The huge bureaucratic mechanism of the later Roman Empire bore an exceedingly military colour. This was due to the fact that in the third century many soldiers were employed as civil officers. What relationship with the Roman society and economy had this transformation of soldiers into civil officers in the formative period of the later Roman Empire? To consider this problem the development of the office of primipilus is surveyed in this article. The following conclusions are gained. Because of the financial crisis and the fall of the value of money at the end of the second century, the annona levied in kind was introduced. As the annona was originally levied for military provisions, a system of administration was organized for collecting and transporting the annona with chief centurions primipili as responsible officers of this task. This system was the lustrum primipili mentioned in inscriptions and the administratio primipili in laws. Thereafter as inflation went from bad to worse, the annona came to be levied to maintain not only the army but also the imperial government as a whole. By the reign of Diocletian, the annona came to occupy major part of land tax. The system of annona-administration within the limits of the army could not cope with such development of the annona. A new system of adminisatration beyond the limits of the army was needed to manage the annona. The primipili and other military officers who had taken part in military provisions were transformed into civil officers. This change was one of the reorganizing processes to cope with the increasing importance of the annona. From the reign of Constantine onwards, the primipilares charged with the task called pastus primipili had nothing to do with the annona-collection. They simply transported military provisions to the frontier army. It is obvious that this demilitarization of the annona-administration aimed at preventing an excessive concentration of powers in the army, and the increase of the annona forced this demilitarization.

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What was the historical nature of social changes in the Ch'un-ch'iu (春秋) and Chan-kuo (戦国) periods which gave birth to the Ch'in (秦) and Han (漢) empires? This paper seeks to analyse this problem within the context of the formative process of the Chun-hsien system. Former studies have shown that the Hsien of the Ch'un-ch'iu period was established on large Yi (邑) s which controlled several small Yis based on the primary agricultural land. The relation of production in each Yi was so independent that the surviving tribal system of ruled tribes was kept intact and incorporated into the Old Hsien of the Ch'in and Han empires as they were, althogh the hereditary rule by the Hsien ruler was gradually eroded away. In other words, the remarkable change of Hsien in the Hsien-ch'in (先秦) period directly appeared in the erosion of the Hsien rulers' hereditary power. This paper studies how far this erosion had developed in the State of Ch'u (楚), one of the powers in the Ch'un-ch'iu period. Not all of the Hsiens in Ch'u during the Ch'un-ch'iu period were larger than the Old-hsiens of the Ch'in and Han empires. If there was any criteria for the "Hsien" of the Ch'in-Han period, there must have been also criteria for the Hsien of the Ch'un-ch'iu period, though local varieties must be taken into account. The Hsien ruler was called "Ch'un (君)" or lord and Hsien-Yin (尹) was equal to Hsien-ch'un, though there is the possibility that Hsien-kung (公) may have had a special siginificance. An investigation of these Hsien rulers clearly shows that their hereditary power had been widely eroded and the character of the Hsien in Ch'u during the Ch'un-ch'iu period had greatly changed. The advance of Kung-tzu (公子) and Kung-sun (公孫) overwhelmed the Shih-tzu (世族) in the central government and hindered the hereditary rule of these same Shih-tzu at the Hsien level. It is more important that the Wang-tzu (王族) themselves were denied hereditary rule, so that the advance of Kung-tzu and Kung-sun did not bring about a new breed of Shih-tzu. Therefore this advance is an important indication of universal penetration of the royal power of ch'u into Hsiens, even before the reform of Yi-yen (〓掩), the royal appropriation of hilly country forests, groves and marshes already had the full significance of starting the transformation of the Ch'un-ch'iu hsien at the time of King Chuang (荘王) when the power of Kung-tzu and Kung-sun was ascendant. How the Shih-tzu which preceded the Chan-kuo kingdom, like San-chin (三晋) and Tian-shi (田氏) of Ch'i (斉) ruled their Hsiens, and how the role Chao (昭), Ch'u (屈), Ching (景), the three big Shih-tzus of Ch'u played was to be interpreted in the light of the result of our investigation, is a problem to be clarified in future research.

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In this paper I examine the co-operation between the U.K. and the U.S. in intelligence activities before the Pacific War. The main theme is the role of Sir William Wiseman. W.Wiseman was a British intelligence agent during World War I. With Colonel House's help, he succeeded in bringing the U.S. into the War and constructing the Anglo-American allied activities in the War. His concept of allied strategy aimed at the Pax Americana that is capable of co-operating with the Pax Britannica. After World War I, he was in the employment of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. As soon as World War II began, the Anglo-American co-operation was once more required because of the axis aggression on Britain. FDR promised Churchill to help Britain by awakening Americans from their isolationism. As an ex-agent, Wiseman took counter-intelligence measures (e.g. Wiedemann Case) and planned to detach Japan from the Tripartite Pact with Fr. Drought who helped him in hopes of shortening the possible War with Japan. The "Japanese-American Negotiations" were projected by the latter and aimed at delaying the start of the war at the request of FDR and Hull. The Role of Wiseman during World War II was an unofficial co-operator with Anglo-American agents and informant to the U.K. as to the above negotiations. It seems that Churchill, Stephenson, Wiseman, Hoover and FDR co-operated in these activities, and Wiseman, Drought and Strauss had pro-Jewish inclinations. These personal connections may reflect FDR's and Churchill's strategies in regard to the Japanese War Affair.

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