during that same year limiting serious attacks on Chinese ships. While the Shogunate initially adopted a firm attitude toward Chinese smugglers for the purpose of re-stabilizing its foreign trade sector, a number of daimyo insisted on the necessity to sink their ships, resulting in apprehension on the part of the Shogunate over escalating use of military force causing a potentially harmful influence on its trade with China. In order to maintain trade relations with China, the Shogunate decided to turn to more peaceful measures to deal with smuggling.

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