The Chinese Eastern Railway (hereafter, CER), a useful shortcut for the Trans-Siberian Railway, was built by the Russian Empire under a contract concluded with the Qing Dynasty in 1896; and the resulting railway zone was administered solely by the Russians until 1917. Although the Russian community in the railway zone has been a popular topic of discussion among scholars in Japan, the U.S., Russia, and China, little is known about the railway zone itself, which comprised the legal and institutional structure of this "colony." The aim of this article is to clarify how the railway zone was formed, from the standpoints of both Russia and China. The article begins with an analysis of how the CER appropriated land. In the beginning, the scale of appropriation was limited to the immediate needs of railway construction ; later, however, S. Iu. Witte, the Russian finance minister and supervisor of the CER, instructed the railway engineers to expand appropriation to the greatest extent possible. In Harbin alone, which was the base of construction and the junction of the railway lines with the Songhua River, 11,533 hectares had been appropriated by 1902. The author argues that the reason for this was that Witte wanted the CER to sell or lease the land as a developer, in order to recover the cost of railway construction. The expansion of the railway zone was a concern for the Qing Dynasty's military governors in Manchuria, because such an expansion implied an increase in Russian influence within the Dynasty's homeland. Therefore, the governors made prompt attempts to Sinicize the area around the railway zone by means of colonies populated by Han settlers. The Russian Empire felt a sense of crisis in response to this movement and planned to settle Russian colonists within the railway zone. Eventually, the Qing Dynasty realized a significant increase in the Han population of Manchuria, while Russia's colonization plans did not materialize, owing to 1) a conflict of opinion among government ministries and 2) the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Despite its failure to realize a large-scale colonization project, Russian still managed to maintain extensive executive powers in the governance of the railway zone. The CER played the role of administrative organ and monitored both judicial affairs and the policing of the zone. It was in this way that Russia attempted to Russify the area. The railway zone was undeniably a part of Russia's informal empire ; however, China constantly sought opportunities to recapture sovereignty over the area. The railway zone would survive until the Manzhouguo government abolished it in 1936.

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The Sima 司馬 Family of Henei-jun 河北郡 (present day Jiaozuo, Henan Province), which formed the imperial lines of the Eastern and Western Jin Dynasties, sought refuge in northern China after its Dynasties fell and distinguished itself as a high ranking member of the Northern Wei Dynasty's bureaucracy. However, the northern aristocrats of Han ethnic descent did not trust refugees from the south, forcing them to live in isolated communities on the periphery of the capital and refusing to intermarry with them or allow the burial of their dead in their homeland. The Simas did take advantage of their imperial heritage to gain appointments to southern border regions, where they could settle their former subjects fleeing the Southern Dynasties; but when the Northern Wei unified northern China in 439, the Simas were shifted to areas on the northern border far from their homeland. Part of the Sima Family's fame stemmed from many leaders of the rebellions staged throughout China at that time assuming the name Sima, resulting in the name having great impact on all classes of society in both the north and south. It was only during the reign of Northern Wei Emperor Xiaowen孝文 (515-528) that rebellions allegedly lead by the Simas went out of style. It was as this same time that the Simas were finally able to construct a. family gravesite in their homeland of Henei-jun. The appointment of Simas in the bureaucracy were no longer limited to the regional administration of the Northern Wei's southern and northern borders, but now spread to all areas throughout the empire, including the grant of an official place of residence there. Intermarriage, which up until that time had been limited to the Northern Wei imperial family and local ethnic peoples, came to include the northern Han aristocratic families. The many marriages that had been arranged with the Yuan imperial family ensured close relations with the Dynasty, even after the Simas' returned to Henei. In other words, the bridging of the alienation that had existed between refugees from the Southern Dynasties and Northern Dynasties Han aristocrats had to wait for the reforms carried out during Xiaowen's reign. It was at that time that the Simas were able to regain their homeland, extend their influence and authority there, as well a begin marrying into northern Han families. The author of this article concludes that during the Northern and Southern Dynasties period, entry into aristocratic society through marriage could not be achieved without a family being able to maintain power and authority in one's homeland.

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During the Meiji and Taisho Periods, ensuring stable supplies of foreign rice, which was an indispensable issue in Japan's food security policy, led to increased interest in the Chinese mainland. At the same time, however, China had implemented a grain protection act which had, in principle, banned all exports of rice. This article discusses relations between Japan and China focusing on the issue of food, in order to clarify the process of negotiations over lifting bans on the export of Manchurian-grown rice. In Japan, China's rice protection act was viewed from three aspects: domestic policy issues, rice protectionism as a foreign affairs issue, and the present state of agriculture in Manchuria. It was in 1918, in the face of severe riots stemming from rice scarcity, that a reformulation of Japan's food security policy became necessary. At the same time, rapid increases in Manchurian rice production were being viewed as Japan's answer to its food supply problems. On the other hand, the deliberations by the government's Council of Advisers were marked by pessimism about the country's dependency on foreign rice. Therefore, in terms of domestic policy, there was little hope that the Chinese grain protectionism issue could be solved, while foreign policy continued to emphasize the opening of the Chinese market. This conflict between domestic and foreign policy became evident during the preparatory stages of the Special Conference on Customs arid Tarriffs to be held in Beijing during 1925-26; and in an attempt to resolve the conflict, the Foreign Ministry removed its demand that China's Grain Protection Act be overturned and thus eliminated grain protectionism as a diplomatic problem. Meanwhile, rapid increases in Manchurian rice production, which had elicited little interest in Japan, began to be smuggled into colonial Korea, and further expansion of this activity ended up giving rise to an export system based on foreign trade not subject to Chinese sanctions. Consequently, the grain protectionism issue became "solved" on all three domestic, foreign and Manchurian fronts.

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