Diplomatic relations between the Jeoson and Qing Dynasties were first established in 1637, marking the most important event in the history of the Korea's foreign relations to date. However, the circumstances leading up to that event have still not been made sufficiently clear. This article takes up the 1627 Chongmyo 丁卯 War, which marked the Qing Dynasty's first invasion of Korea as the starting point in the process by which diplomatic relations between the two countries were established. First, the author examines the relations between the Jeoson Dynasty and the Jurchen Kingdom of Aisin Gurun, the Qing Dynasty's predecessor, leading up to the 1627 invasion. Although the Jeoson government at the time had emphasized friendly relations with the former Ming Dynasty, it also was planning to dispatch envoys to Aisin Gurun in order to resume diplomatic negotiations. However, Aisin Gurun, out of intimidation by the forces of Ming General Mao Wen-Long 毛文竜 and a serious famine, decided to launch an invasion of Korea. The attack was thwarted by internal strife within the Aisin Gurun ranks over lack of preparedness in their military operations, and the disorganization also posed difficulties in suing for peace. The author then turns to diplomatic relations in the wake of the Chongmyo War. Due to differences in perception that arose between Hong Taiji, who remained in the Aisin Gurun capital of Shenyang, and Amin, the commander in chief at the front, two different peace treaties were concluded with Korea, one at Kanghwa, the other at Pyongyang. The Jeoson Dynasty chose ally to itself with Aisin Gurun based on the former treaty, since it agreed with Hong Taiji that this treaty did not specify the political superiority or advantage of either party. The author ends the article with an examination of the first dispatch of envoys by the two states based on the Kanghwa Treaty. He concludes that the extremely proactive attitude shown by the Jeoson government resulted in the withdrawal of the Aisin Gurun army from Uiju on the northern border. Furthermore, in the peace negotiations there were no discussions of exchanging tributary gifts on a regular basis or opening trading posts on the border, indicating an agreement far different from setting up mutual relations of friendship between the two states. From that time on such fluidity characterizing Jeoson-Aisin Gurun relations would continue to a certain extent, which is directly attributable to the vagueness of the peace treaty concluded after the Chongmyo War.

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Since the 1980s, Japanese Buddhist sects operating during the regime of the Edo Bakufu have been described as religious communities retaining their autonomy under the authority of the shogunate. During the past few years, historians have come to affirm that it was possible for each sect to coexist within the late premodern feudal system, leading to attention being directed at the characteristic features of the shogunate's religious policies and its position regarding religious conflicts. However, the question of how those policies affected the religious communities concerned and the manner in which they were managed has yet to be studied. This paper examines an incident concerning an issue of religious doctrine, a matter that should have been a part of Buddhist community autonomy, but during which the feudal authorities interfered nonetheless. The incident arose within the Higashi Honganji Temple Shinshu sect involving five monks from Owari Province accused by the head temple's abbot of heresy (Ianjin 異安心). After undergoing an interrogation by the temple's office of inquiry, the monks were found to be innocent. However, the not guilty judgment brought about internal dissension within the community, leading to rioting among the sect's adherents in Owari fief. Moreover, when the verdict was reported to the fief's authorities, the Honganji's Nagoya-Gobo temple, acting as herald (Furegashira 触頭), reported that the temple headquarters had judged the priests to be heretical, leading to a misunderstanding between the feudal authorities and the temple. The use of the term fuseigi 不正義 (incorrect) Ianjin in the public proclamation made by the Owari authorities led to confusion among both the sect's priests and its adherents. The feudal authorities dealt with the situation by ordering the temple to modify its judgment so that it would fit the Owari proclamation; and the temple complied. However, this meant that the temple had forfeited its own autonomy regarding matters of doctrine, which in return lead to a backlash among its priests and adherents. This incident reveals the confrontation that existed surrounding the autonomous interpretation of religious doctrine within Buddhist sects brought about by the shogunate's religious policies.

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This article discusses how high-ranking officials were trained under France's July Monarchy (1830-1848), at a time when government administration was becoming more and more complex and a bureaucratic organization was gradually being institutionalized. The author takes up the case of the Auditorat in the Conseil d'Etat, focusing on the logic behind the recruitment and training of its administrative officials. He describes the actual circumstances of recruitment and training of auditeurs via a synthesis of three approaches: 1) institutional analysis of the auditeur based on laws and ordinances, 2) prosopographical analysis utilizing the personal data of 211 auditeurs and 3) analysis of petitions for recruitment of auditeurs as well as their internal evaluation. The author concludes that first, two contrary opinions existed regarding the institution of auditeur during the time in question. One was the conservative idea which considered the auditorat as a stagiaire who would become merel a maitre des requetes or a conseiller in the Conseil d'Etat in the future; the other was the republican idea which considered the institution to be the grande ecole d'administration, in which trained officials who could be entrusted with any administrative post. The laws and ordinances pertaining to auditeurs promulgated under the July Monarchy all embodied the opposition between these ideologies. Secondly, the necessary conditions of auditeur recruitment were threefold: 1) the social background of the candidate, 2) the influence of recommenders and 3) the abilities of the candidate. However, it is impossible to determine which condition was the most conclusive, leading one to believe that it was a combination of them which led to successful recruitment. Finally, as to the system of auditeur training, the author points out that auditeurs were expected to acquire the skills of administrative officials through experience gained along different career paths, which included a central administrative post, a local administrative post and a post in the Conseil d'Etat. However, auditeur training was not very successful because of the customs surrounding the promotion of central administrative officials and the lack of administrative ability on the part of the auditeurs themselves. In addition, the lack of maitre des requetes posts in the Conseil d'Etat made the training of auditeurs more difficult. Nevertheless, approximately half of those who had trained at the auditorat under the July Monarchy were given administrative appointments and reappointed by the next political regime. This proportion of reappointments exceeded the number during the Napoleonic era and the Bourbon Restoration. Consequently, it can be said that the institution of auditeur under the July Monarchy served the function of training high-ranking officials to some extent and that this institution had a impact on both the struggle for hegemony in the Chambre des pairs and the Chambre des deputes, and on the institutionalization of the recruitment and the careers of high-ranking officials during the nineteenth century.

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