There has been a tendency among Japanese historians to slight the litigation system of the medieval imperial court resulting in, very few studies on being done this theme. Recently, however, several important aspects have become clear. First, in the latter half of the Kamakura period, both the Kamakura bakufu and the imperial court administered matters with benevolence, while pursuing a revival of the zasso system (雑訴の興行). Second, the Kamakura bakufu encouraged court nobles to handle independently legal matters related to the imperial court, a move which in turn helped to revitalize the imperial court. Based on these studies, the author believes that an investigation of the imperial litigation system is fundamental in grasping the political history of the late Kamakura period. In the present article, the author examines both the establishment of the legal institution teichu (direct petition from "within the garden") executed by the court nobility, and the role of functionaries (bugyo) within the framework of this institution. First, in the imperial litigation system, each functionary had his speciality and dealt exclusively with cases subsumed under that area (tanto bugyo-sei). This system was first established in the reign of ex-emperor GoSaga, who particularly endeavored to revive the practice of zasso, which was later codified in 1317. Considering the foregoing facts the author believes that the establishment of the tanto-bugyo system had great significance for the revival of zasso in the medieval imperial administration. This system, however, was defective in one important aspect. Functionaries' procrastination and negligence of their duties directly caused the delay of the litigation procedure. It was this defect which triggered the necessity of institutions such as teichu, where one could directly file petitions. Abundant examples indicate the dramatically increasing role of teichu as time progressed. By the beginning of the fourteenth century, upper-class court nobles including dainagon (chief councillors of state), and even emperors themselves served as judges. 'Negligence' on the part of bugyo, again, not only hastened the development of teichu, but also increased the significance of the institution. Taking these facts into consideration, the Teichu Shikijitus (the day of teichu) suggested that, if necessary, even emperors should execute jurisdiction to obtain sage judgement. This suggestion epitomizes the revival of the legal practice, zasso, which was greatly reinforced by the popularity of teichu. The imperial court legal institution, teichu which was first established in 1293 and was consistently developed and improved there after, could be, therefore, regarded as the zenith in the history of the zasso revival supported by the imperial court authority.

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In the past the Hiranuma Cabinet has been often referred to in connection with the Japan-Germany-Italy mutual Defense Pact of 1937. This paper puts a new perspective on the well-known 'Complex and bizarre communique' and criticizes the previous trend in treating the Hiranuma Cabinet as incompetent. This paper, through a close examination of both American and British diplomatic data, throws light on Hiranuma's manoeuverings with respect to the U.S. and clarifies the following three statements. First, Hiranuma wished to conclude the Chino-Japanese War immediately and pursue possible ways for peace negotiations with the Chiang Chieh-shih Government. The idea of a peace treaty suggested by American and Britain had been thoroughly discussed by the Hiranuma Cabinet as to whether Japan and China should accept it or not. This discussion led to the disolution of the first Konoe-Communique and inevitably forced Japan to change its attitude. Since their failure in the Trautmann Peace Move they had repeatedly refused peace negotiations conducted through a third party. Secondly, Hiranuma, having predicted that both America enforce economic sanctions against Japan, tried to approach the U.S. positively. At the end of May, 1939, Hiranuma sent a message to President Roosevelt through Ambassador Grew, and held a meeting with Secretary Dooman of the American embassy concerning the possibility of holding an international meeting to discuss methods of resolving the crisis in Europe. There was, however, one condition, that America would call Britain to the meeting and Japan would call Germany and Italy. Hiranuma wished to add to the topics at the meeting truce conditions for the Chino-Japanese War. Thirdly, on the night prior to the start of the European War only Japan and America held the key to the solution of the Far East Problem. Hiranuma's successfully improved relations with America confused Britain, who thereby did not have a chance to impose economic sanctions on Japan. Hiranuma's diplomacy had been supported by his right hand men and he had never hesitated in approaching the American and the British embassies. His approach was decisive and straight to the point. Hiranuma made himself a reputation by suppressing the Communist Movement at the beginning of the Showa Era and by such manoeuvrings as the Anti-Minobe strategy in the Kokutai-meicho-Movement. The times, however, changed drastically during the following decade. Hiranuma was to be stultified by political moderates, but never the less was able form a cabinet which was in line with them. He continued to make his best effort to fulfill their expectations. Considering only the results of his diplomatic manoeuvres, one can observe that there were fewer reactions from America than were expected, although much effect was exercised on Britain and China. However, results are not wholly indicative of history. While the people and the media were thinking only of the alliance with Germany and Italy, Japanese diplomatic policies were moving calmly towards the Pacific.

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