This article examines the Reformed Government of the Republic of China (RGRP), which was established in Nanjing in 1938 under the protection of the Japanese Army and was in power until 1940. The RGRP has been regarded in the research to date as a Japanese-controlled puppet regime, similar to that established in Manchukuo. There is no doubt that the RGRP did exhibit some features indicating puppetry ; however, it would have been very difficult for that government to exist if it functioned solely as a Japanese tool. Therefore, the author has chosen to forgo the term "puppet" before determining the true nature of the RGRP. By clarifying its aim and its political stance, the author intends to show that the RGRP did in fact function as a government of China. He begins by considering the RGRP's leadership---Liang Hongzhi, Chen Qun, Wen Zongyao and Wang Zihui---in particular, how they defined the objectives of the new government, delineated visions of China's future and articulated their positions. In fact, the RGRP could not have functioned according to the wishes of these leaders in the midst of any direct intervention on the part of the Japanese military. Moreover, government leaders like Wen Zongyao and Wang Zihui had their own individual political ideas and opinions, as shown by the articles they published, enabling us to grasp the whole picture involving Chinese political discourse during the era in question. Such political ideas and opinions can be observed as having been well embedded within the China's historical experience from the latter half of 19th century through the first half of 20th, as exemplified by views concerning foreign diplomacy. By analyzing the ideas and opinions expressed by the leaders of the RGRP, it becomes possible to learn its true significance in the modern history of China. While taking pro-Japanese, anti-Chiang Kaishek and anti-Nationalist and anti-Communist Party political stances, the RGRP leaders also objectively analyzed the current situation and requested the Japanese to restore the occupied territories to their former condition. The author shows that RGRP was far more independent compared to the previously established the Great Way Government of the Municipality of Shanghai. That being said, the ideas and opinions adopted by the RGRP leadership were no doubt based on the premise that China had lost the Sino-Japanese War ; therefore these ideas and opinions had to change as soon as Wang Jingwei of the Nationalist Party started peace talks with Japan at the end of 1938.

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Fengfu 〓賻 refers either to money or goods given to a family in mourning during funeral and burial rituals or the ritual itself involved in the act of donation. During the Tang period, fengfu customs were determined by the Luling 律令 Code of Funerals and Burial (Sangzangling 喪葬令), the content of which can be found in the standard sources Tangling Shiyi 唐令拾遺 and Tangling Shiyi-Bu 唐令拾遺補, as well as the newly discovered Tianshengling 天聖令. This last source, while of the later Northern Song Dynasty, contains rules about the process of applying for mourning ceremonies and memorial donations (fuwu 賻物) to the imperial household, information which provides some new, fundamental historical data for researchers of fengfu during the Tang period. The present article aims as clarifying in concrete terms various problems encountered in the Sangzangling as the content, standards and application procedures of fengfu, in order to better grasp the substantive aspects of the system in Tang China and further the research on reconstructing the original code. The author begins with the research conducted by Wu Liyu 呉麗娯, who since the discovery of Tianshengling, has attempted to reconstruct Sangzangling based on the new historical data provided, pointing out aspects of the fengfu system not well heeded in the research to date. Wu's analysis of such problems in Tang fengfu customs as the qualifications required of recipients, standards and application procedures focuses mainly on individual circumstances within fengfu rather than considering it as a whole system composed of the two elements of feng 〓 and fu 賻. Therefore, the author proceeds with an analysis of these two elements and the specific forms they took during the Tang period. Next, he takes up two more aspects of qualifications for fuwu recipients not covered by Wu, namely, 1) in cases where a potential recipient has left office under reasonable circumstances (yili quguan 以理去官) and 2) cases of officials serving in posts beyond the authorized quota for the position (yuangaiguan 員外官). The author then turns to the research done by Inada Natsuko 稲田奈津子, who has argued that Wu's Tang code reconstruction and analysis of fengfu is not accurate, and the revisions that she proposed, which now require a reexamination of the procedures involved in applying for fengfu. Accordingly, he proceeds to analyze the provisions for applying and classifies the procedures following the death of a potential recipient into three categories: reporting his death, applying for fengfu and applying for a mourning ceremony.

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When selecting capable personnel to man its Army and Navy, both of which were founded during the last years of that regime, the attribute known as "wazamae" 業前, meaning certain rare and desirable skills, was a key point for the Tokugawa Bakufu. Although there has been previous research on personnel selection, an analysis of the actual situation, particularly actual cases among the lower ranks, has been lacking due to limited historical materials. Furthermore, the situation of the Navy is not as well understood as that of the Army. Therefore, in this article, the author examines the actual conditions under which naval officers were appointed by utilizing the documents formerly stored in tamonyagura 多聞櫓 (the battlement enclosures) of Edo Castle. The article begins with an analysis of the changes that took place in the posts held by naval officers and the way in which appointments were made according to their social status. Methods differing from the norm were adopted in the case of lower ranking officers, putting great emphasis on "wazamae," regardless of individual social or family status and hereditary stipend. These methods made it possible for capable people to play important roles in the Navy, while minimizing changes in social status and expenditures. However, the Navy was not satisfied with these methods and attempted to grant social status and privileges appropriate to their officers' "wazamae" and assigned duties. Next, the author considers the ideas of both the Navy and the Bakufu's central authority during the Keio 慶応 era (1865-68) concerning "meshidashi" 召出 (lit. to summon; but also meaning to grant fiefs or stipends as reward for being taken into the service of the shogun) held by the sons and brothers of direct Bakufu retainers and indirect vassals (baishin 陪臣) demonstrating exceptional "wazamae". Despite the Navy's hope to employ their new personnel selection method, an obstacle existed based on the principle that the recipient of such a fief or stipend served the shogun as the head of a "family" in accordance with that family's status and hereditary stipend. Therefore, while the Navy continued to request that their officers receive meshidashi, the grants were controlled by the Bakufu's central authority, in particular, through restrictions against forming branches of direct retainer families. This occurred against a backdrop of the expansion of departments requiring "wazamae" and the establishment of shared precedents regarding appointments and promotions. Finally, the author takes up reforms in the naval officer personnel system carried out after the battle of Toba-Fushimi. Although the reforms were epoch-making in basing appointments upon "wazamae" rather than family status, the gap between the treatment of the heads of direct retainer families and that of other members was not easily bridged. Even after the reforms at the end of the Tokugawa period dismantled Japan's premodern military system, the warrior class continued to exist firmly upon the basis of the traditional "ie" 家 (family) institution.

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